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SUMMARY
Much of the literature on supply chain management (SCM) has overlooked the importance
of nonprice factors to consumer demand and does not include it in its model1. Even
when a nonprice factor such as service is being considered, it is often studied only at the
seller/retailer-customer level, and rarely at the manufacturer-customer level. The literature
overlooks the fact that manufacturer, as well, can influence demand through interacting
with customers via nonprice factors. In reality, for example in a PC market, the demand for,
say, IBM PCs does not depend solely on price, but on IBM’s level of technical customer
supports as well. This research is being conducted to fill in this gap by studying the
influence of both price and services in a dynamic supply chain environment.
To capture both horizontal strategic interaction and vertical strategic interaction be-
tween firms in a supply chain, this report studies a case where there are two manufacturers
producing competing products and selling them through a common retailer. The two man-
ufacturers must decide on the wholesale price and the level of service they plan to provide
to the consumer. We assume that the two manufacturers have equal bargaining power and
makes their decisions simultaneously. We assume, as a base case, that the manufacturers
have more bargaining power than the retailer. Thus, the manufacturers have the power
to set wholesale prices and service levels before the retailer sets the retail prices. The
retailer, having less power, makes his decisions (on retail price and ordering quantity of
1Examples of nonprice factors are customer supports, service quality, advertising, etc.
xiv
each product) after observing the actions of the manufacturers. Each firm are assumed
to optimize only its own profit (uncoordinated). The consumer demand depends on two
factors: (1) retail price, and (2) service level provided by the manufacturer. All firms in
the industry are assumed to behave as if they have perfect knowledge of the demand and
the cost structures within the industry.
We extend the study on this basic model in three directions. First, we explore the role
of bargaining power in supply chain strategic interactions; particularly, we investigate the
strategic behavior of firms when the retailer possesses more bargaining power than that
assumed in the base case. We derive and compare equilibrium solutions for the supply
chain under three different scenarios (e.g., Manufacturer Stackelberg, Retailer Stackelberg,
and Vertical Nash). We found that it is more beneficial to consumers when there is no dom-
inant player(s) in vertical strategic interaction. Furthermore, when one manufacturer has
economic advantage in providing service, the retailer will act to separate market segment
by selling products with low service at low price and selling products with high service at
high price.
We then extend the framework to study multi-period model. In this model, demand
also depends on the past period retail prices and service levels, as well as current prices
and service levels. This assumption captures the “learning through repeated transactions”
behavior of demand. We investigate how the “learning” behavior by consumers would
affect the strategic behavior of firms over multiple periods. Game-theoretic approaches
and dynamic system and control theory are used as tools to model the problem. We found
that if demand is only sensitive to price in its learning process, the company with any
type of cost advantage will gain more profit and capture a larger market base than its
xv
competitor. The retailer will sell both products at the same retail price but the firm with
cost advantage will be able to support more service to its customers.
We also compare the results from our model to those obtained from a myopic model.
In a myopic model, the firms only care about their profits in the current period and ignore
any future effects their behavior might cause over time. We found that myopic firms are
not capable to cope with the learning consumers. Their markets shrink and they earn less
profit over time. On the other hand, our model, with think-ahead firms, can prevent this
phenomenon from happening. Firms plan their actions to take advantage of the learning
behavior of demand. The service levels and prices are chosen such that the firms are
rewarded by the consumers. Thus, markets keep growing for both products while firms can
keep earning more profits.
Finally, we examine a single period problem with stochastic demand. When demand
is uncertain, the retailer faces a newsvendor-type problem. In our model, the newsvendor
must manage two competing products against a price-dependent demand. The retailer
must decide how much to order from the two manufacturers and at what price each product
should be sold in order to maximize his profit. This problem has not been examined in
literature. We investigate this problem and analyze how uncertainty can impact strategic
interactions among firms in the supply chain, and compared the results to the deterministic
case. We derive an expression for the newsvendor’s optimal retail prices. We also derive a
sufficient condition such that there exists a unique solution for the retail prices. Next, we
extend the model to include the two manufacturers. We provide an algorithm to search for
the equilibrium wholesale price and service level, given that the manufacturers know the




1.1 Background and Motivation
Over the past decade, supply chain planning has gained significant importance, due pri-
marily to advances in information technology such as Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP),
distributed client-server networks, and the Internet. As an example, with the advent of
the Internet, several auction sites have emerged, allowing consumers to bid on their desired
item. Consumers have more access to information about products, including price and
quality of products as well as level (or quality) of customer service manufacturers provide
to their customers. This phenomenon has created a paradigm shift for both retailers and
manufacturers. Retailers (or more appropriately, e-tailers) are now more inclined to com-
pete on price (see Keeney(1999) [39], Brynjolfsson et al.(2000) [5], and Dewan et al. (2003)
[19] for more details on online competition).
On the other hand, manufacturers, rather than competing solely on price, have focused
more on using services and/or the quality of their products to build brand loyalty. As an
example, IBM and Dell are famous for their customer support. These reputations give them
an edge over their competitors when customers decide which brand to buy. When customers
buy a new computer, they not only consider the hardware, but also the software that
comes with it. Customer service is also one of the attributes that influences the customers’
decision. This is because customer support can “help the customers obtain maximum value
1
from their purchases” (Goffin (1999)[27]). Another example is in electronics appliances such
as washer/dryer machines, refrigerators, etc. In the washer market, Maytag and GE are
competing to sell their appliances through common retailers such as Sears or Bestbuy. The
major concern for end consumers is not only low price but also the service that comes with
the appliance. Therefore, it is important for both GE and Maytag to provide good service
in order to maintain loyal customers and lure customers from their competitors.
These examples show efforts by manufacturers to distinguish themselves from their
competitors through nonprice factors such as services. In both markets mentioned above,
the manufacturers interact directly with the end consumers to create demand for their
products. This emphasizes the importance of services on demand, which has been largely
overlooked by academics. However, the return on investment in services usually has a
decreasing return to scale; the next dollar invested in service produces a lesser increment
in service than the last dollar invested. In other words, it costs more to provide the next
unit of service than the last one1. Therefore, it is important to find the optimal level of
service (or quality) that can be achieved for any given demand level.
Aside from emphasizing service and quality, competitive pressures have also forced
manufacturing and service organizations to streamline their supply chain operations, reduce
system operating costs, while improving speed and reliability. All of these must be done
through channel coordination and channel selection.
Different objectives of channel members, however, can create conflicts within a channel.
As a result, its members often fail to reach the system-wide optimal pricing decisions. For
example, in a market with a monopolist or a group of oligopolists, the manufacturers have
1See Chapter 2 for literature review with similar assumption
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more negotiation power than the retailers and are therefore able to sell their product with a
premium above the competitive price. Many studies focus on vertical coordination among
channel members through various transfer pricing schemes or formal agreements such as
contracts to achieve maximum channel profit. Many of these studies consider only one
manufacturer (monopoly) and its channel intermediaries, the analysis of competition and
cooperation is confined only to vertical interaction, and involves only one product.
Little attention has been given by researchers to a larger segment of most consumer
goods and electronics markets in which retailers sell multiple (often competing) brands at
the same location. This latter channel structure represents numerous markets including
those consisting of specialty stores (e.g. consumer electronics, sporting goods, and automo-
bile parts, to name a few), department stores, supermarkets, and convenience stores. This
research analyzes the channel structure with multiple-brand vendors (common retailer).
Specifically, we analyze a market structure in which there are two competing manufacturers
and one common retailer. We also include nonprice factor in the study of the competition.
In the majority of the existing literature in economics and operations research, when
a nonprice factor such as service is considered, it is often studied only at the retail level.
Only a few studies explore the fact that manufacturers can influence the demand through
nonprice factors as well. Our goal is to investigate the above channel structure with price
and nonprice factors considered together. Figure 1 shows the channel structure studied in
this research.
Our study integrates pricing and service/support decisions into one model. Tradition-
ally, decision on levels (quality) of customer support, wholesale prices, and production have
all been determined by separate divisions within the same manufacturing firm. The same
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is true for a retailer who must make decisions on retail price and ordering quantity to the
manufacturers or wholesalers. We plan to study these decisions within a single framework
to see how certain parameters affect the optimal solution. Our research would impact
the way firms operate and make their decisions regarding competition and supply chain
coordination.
One of the main features lacking in the existing literature is the study of channel
structure in the multi-period setting with learning demand2. Also lacking in the literature
is the study on how bargaining power affects behavior of firms in a supply chain. We are
interested in the behavior of retailers and manufacturers when faced with learning demand.
We plan to investigate how learning demand and bargaining power can affect service levels,
retail price, wholesale price, and the profit of each firms. We believe this is an important
contribution that has not been explored in the existing literature.
In our model, we define service as the following:
DEFINITION 1.1. Service is any action which the provider takes to enhance the ex-
perience of the customer while he/she is consuming the product. Hence, the customer’s
willingness to pay for that product increases. Examples of services include post-sale cus-
tomer support, improved quality, etc.
Service may increase the value of the product to the customer because it results in
informational asymmetries that favor the firm, or possibly because it generates benefits
that customers weigh against search costs when deciding where to shop (for alternatives).
2This simply means that the customer demand in the current period depends on prices and service
levels in the past period(s).
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1.2 Problem Description
The model considered in this report has two manufacturers and one retailer. The manufac-
turers sell physical products to the retailer and provide services directly to the consumer.
The consumer demand for each product is sensitive to both retail price and service level
provided by the manufacturer. Figure 1 shows the schematic presentation of this supply
chain. We assume that the two manufacturers have equal bargaining power. This translates
to simultaneous moves by both of them. We also assume, as a base case, that the manu-
facturers have more bargaining power than the retailer. Thus, they have the power to set
wholesale prices and service levels before the retailer sets the retail prices. Chronologically,













production cost (c1) production cost (c2)
Di = ai - bppi + θp(pj - pi) + bssi – θs(sj - si)
Figure 1: Main Model.
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Retailer gives orders





Demand for the 
season is realized
Retailer gets profits











Figure 2: Timeline of events within each transaction.
Step 1. The manufacturers simultaneously announce wholesale prices to be offered to the
retailer and service levels to be offered to consumers.
Step 2. In response to the manufacturers’ announcement, the retailer decides the retail price
and ordering quantity of each product that would maximize his expected profit. The
retailer’s ordering quantities become incoming demands for each manufacturer.
Step 3. The consumer demand for each product is realized.
Step 4. The shortage cost or disposal cost for each product is charged to the retailer, depend-
ing on the demand and the stocking level. The manufacturers realize their profit in
this transaction.
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We extend the study on this basic model in three directions (see Figure 3). First, we
explore the role of bargaining power in supply chain strategic interactions; particularly,
we investigate the strategic behavior of firms when the retailer possesses more bargaining
power than that assumed in the base case. We derive and compare equilibrium solutions for
the supply chain under three different bargaining power assumptions (e.g., Manufacturer
Stackelberg, Retailer Stackelberg, and Vertical Nash). The results from this investigation
will shed some light on how retail prices and service levels are influenced by bargaining
power. Details of our investigation are given in Chapter 3.
We then extend the problem to multiple periods. In the multiple period model, demand
also depends on past period retail prices and past service levels. This is to capture the
“learning through repeated transactions” behavior of demand. For example, in PC industry,
consumers upgrade their PCs every 3-5 years. Thus, it is possible that customers gain more
experience on price and service every time they upgrade their products. The price they
paid and the service they received during their last experience will influence their next
upgrading decisions. We investigate how “learning” behavior by consumers would affect
the strategic behavior of firms over multiple periods. Game-theoretical approaches and
dynamic system and control theory are used as tools to model the problem. Details on this
part of the research are given in Chapter 4.
Lastly, we modify our model to capture demand uncertainty. When demand is stochas-
tic, the retailer faces a newsvendor-type problem. In the classic newsvendor problem, there
is only one product, with a given fixed price and uncertain demand. In our model, however,
the newsvendor must manage two competing products against a price-dependent demand.
The retailer must decide how much to order from the two manufacturers and at what price
7
each product should be sold. We investigate this problem and analyze how uncertainty
can impact strategic interactions among firms in the supply chain, as compared to the de-
terministic case. Chapter 5 provides details of our investigation on the uncertain demand





Base case: Single period, deterministic demand,
Manufacturer Stackelberg.
Chapter 4: Multiple periods, 
deterministic demand,
Manufacturer Stackelberg 
Chapter 3: Single period, deterministic demand,
Retailer Stackelberg & Vertical Nash
Chapter 5: Single period, 
stochastic demand,
Manufacturer Stackelberg
Figure 3: Research Direction.
1.3 Outline and Research Contribution of this report
This report examines a supply chain structure with two competing manufacturers and a
common retailer. The demand depends on prices and service levels. In Chapter 2 we review
the relevant literature, and compare it to the problem we investigate in this thesis.
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Next we investigate the role of bargaining power in Chapter 3. Namely, we consider the
problem with single period setting and with deterministic demand. We derive the expres-
sions for the equilibrium retail prices, wholesale prices, and service levels under different
bargaining power assumptions. We then compare results from the three scenarios and de-
rive some insights on the strategic interactions among firms in the supply chain. We then
study the influence of each parameter in the model on the equilibrium solution by using
sensitivity analysis.
In Chapter 4 we extend the basic case over multiple periods. We study the behavior
of each firm (one retailer and two competing manufacturers) over time when faced with
“learning” demand. We assume that demand for each product in any given period is affected
by two types of components: (1) the difference in prices and service levels between the two
products in the previous period, and (2) the amount of investment by each manufacturer
at the beginning of each period to expand the market base of its product (or brand). We
approach the problem by introducing a new methodology for game-based decision making
in multiple periods by combining a game-theoretic approach with concepts from dynamic
systems and control theory. Finally, we derive economic and managerial insights using the
knowledge from dynamic systems and control theory.
In Chapter 5 we consider the first part of the stochastic problem by studying the two-
product newsvendor problem with price-dependent demand. We derive an expression for
the optimal retail price. We also derive a sufficient condition such that there exists a unique
solution for the retail price and for the order quantity for both products. We find that the
hazard rate of the demand distribution is crucial for the existence of a unique solution. We
also give a set of conditions that must be satisfied by the optimal solution. Next, we extend
9
the model to include the two manufacturers. We then formally describe the model using
mathematical expressions. The results from the investigation of two-product newsvendor
are used to determine the retailer’s reaction function. We then propose an algorithm to
provide the manufacturers with the equilibrium wholesale price and service level, given that
they know the retailer’s reaction function. Finally, some numerical examples are shown.
Chapter 6 concludes with our contributions and gives some possible extensions to our





There are many existing studies on supply chain management. They range from economics
and marketing to operations research and management. We will concentrate on those that
are related to our model. As shown in Chapter 1, our research spans three different direc-
tions. Each direction requires different combinations of knowledge from various relevant
fields. In the single-period deterministic problem considered in Chapter 3, game theory
and optimization are used to investigate the problem. Chapter 4 requires game theory
and dynamic systems and optimal control to model multi-period problem with demand
learning. Lastly, Chapter 5 studies the supply chain with stochastic demand. The model
requires knowledge from both game theory and operations research. In this chapter, related
literature for each direction will be reviewed and addressed.
We categorize literature into groups according to the three research directions of this
thesis. To systematically review existing literature, it is very helpful to consider the fol-
lowing five factors:
(1) Channel structure: Number of Supplier(s) and Retailer(s). The structure of the
channel being studied is the most important factor. Early studies focus on one re-
tailer and one manufacturer (two-stage supply chain) or two competing retailers.
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Recent studies include other situations such as one supplier-multiple retailers, multi-
ple suppliers-single retailer, or multiple suppliers-multiple retailers. We assume one
retailer and two suppliers in our model.
(2) Number of products: Single versus Multiple. Most models in the literature assume a
single product; some assume two or more competing (heterogeneous, substitutable)
products. Our model assumes two competing products, each being produced by a
different manufacturer.
(3) Decision attribute(s): Price versus Nonprice. In most literature, firms compete only
on price. However, nonprice factors such as service, advertisement and quality level
can also influence the demand for the product. In the literature, there are differences
in how various types of nonprice factors are defined and used in different models. For
example, So (2000) [80] uses a delivery time guarantee, Iyer (1998) [32] uses locational
differentiation among retailers, while Hall and Porteus (2000) [28] use customer ser-
vice capacity. In our model, we define our nonprice factor to be the level (or quality)
of service. This is similar to the definition used in McGahan and Ghemawat (1994)
[58].
(4) Demand: Deterministic versus Stochastic. Most of the marketing and economic lit-
erature assumes that the demand is deterministic while most of the literature in
operations assumes a stochastic demand. In this thesis, we investigate the problem
with both deterministic and stochastic demand assumptions. The literature on the
deterministic case provides good background to our stochastic model and should be
studied carefully.
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(5) Number of periods: Single versus Multiple. Most marketing and microeconomic
models assume a single period and focus on how each player interacts and on critical
factors that influence their decision. The multi-period model, on the other hand,
is used to capture the dynamic and “learning” aspect of the model. Our model
in Chapter 4 is multi-period, but results from the single-period problem studied in
Chapter 3 are the basic building blocks for the multi-period model.
Different combinations of the above 5 factors give rise to various situations. Some have
been extensively studied, while some have been overlooked and not yet explored. Table
2.1 shows some of the literature categorized according to the assumption used in the main
model on various factors (e.g., demand, number of periods, attributes, number of products,
and channel structure). In the table, our problem is compared to the rest of the literature.
The marketing literature often focuses on the coordination of pricing decisions in a
single period, without production and inventory considerations. The operations literature,
on the other hand, has traditionally been focused on coordinating production and inventory
decisions, assuming that price and, hence, demand are given. The problems that are most
heavily studied are within the EOQ setting where both the supplier and the retailer face a
fixed production/ordering cost and a linear inventory holding cost.
Other studies in marketing and management literature focus on decentralized supply
chain and try to find mechanisms to coordinate the actions among various players to achieve
the optimal (centralized) solution. In a decentralized supply chain, closely inter-related
business activities are often performed by multiple firms with conflicting objectives. When
the decisions of these firms are uncoordinated, the supply chain as a whole encounters a
significant loss of efficiency. Coordination of activities among different firms offers numerous
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Structure Attributes # Prod. # Periods Representing Paper(s)
1 Retailer, 1 Manu. Price & Service 1 1 Jeuland & Shugan (1983)
1 Retailer, 1 Manu. Price 1 1 Moorthy (1987)
1 Retailer, 2 Manu. Price 1 1 Choi (1991)
1 Retailer, 1 Manu. Price & Power 1 1 Ertek and Griffin (2002)
2 Firms Price & Service 1 1 McGahan and Ghemawat (1994)
N Firms Price & Service 1 1 So (2000)
2 Retailers, 1 Supplier Price & Service 1 1 Tsay and Agrawal (2000)
1 Supplier, 2 Retailers Price & location 1 1 Iyer (1998)
1 Retailer, 2 Supplier Price & Service 2 1 Chapter 3
2 Firms Price & Advertising 2 ∞ Vilcassim et. al. (1999)
2 Firms Advertising 2 t > 1 Fruchter and Kalish (1997)
2 Firms Advertising 2 ∞ Chintagunta (1993)
2 Firms Price & Brand 2 ∞ Chintagunta and Rao (1996)
1 Firm Price & Inventory 1 t > 1 Federgruen and Heching (1999)
1 Newsvendor Price 1 t > 1 Pertuzzi and Dada (1999)
1 Newsvendor Price 1 t > 1 Petruzzi and Dada (2002)
1 Retailer, 1 Supplier Price 1 t > 1 Chen et al. (2000)
1 Retailer, 2 Supplier Price & Service 2 t > 1 Chapter 4
1 Newsvendor Price 1 1 Silver et al. (1998)
1 Newsvendor Price & Quantity 1 1 Lau and Lau (1988)
1 Newsvendor Price & Quantity 1 1 Dana and Petruzzi (2001)
1 Newsvendor Price & Quantity 2 1 Khouja et al. (1996)
1 Newsvendor Price 2 1 Li et al. (1991)
1 Newsvendor Price m > 1 1 Lau and Lau (1995)
N Newsvendor Price 1 1 Lippman and McCardle (1997)
1 Newsvendor, 1 Supplier Price 1 1 Lariviere and Porteus (2001)
1 Newsvendor, N suppliers Price 1 2 Petruzzi and Dada (2001)
1 Firm Price & Inventory 1 1 Johnson and Montgomery (1974)
1 Newsvendor, 2 suppliers Price & Service 2 1 Chapter 5
Table 1: Summary table of the existing literature
challenges and opportunities both for academic and real-world applications. Therefore,
there exist many studies in economics , marketing, and operations management addressing
coordination among firms in supply chain. Examples of reviews of advances in this problem
can be found in Thomas and Griffin (1996) [84], Simchi-Levi et al. (1999) [79], Tayur et
al. (1999) [82], and Cachon (2001) [10].
Our model combines marketing and operations approach to study both pricing and
ordering decisions faced by firms in the supply chain. We investigate strategic interactions
among firms in the supply chain using combinations of game theory, dynamic systems and
control theory, and operations research. The coordination issue is not the focus of this
thesis1.
1Possible extensions of this thesis are be given and discussed in Chapter 6
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In the following sections of this chapter, we review some of the works related to our
problem. In Section 2.2 we review literature in which models assume a deterministic de-
mand. These models are mostly from the marketing or economics literature and are used
to demonstrate the coordination of channel through price or other payment schemes. The
literature provides a good basis for understanding how players in each stage of a supply
chain interact with one another. Literature on nonprice competition is also discussed in
this section since our model assumes that demand is sensitive to both price and service2.
Section 2.3 reviews literature in which multiple-period models are analyzed, especially
those that involve “learning” through repeated transactions. There are two streams of
research on “learning.” The first group refers to “learning” as a process of updating in-
formation on demand distribution (e.g., Petruzzi and Dada (2001) [68] and Cachon and
Porteus (1999) [8]). Another stream of research imbeds “learning” into demand function
as part of demand modelling (e.g., Vilcassim et al. (1999) [91]). We follow this latter
approach in our analysis of the multi-period problem in Chapter 4.
Section 2.4 reviews literature involving the newsvendor model and its extensions. Our
model defined in Chapter 5 differs from existing models because of additional assumptions
on (1) price-dependent demand, and (2) multiple products being sold by the newsvendor.
The existing literature assumes and studies models with only one of these assumptions at
a time, but never assumes both in the same model. Our work in Chapter 5 is an important
extension to existing literature on the newsvendor model.
2The deterministic version of our model can be seen in Chapter 3.
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2.2 Deterministic Demand
The literature with deterministic demand can be separated into two main groups. In the
first group, demand is assumed to depend solely on price. In the second group, demand
may depend on other attribute(s) such as service or quality.
2.2.1 Price-Sensitive Demand Models
Studies on horizontal competition between two or more producers (or sellers) can be traced
back to classic economic models such as Cournot, Bertrand, and Stackelberg competition.
Reviews on these models and their variants can be found in Tirole (2000) [87]. However,
these studies are primarily based on a single-echelon environment. Early studies on a
multi-echelon environment can be found in Jeuland and Shugan (1983) [35], McGuire and
Staelin (1983) [59], Moorthy (1987) [62], and Ingene and Parry (1995) [31]. Most of these
studies consider only the case with a single manufacturer and a single retailer. They
have focused on vertical coordination among channel members through measures such as
transfer pricing schemes or formal agreements. Particularly, Jeuland and Shugan (1983)
show that the supplier can use a quantity discount schedule to induce the retailer to choose
the channel-optimal retail price. Moorthy (1987) shows that channel coordination can also
be achieved through a simple two-part tariff: the supplier sells the product at his own
(marginal) production cost and charges the retailer a fixed side-payment.
Lee and Staelin (1997) [51] examine strategic pricing policies in uncoordinated supply
chain (no vertical integration or two-part tariff). Using a game theoretic approach, the
paper shows that the question of using linear or nonlinear demand functions is not as crit-
ical as whether the demand functions imply vertical strategic substitute (VSS) or vertical
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strategic complement (VSC). They also show that it is not always beneficial to use the
knowledge of the competitors’ reactions.
Kim and Staelin (1999) [42] examine a single period profit maximizing game with two
manufacturers and two retailers. The manufacturers must decide on how large a side pay-
ment to give to each retailer, and retailers decide on how much of this side payment to
use to promote the manufacturer’s product. The authors derive the optimal solutions and
perform sensitivity analysis on the results. They find that if consumers become more sen-
sitive to differences in merchandizing activity between brands within a store, the retailers’
profits increase and the manufacturers’ profits decrease.
Weng (1995) [93] studies both pricing and production/ordering decisions. Weng con-
siders a system with a single manufacturer and multiple, identical retailers and shows that
channel coordination can be achieved by using a quantity discount policy. Chen et al.
(2001) extend Weng’s model to non-identical retailers. Both papers consider a static model
(i.e., stationary demand) with concave cost function, which is different from our dynamic
model.
Choi (1991) [15] examines a channel structure with two competing manufacturers and
one common retailer that sells both manufacturers’ products. The study includes a one-
period problem with deterministic, price-sensitive demand, and three noncooperative games
of different power structures between the two manufacturers and the retailer, i.e., two
Stackelberg games and one Nash game.
Tsay and Agrawal (2000) [90] study a distribution system in which a manufacturer
supplies a common product to two independent retailers. The demand is deterministic
and depends on both the retail prices and retail services. They show that the intensity
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of competition with respect to each competitive dimension plays a key role, as does the
degree of cooperation between the retailers.
Zhao and Wang (2002) [98] study the multiple-period problem of a system with one
supplier and one retailer facing a deterministic, price-sensitive and time-dependent demand
over a finite horizon (one selling season). They study the case where the manufacturer is
the Stackelberg leader and give the retailer a price schedule for every period in the coming
season. Dynamic programming techniques are used to obtain some key results and to show
that there exists a wholesale price schedule that can lead to the channel-optimal solution.
Ertek and Griffin (2002) [22] study decentralized pricing-production decisions in a
supplier-buyer channel with EOQ cost structure. They examine the impact of power struc-
ture on price, sensitivity of market price, and profits in a single-product, two-stage supply
chain with one supplier and one retailer. They consider the cases where each of the player
(supplier/retailer) has a dominant bargaining power. However, they do not address coor-
dination issues.
2.2.2 Service/Quality-Sensitive Demand Models
Nonprice factors include services, quality, negotiation power, etc. However, the majority
of the studies mentioned above have considered price or product quantity as the only
dimension of competition. Some researchers have recognized this weakness and developed
models containing additional attribute(s) that may influence consumer demand. Early
research to include attributes such as product quality and service can be found in economics
literature such as Spence (1975) [81] and Dixit (1979) [20]. In marketing literature, Jeuland
and Shugan (1983) include nonprice variable such as quality and services in their model with
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the profit function as a linear function of service amount. Our model, on the other hand, has
the profit function as a nonlinear function to service amount due to the decreasing returns
of providing service. Moorthy (1988) [63] examines a competition in duopoly through both
price and quality. Our model considers both horizontal and vertical relationships. Recently,
there have been many studies that incorporate nonprice factors in a model to analyze its
impact on competition or channel coordination.
Iyer (1998) [32] examines a channel with one manufacturer and two retailers who com-
pete on both price and non-price factors. He assumes that consumers are heterogeneous
in spatial locations (as in the spatial models of horizontal differentiation) and in their will-
ingness to pay for retail services (as in the model of vertical differentiation). In the model,
the manufacturer is the Stackelberg leader, while the two retailers move simultaneously.
The paper shows that in markets with small locational differentiation and substantial di-
versity in consumer willingness to pay, the manufacturer’s problem is not just to align
retailer interests, but also to use a channel contract to induce the optimal level of retail
differentiation.
McGahan and Ghemawat (1994) [58] study a single-transaction, game-theoretic model
in which duopolists attempt to retain old customers through service and attract new cus-
tomers through price. They use a two-stage model in which the duopolists simultaneously
commit to expenditures on customer service in the first stage and then (simultaneously)
name their prices in the second stage. The paper shows that large firms are likely to exhibit
greater customer retention rates than their smaller rivals in equilibrium.
Hall and Porteus (2000) [28] study a finite multiple-period problem in which two firms
compete by investing in capacity that is used to provide goods or services to their customers.
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They assume that there is a fixed total market of customers whose demands for the goods
or service are random. The paper obtains results for both single-period and finite-horizon
problems.
So (2000) [80] studies the problem where several heterogeneous service firms use delivery
time guarantees to compete for customers in the marketplace. Demand is deterministic and
is assumed to be sensitive to both price and delivery time guarantees. The objective of the
firm is to maximize profit by selecting the optimal price and time guarantee. He finds that
the high capacity firms provide better time guarantees, while firms with lower operating
costs offer lower price, and the differentiation becomes more acute as demands become
more time-sensitive.
2.3 Multiple-Period Models
Existing studies on multiple-period models can be separated into two groups. Studies in the
first group are mostly from the industrial engineering and operations research community;
they focus on production and/or inventory management by a single firm. The second
group is mostly from the marketing and management community; they concentrate on
competition and interactions among firms through either price or nonprice factor(s) over
time. Our research in Chapter 4 fits into the second group. Literature in each group is
reviewed here.
2.3.1 Productions and Supply Chain Management
Early literature in this group include Thomas (1970) [83], who considers the joint pricing-
production decision in a discrete-time (multi-period) setting. Federgruen and Heching
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(1999) [23] consider pricing-production models with concave revenue functions. Particu-
larly, they examine a multiple-period, single-item problem, in which a firm faces uncertain
price-dependent demand. The paper addresses the simultaneous determination of pricing
and inventory replenishment strategies for such a firm in both finite and infinite horizon
models, with the objective of maximizing total expected discounted profit or its time aver-
age value.
There is a rich collection of literature on supply chain coordination with stochastic de-
mand. Several mechanisms have been identified to coordinate manufacturer-retailer chan-
nels. They include the inventory buyback/return policy (Pasternack (1985) [67] and the
quantity flexibility policy (Tsay (1999) [89]) for models without pricing decisions, and with
revenue sharing contracts (Cachon and Lariviere (2000) [9]) and with a two-part tariff
(Weng (1997) [94]) for systems with pricing and production decisions. The coordination
mechanisms serve as means to share risk among firms in a channel in order to resolve in-
centive incompatibilities due to uncertainties. For an up-to-date, comprehensive review on
this line of research, the reader is referred to Cachon (2001) [10].
2.3.2 Multi-period Dynamic Competition
The majority of studies in this group are from the marketing and management community.
Marketing literature models demand as diffusion of acceptance with adoption rate/sales
rate and focus on consumer adoption process of a new product. The current research on
diffusion models originated with the Bass model (Bass (1969) [3]), which does not include
price. Robinson and Lakhani (1975) [73] were the first to incorporate the variable of price
into the Bass model. In recent work, the cost experience curve has been introduced on
21
the production side; hence there are learning effects on both demand and cost. Most
applications deal with durable goods where each adopter represents one unit of sales. In
most cases, repeated sales have been ignored. However, Jeuland and Dolan (1982) [34]
and Mahajan et al. (1983) [57]) included repeated purchases in their models. Dockner
(1985) [21] generalizes the Robinson-Lakhani model to a duopoly. Dockner applies a game-
theoretic approach to find a Nash Equilibrium. However, this group of literature focuses
only on price as the main decision variable. It also does not consider the role of retailer in
the supply chain during dynamic competition.
There is another parallel stream of research in economics and marketing that is not
based on Bass’s diffusion model. Demand is assumed to be derived from aggregate (retailer
level) scanner data. Our model follows this approach which is common in microeconomics
(see Tirole (2000) [87] and Shy (2000) [76]). Both price and nonprice variable(s) can be
included in the model. Hotelling (1929) [30] was the first to introduce a formal model of
product differentiation through price and location. Gabszewicz and Thisse (1979) [26] and
Cohen and Whang (1997) [17] develop models where customers’ preference for products
can be strictly ordered (for example, quality - the higher, the better). Other studies such
as Chintagunta (1993) [13] examine the sensitivity of equilibrium profits in advertising
game in a duopolistic market. Chintagunta and Rao (1996) [14] consider pricing strategies
in a dynamic duopoly. Fruchter and Kalish (1997) [24] investigate dynamic competition
through advertisement between two firms.
It is only recently that “learning” through repeated transactions has been integrated
into multi-period models. There are two streams of research on “learning.” Petruzzi and
Dada (2001, 2002) [69], [70] and Cachon and Porteus (1999) [8] are among the studies in
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the first group which regard “learning” as a process of updating information on demand
distribution. Petruzzi and Dada (2001) analyze the problem of determining inventory and
pricing decisions in a two-period retail setting when an opportunity to refine information
about uncertain demand is available. In particular, they determine the optimal stocking
and pricing policies over time when a given market parameter of the demand process,
though fixed, is initially unknown. Petruzzi and Dada (2002) [70] extend the problem by
considering a multiple period problem. The authors use dynamic programming to formulate
their model.
Another stream of research embeds “learning” into the demand function as part of de-
mand modelling. Vilcassim et al. (1999) [91] use this approach in their analysis of price and
advertising competition among firms in a given product market. Firm (or brand) level de-
mand functions account for the contemporaneous and carry-over effects of these marketing
activities, and also allow for the effects of competitor actions. This approach enables them
to quantify both the direction and magnitude of competitive reactions, and also to identify
the form of market conduct that generates the particular pattern of interaction. We follow
this latter approach of “learning” in our analysis of multi-period problem in Chapter 4.
2.4 Newsvendor Model
The classical newsvendor problem assumes that the selling price is given and that the de-
mand is independent of the product’s price. This assumption is used in many extensions of
the newsvendor problem. However, recently many researchers start to address the newsven-
dor problem with price-dependent demand. Our model in Chapter 5 follows this trend. In
this section, we first review some of the extensions on the classical newsvendor that still
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assume price-demand independence. Newsvendor models with joint price-ordering decision
are then discussed.
2.4.1 Price-Independent Demand Model
Numerous extensions to the classical newsvendor model have recently been proposed in
the literature (see Khouja (1999) [41] for extensive reviews). In particular, Lau and Lau
(1988) [45] introduce a price-sensitive demand model under two objectives to maximize
expected profit to and maximize the probability of achieving a target level of profit. Parlar
(1988) [66] characterizes a duopoly of two newsvendors who become competitors because
their products are partially substitutable (i.e., when either of the firms’ stock is out, a
fixed fraction of the excess demand transfers to the other). Lippman and McCardle (1997)
[55] generalize this by considering various scenarios where the realized aggregate demand is
initially split between the firms as a function of their inventory levels and more substitutable
patterns. In their model, the two newsvendors sell perishable goods and choose quantities
to be sold at a predetermined market price. Both papers (Parlar (1988) and Lippman
and McCardle (1997)) examine the existence and uniqueness properties of Nash solutions.
However, explicit computation of the equilibria turns out to be nontrivial in both settings.
Lau and Lau (1988) [46] study a two-product newsvendor problem under the objective
of maximizing the probability of achieving a profit target. Li et al. (1990) [53] present an
analytical solution of the problem for the case of independent and uniformly distributed
demands. Lau and Lau (1991) [47] present an analytical solution of the problem for the case
of independent and exponentially distributed demands. The problem of a multi-product
newsvendor problem with capacity constraints is examined in Lau and Lau (1995) [48].
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Khouja et al. (1996) [40] examine a single-period newsvendor problem with two sub-
stitutable products. However, as in the classic newsvendor problem, they assume that the
price is given. Since many local optimal solutions may exist, the authors use Monte Carlo
simulation to identify the optimal solution (no analytical solution is given).
Lariviere and Porteus (2001) [43] study a simple supply chain contract in which a
manufacturer sells to a retailer facing a (standard) newsvendor problem with wholesale price
as the lone contract parameter. They study a single-period model with the manufacturer
as a Stackelberg leader. The “optimal” contract is created such that it maximizes the
manufacturer’s profit subject to assuring retailer acceptance (the retailer has opportunity
cost to compare with the expected profit).
Petruzzi and Dada (2001) [69] study a two-period newsvendor problem with the possibil-
ity of refining information about the uncertain demand. The newsvendor uses the demand
information he gets in the first period to help him plan for his actions in the second period.
2.4.2 Joint Price-Ordering Decisions
Research in joint pricing-ordering decisions was first formulated by Whitin (1955) [95]. He
incorporates pricing into the classic Economic Order Quantity (EOQ) model by assuming
that the demand rate depends linearly on the price. Major extensions to Whitin’s model
include Porteus (1985) [71], who considers investment to reduce setup cost, and Cohen
(1977) [16], who models perishable products. The decisions in all these models are static in
nature but the analysis on these models provide the basis for research on newsvendor-type
model.
Although most newsvendor models assume that price is given, there have been, in recent
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years, many papers addressing the newsvendor problem with price-sensitive demand. Lau
and Lau (1988) [45] is one of the earliest papers that study the problem with newsvendors
facing such demand. In their model, the newsvendor simultaneously decides the price and
order quantity. However, they use an alternative objective of maximizing the probability of
achieving the target profit level. Petruzzi and Dada (1999) [68] also examine an extension
of the classical newsvendor problem in which ordering quantity and selling price are set
simultaneously because the demand faced by the newsvendor is price-sensitive. They first
study a single-period version of the problem and then extend it to a multiple-period one.
Using the change-of-variable method, they find the condition that would guarantee the
existence of a unique solution. Chapter 5 of this thesis extends their work to the case of a
two-product newsvendor facing price-sensitive demand.
Dana and Petruzzi (2001) [18] examine a firm’s price and inventory policy when it faces
uncertain demand that depends on both price and inventory level. The authors extend
the classic newsvendor model by assuming that consumers choose between visiting the
firm and consuming an exogenous outside option. The paper investigates both the case in
which the firm’s price is exogenous and the case in which price may be chosen optimally.
The paper shows that the firm holds more inventory, provides a higher fill rate, attracts






With the current dynamic and competitive environment, product manufacturers must com-
pete with more complicated strategies than simply lowering their price. Non-price factors
such as service have become more important in affecting a consumer’s decision to buy a
product. In this research, service is defined as any action that the manufacturer takes
to “help the customers obtain maximum value from their purchases” (Goffin 1999, [27]).
Example of services include post-sale customer support, product advertising, improved
product quality, product delivery, etc.
There are quite a few successful firms that have focused on service and quality of their
products in building brand loyalty. For example, IBM and HP are both famous for their
customer support. This reputation gives them an edge over their competitors. Another
example can be seen in consumer electronics such as digital cameras. Nikon and Canon
are competing to sell their products through common retailers such as Ritz Camera or
BestBuy. One of the major concerns for end customers is not only how low the price is, but
also how good the service he or she expects to receive that comes with the product. In both
of these examples, the manufacturers interact directly with the end consumers through the
service channel.
The impact of the manufacturer’s service quality to consumers’ buying decisions is likely
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to influence the strategic interactions between a manufacturer and his retailer regarding
pricing and ordering quantity. Moreover, competitive pressure from other manufacturers
and their interactions with the retailer are issues that a manufacturer must also consider
in its decision processes. Our research focuses on the supply chain depicted in Figure 4,
where each manufacturer provides services directly to the customers and the retailer sells
competing products to end consumers1. To the best of our knowledge, very few studies
have considered all these issues of price and service interactions, manufacturers’ competition
and supply chain’s channel coordination simultaneously; even though most consumer goods
and electronics products are sold by retailers who sell multiple competing brands at the
same location (See Chapter 2 for literature reviews). This research will make significant
contributions in this important research area.
In order to study the role of service in competition between two manufacturers in this
supply chain we need to make assumptions regarding vertical strategic interactions between
manufacturers and the retailer. In general, in a market with a monopolist or a group of
oligopolists the manufacturers would possess more bargaining power than the retailer and
would be able to sell their product with some premium above the competitive price. On
the other hand, if the retailer possesses more negotiation power, it can bring down the
manufacturer’s profit and absorb the majority of the profit to itself. The reason we need to
consider these cases is because the retailer that deals with a number of competing products
is often a large retailer that can influence the market substantially. It has been reported
that the bargaining power has transferred from manufacturers to retailers in some retailing
1This research does not study the impact of retailer’s service to customers due to its potential “conflict”
with the service provided by the manufacturers. Issues about possible differentiation between services from














production cost (c1) production cost (c2)
Di = ai - bppi + θp(pj - pi) + bssi – θs(sj - si)
Figure 4: Schematic illustration of the supply chain.
markets (see Messinger and Narasimhan (1995) [60] and Yoruk and Radosevic (2000) [97]).
Thus, it is important to study how bargaining power can affect the supply chain equilibrium
solution. To achieve this goal, the following three scenarios are examined: Manufacturer
Stackelberg (MS), Retailer Stackelberg (RS), and Vertical Nash (VN).
In this chapter we apply a game-theoretic approach to derive equilibrium solutions for
prices (and ordering quantities), service levels, and profits for each channel member. The
derivations are benchmarked with results obtained in the literature (e.g., Choi 1991) with-
out service factors. Our research concludes that consumers receive more service when every
channel member possesses equal bargaining power (e.g., Vertical Nash). An interesting but
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less intuitive result shows that as market base of one product increases, the competitor
also benefits but at a smaller amount than the manufacturer of the original product. Fur-
thermore, when one manufacturer has some economic advantage in providing service, the
retailer will take an active role to separate market segments by selling the product with
low service at a low price and selling the product with high service at a high price.
In Section 3.2 a basic model of noncooperative games is developed. Demand function,
cost structure for each firm, and vertical strategic interactions are also specified in this
section. Section 3.3 presents derivations and comparisons of analytical equilibrium solutions
(e.g., prices, services, and profits) under three scenarios using the game-theoretic approach.
Section 3.4 performs analysis on the results and sensitivity analysis on key parameters by
examining their influences on the equilibrium solution. The last section summarizes major
findings and delineates several possible extensions to this research.
3.2 Model
In our supply chain structure, there are two manufacturers producing different but substi-
tutable products. Both of these manufacturers sell their products to a common retailer,
who in turn sells the products to the end consumer. We assume that there is only one
retailer in the area. In other words, we assume that the distance between each retailer is
so large that there is no competition among retailers. This may be a strong assumption
for some markets. However, it allows us to focus on the competition between the two
manufacturers. We also assume that consumer demand for each product is sensitive to two
factors: (1) retail price, (2) service provided by the manufacturer. Notice that only services
that are provided by the competing manufacturers are considered. Effectively, we ignore
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the effect of the services provided by the retailer to the customer demand for each product.
We can think of this as the retailer providing the same level of service to both products;
the only difference to the customer’s perception (other than price) is the services provided
by the manufacturer.
We assume also that the investment in services has a decreasing return to scale. Namely,
the next dollar invested by the manufacturer returns less service than the last dollar in-
vested, i.e., it is harder (and costs more) to provide the next unit of service than the last
one. This can be reflected in the quadratic form of the cost of providing services. The same
quadratic equation is also used in Tsay and Agrawal (2000).
In this section, the mathematical model of the supply chain depicted in Figure 1 is
defined. In our model, we assume that all activity occurs within a single period. There are
two manufacturers, indexed by i ∈ {1, 2}, and one retailer. Each manufacturer produces
one product, also indicated by the same index as its producer, and also provides service
directly to consumers. The retailer carries the products of both manufacturers and faces
a deterministic consumer demand that is influenced by both the retail prices and the
manufacturer’s service of both products. Each manufacturer must decide on his product’s
wholesale price and level of service to be provided to consumers, while the retailer controls
the retail price of both products.
3.2.1 Demand Function
Our model represents a generalization of the model found in Choi (1991). Given this
structure, we next specify the consumer demand function and cost structure for each firm.
In defining the demand function, we follow the approach by McGuire and Staelin (1983)
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[59]. This approach uses a set of basic characteristics of the type of demand of each product,
e.g., downward sloping in its own price, increasing with respect to the competitor’s price,
and then specifies an analytically feasible function (e.g., linear) that captures these desired
characteristics. An alternative approach would derive specific (nonlinear) functions facing
the retailer. Typically, this latter approach requires making explicit assumptions concerning
consumer tastes, or the existence of a few types of market segments. Examples of this latter
approach can be seen in Lal and Matutes (1994) [44].
As pointed out by Lee and Staelin (1997) [50] and Choi (1991), although a liner demand
functions do not have good forecasting properties (possibility for negative quantities), they
outperform multiplicative and exponential demand functions for analysis of the primary
interests such as category pricing or product line pricing. For our model, we make the
following assumptions regarding demand functions:
ASSUMPTION 1. The demand structure is symmetric between the two products. De-
mand for one product is decreasing in its own retail price and increasing in the competitor
retail price. On the other hand, it is increasing in its own service and decreasing in the
competitor service.
ASSUMPTION 2. Product i has market base ai and production cost ci. Market base ai
measures the size of product i’s market. It is the demand of product i faced by the retailer
when both products are priced at zero but the manufacturers offer no service.
ASSUMPTION 3. Decreasing product retail price or increasing service level will trigger
two phenomena. First, a group of customers will decide to switch from the other product.
Second, a group of customers who otherwise would not have bought either product will
purchase at this lower price or higher service. The opposite happens when price is increased
32
or service level is decreased.
From Assumption 1 to 3, the demand for product i, which is the same as the retailer
ordering quantity, can be expressed as:
Qi(pi, pj, si, sj) = ai − (bp + θp)pi + θppj + (bs + θs)si − θssj (1)
where ai > 0, bp > 0, θp > 0, bs > 0, θs > 0, i = 1, 2, and j = 3− i.
Here, ai is a non-negative constant. It can be thought of as a “market base” (Tsay and
Agrawal 2000) as defined in Assumption 2. We assume that ai is large enough so that Qi
will always be non-negative. We can think of (bp + θp) as the measure of the responsiveness
of each manufacturer’s market demand to its own price. As specified in Assumption 3, when
the price of product i is decreased by one unit, the product will gain bp+θp more customers.
Amongst these customers, θp of them are switching from the competitor’s product while bp
of them are the direct result of a larger market demand due to the smaller price. In other
words, bp of them would not buy the product otherwise. A similar explanation can be used
for service-related parameters bs and θs.
Note that we can rearrange the terms in Equation 1 to the following form:
Qi(pi, pj, si, sj) = ai − bppi + θp(pj − pi) + bssi − θs(sj − si). (2)
This is similar to the demand function used in Tsay and Agrawal (2000) [90], except their
model was used to study a system with one manufacturer and two competing retailers in
their study.
Just as in Choi (1996) and Tsay and Agrawal (2000), the functional representation
of the mean demand given here has the property that, for a fixed set of retailer’s and
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manufacturers’ actions, the total market size does not change with variation in θp, θs. This
can be seen through a comparison with the alternative form
Qi(pi, pj, si, sj) = ai − bppi + θppj + bssi − θssj.
Here, increasing θp(θs) would increase (decrease) the total demand. This is difficult to “ra-
tionalize economically as well as to reconcile with the aspiration of using these parameters
to represent competitive industry” (Tsay and Agrawal 2000).
3.2.2 Cost Structure
In our model, the manufacturers can influence the demand by setting the wholesale prices
and the service levels. On the other hand, the retailer can independently influence the
(retail) price of each product. We do not assume any collusion or cooperation among firms.
Each channel member has the same goal: to maximize his own profit. This leads us to the
following assumption:
ASSUMPTION 4. All channel members try to maximize their own profit and behave
as if they have perfect information of the demand and the cost structures of other channel
members.
The state of information specified in Assumption 4 is typical in analytical modelling,
although it overstates the information climate of the real world. From the model and
Assumption 4, the retailer’s objective is to maximize its profit function, which can be




(pi − wi)Qi(pi, pj, si, sj) (3)
where Qi(pi, pj, si, sj) is as specified in Equation 2.
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To specify each manufacturer’s profit function, we note that manufacturers carry two
types of cost: production cost and service cost. The latter includes the cost of providing
service to customers. This may include the total wage of employees in the service de-
partment, the cost of training these employees, or the cost of hiring outsiders to provide
customer service. Just as in Tsay and Agrawal (2000) [90], we assume diminishing returns
of service. This is specified in the next assumption.
ASSUMPTION 5. Cost of providing service has a decreasing-return property; the next
dollar invested would produce less unit of service than the last dollar - i.e., it becomes more
expensive to provide the next unit of service.
This diminishing return of service can be captured by the quadratic form of service
cost. In our model we assume that the cost of providing si units of service is ηisi
2/2. This
function is also used in Tsay and Agrawal (2000) [90]. Thus, the manufacturers’ profit
function can be written as:





;i = 1, 2 (4)
where ηi is the service cost coefficient of manufacturer i.
3.2.3 Strategic Interactions
Note that so far we have not made any assumptions regarding the bargaining power pos-
sessed by each channel member. The assumption regarding bargaining power possessed by
each firm can influence how the pricing game is solved in our model. Depending on the
situation in any particular industry, the bargaining power of retailers and manufacturers
can vary significantly. In the last few decades there are widely accepted notion that retail-
ers are gaining “power” over the manufacturers. However, the validity of the notion that
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retailers are gaining power at the expense of the manufacturers is being questioned and
studied by researchers in recent years(Ailawadi et al. 1995 [1], Messinger and Narasimhan
1995 [60], Kim and Staelin 1999 [42]).
Following the notions in Choi (1991), variation in bargaining power in a particular
supply chain can create one of the following three scenarios:
1) Manufacturer Stackelberg (MS): The manufacturers have more bargaining power
than the retailer and thus are the Stackelberg leader.
2) Retailer Stackelberg (RS): The retailer has more bargaining power than the manu-
facturers and is the Stackelberg leader.
3) Vertical Nash (VN): Every firm in the system has equal bargaining power.
In modelling the problem, the level of bargaining power possessed by each firm (as
compared to the other firms) is translated into whether the firm is a leader or a follower.
In the game-theoretical approach, the firm with more bargaining power has the first-mover
advantage (Stackelberg leader). The firm with less power would have to respond to the
leader’s decisions. For example, in the Manufacturer Stackelberg game, both manufacturers
simultaneously select wholesale prices and service levels in the first step. The retailer
observes the decisions made by the manufacturers and makes his response to those decisions
in the second step (by choosing retail prices). In the Retailer Stackelberg game the events
take place in reverse, while every firm moves simultaneously in the Vertical Nash game. In
this research, we analyze our model with all three scenarios of different power structures.
We are interested to see the effect of bargaining power on the results.
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3.3 Analytical Results (Manufacturer Stackelberg, Re-
tailer Stackelberg, Vertical Nash)
To analyze our model, we follow a game-theoretical approach. The leader in each scenario
makes his decisions to maximize his own profit, conditioned on the follower’s response
function. The problem can be solved backwards. We begin by first solving for the reaction
function of the follower of the game, given that he has observed the leader’s decisions. For
example, in Manufacturer Stackelberg, the retailer reaction function is derived first, given
that the retailer has observed the decisions made by the manufacturers (on wholesale prices
and service levels). Then, each manufacturer solves his problem given that he knows how
the retailer would react to his decisions.
3.3.1 Manufacturer Stackelberg
3.3.1.1 Retailer Reaction Function
The retailer in this game must choose retail prices p∗1 and p
∗






j |w1, w2, s1, s2) (5)
where ΠR(pi, pj|w1, w2, s1, s2) denotes the profit to the retailer at this stage when he sets
retail prices pi, pj, given earlier decisions by the manufacturers are w1, w2, s1, s2. The first




= ai − 2bppi + θp(pj − 2pi) + bssi − θs(sj − si) + wibp + wiθp
+pjθp − wjθp (6)
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where i ∈ {1, 2} and j = 3− i. To check the optimality, we check the Hessian matrix:
∂Π2R
∂p2i







Assuming that bp > 0 and θp > 0, we have a negative definite Hessian. Therefore, the p1
and p2 calculated above are the optimal reaction functions for the retailer.
Using the first and second order optimality conditions above, we have the following





(bp + θp)ai + θpaj
2bp(bp + 2θp)
− θs(sj − si)
2(bp + 2θp)
+
(bp + θp)bssi + θpbssj
2bp(bp + 2θp)
(7)
where i ∈ {1, 2} and j = 3− i. From equation (7) and (1), we can also obtain the demand
















where i = 1, 2 and j = 3− i. We can see that the equilibrium quantities p∗i and Q∗i for each
product are linear functions of the wholesale prices and service levels by the manufacturers,
and the market bases (a1 and a2).
3.3.1.2 Manufacturers Decisions
Using the retailer’s reaction function, we can derive each manufacturer’s optimal wholesale
price and service level. This is carried out by maximizing each manufacturer’s profit shown
in Equation (4), given the retailer reaction function. The manufacturer i chooses the
wholesale prices w∗i and service level s
∗
i to maximize his own individual profit. Recall that
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j , si, s
∗
j) (10)
where ΠMi(wi, wj, si, sj) is the profit of manufacturer i at this stage when manufacturers
set their wholesale prices at wi, wj and service levels at si, sj. To find the optimal wholesale




= ai − bp
[
wi +
(bp + θp)ai + θpaj
2bp(bp + 2θp)
− θs(sj − si)
2(bp + 2θp)
+











(2θs + bs)(sj − si)
2(bp + 2θp)
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− bp(bp + θp)bs
2bp(bp + 2θp)
− θp(bs + 2θs)
2(bp + 2θp)
+ bs + θs
]
− ηisi
The second order condition is given below to check the optimality:
∂Π2Mi
∂w2i









Assuming that bp > 0 and θp > 0, we have a negative definite Hessian. Therefore, the wi
and si calculated above are the optimal reaction functions for the manufacturer i.
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The detailed derivation of these expressions may be found in Appendix A. The following
proposition gives the actual closed form solution of wholesale price and service level.






ai +Djaj + (Ei + FiDj)ci + (Fj + EjDj)cj
]
(11)


































Proof: See Appendix A.
Note that if service is not taken into account or is assumed to be zero, equation (7),

























4(bp + θp)2 − θ2p
[
2(bp + θp)ai + θpaj + 2(bp + θp)
2ci + θp(bp + θp)cj
]
(15)
for i ∈ {1, 2} and j = 3 − i. These are the results derived by Choi (1991). Choi (1991)
defines a linear duopoly demand function as Qi = a − bpi + γpj where b = bp + θp and
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γ = θp. His model does not take into account the service provided by manufacturers and
assumes that the two products have equal market base (a1 = a2 = a). Thus, his model is a













of product i when both manufacturers provide service) will be greater than QNSi
∗
(demand






Figure 5 shows the regions where Qi
∗ and QNSi
∗
are compared. Thus, when manufac-
turer i provides its service si ≥ θs(bs+2θs)sj, product i can capture a bigger market than its
competitor.
Now, comparing equations (7) and (13), pi
∗ (retail price of product i when both man-
ufacturers provide service) will be greater than pNSi
∗
(retail price of product i when no
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bp(bp+2θp) (wiS – wiNS)
bpθs + θpbs bpθs + θpbs




service is provided) if the following condition is satisfied
w∗i − wNSi
∗ ≥ [bpθs + θpbp]sj − [(bp + θp)bs + bpθs]si
bp(bp + 2θp)
. (17)













∗ will be greater than pNSi
∗






The Retailer Stackelberg scenario arises in markets where retailers’ sizes are large compared
to their suppliers. For example, large retailers like Walmart and Target can influence each
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product’s sales by lowering price. Because of their sizes, the retailers can maintain their
margin on sales while squeezing profit from their suppliers. The suppliers are mostly
concerned with receiving orders from the retail giants. Similar game-theoretic framework
as applied in the Manufacturer Stackelberg case is implemented to solve this problem;
i.e., the problem is solved backwards. First, the suppliers’ problem is solved to derive
the response function conditional on the retail prices chosen by the retailer. The retailer
problem is then solved given that the retailer knows how the manufacturers would react to
the retail prices he sets.
3.3.2.1 Manufacturers Reaction Functions
Each manufacturer is trying to maximize his own profit





for i ∈ {1, 2}. To cope with competition, manufacturer i chooses equilibrium wholesale

















j , si, s
∗
j |p1, p2) (20)
where ΠMi(w1, w2, s1, s2|p1, p2) is the profit to manufacturer i at this stage when manufac-
turers set wholesale prices w1, w2 and service levels s1, s2, given earlier decisions on retail
price p1, p2 by the retailer.
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= (wi − ci)(bs + θs)− ηisi
The second order condition is given below to check for optimality
∂Π2Mi
∂w2i
= −bp − θp
∂Π2Mi
∂wi∂si




The second order condition shows that we have a negative definite Hessian. Therefore, the
wi and si calculated above are the optimal reaction functions for the manufacturer i.Using
the first and second order conditions above, the response wholesale price and service level
for each manufacture can be derived and are given in the next proposition.














ai − Ljaj − (θpLj +G)pi + (GLj + θp)pj
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(22)














Proof: See Appendix A.
We can see that the optimal service responses for both manufacturers do not depend
on the production cost. Even for the optimal wholesale price responses, the manufacturers
do not need to know the production cost of their competitors. Retail prices can be easily
observed in the market. The value of market bases can be estimated by the manufacturers
by conducting a market survey.
3.3.2.2 Retailer Decision
Having the information about the reaction functions of manufacturers, the retailer would
then use them to maximize his profit
ΠR = (p1 − w1(p1, p2))Q1(p1, p2) + (p2 − w2(p1, p2))Q2(p1, p2). (23)
The retailer in this game must choose retail prices p∗1 and p
∗







where ΠR(p1, p2) denotes the profit to the retailer at this stage when he set retail prices















































To check for optimality, we check the Hessian matrix:
∂Π2R
∂p2i







Assuming that bp > 0 and θp > 0, we have a negative definite Hessian. Therefore, the p1
and p2 calculated above are the optimal reaction functions for the retailer.
Using the first and second order optimization conditions, the equilibrium retail prices
can be derived and are given in the following proposition.
PROPOSITION 3.3. In the Retailer Stackelberg case, the equilibrium retail price p∗1 and
p∗2 chosen by the retailer are
p∗1 =
(X2U1 − Y V1)a1 + (Y V2 −X2U2)a2 + (X2ρ1 − Y σ1)Wc1 + (Y ρ2 −X2σ2)Wc2
X1X2 − Y 2
p∗2 =
(Y U1 −X1V1)a1 + (X1V2 − Y U2)a2 + (Y ρ1 −X1σ1)Wc1 + (X1ρ2 − Y σ2)Wc2
X1X2 − Y 2
.
Proof: See Appendix A.
These equations show linear relationship between retail price and market bases and




The Vertical Nash model is studied as a benchmark to both the Manufacturer Stackelberg
and Retailer Stackelberg cases. In this model, every firm has equal bargaining power and
thus makes his decisions simultaneously. This scenario arises in a market in which there
are relatively small to medium-sized manufacturers and retailers. In this market it is
reasonable to assume that a manufacturer may not know the competitor’s wholesale price
but can observe its retail price. Since a manufacturer cannot dominate the market over
the retailer, his price decision is conditioned on how the retailer prices the product. On
the other hand, the retailer must also condition its retail price decisions on the wholesale
price.
Again, game-theoretic framework is employed to derive the reaction function of each
firm in the supply chain. Fortunately, the reaction functions for the retailer and the man-
ufacturers were already derived in the Manufacturer Stackelberg game and the Retailer
Stackelberg game respectively. From the Manufacturer Stackelberg game, the retailer reac-




















where i ∈ {1, 2} and j = 3 − i. From the Retailer Stackelberg game, the manufacturers











ai − Ljaj − (θpLj +G)pi + (GLj + θp)pj
]
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for wholesale price and service level respectively. Hi, K, Li,Mi, Ni, and G for i = 1, 2 and
j = 3 − i are defined as in the Retailer Stackelberg game. Solving the above equations
simultaneously yields the Nash equilibrium solution. The equilibrium retail prices can be
derived and are given in the following proposition.
PROPOSITION 3.4. In Vertical Nash case, the equilibrium retail price p∗1 and p
∗
2 chosen
by the retailer are
p1 =




(γ1κ2 + λ2κ1)a1 + (γ1ν2 + λ2ν1)a2 + γ1ψ2c1 + λ2ψ1c2
γ1γ2 − λ1λ2
(31)
where κi, λi, νi and ψi for i = 1, 2 are constants.
Proof: See Appendix A.
3.3.4 Comparison of Results
In this section, we compare the results from the three different scenarios to focus on the
effect of power structure on prices, service levels, and profits of each channel member.
However, when the two manufacturers are not identical (in production cost or market
base), it is difficult to compare the results from different scenarios since there will be a
market leader and a follower. In order to separate the effects of different power structures
from the effects of cost differences, we assume identical manufacturers (same market base,
production cost and service cost coefficient). This assumption simplifies the results given
previously by setting ai = aj = a, ci = cj = c, and ηi = ηj = η. The following theorem
summarizes the results with the identical manufacturers assumption.
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THEOREM 3.1. When the two manufacturers are identical (same market base, produc-
tion cost and service cost coefficient), the retail price, wholesale price, service level, demand
























A−B (a + Γc)
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, Φ = 2(H + K) + ηbp + bs(bs + θs)
Ψ = 2(H + K + ηbp), Υ = 2(Λa + bpΘc)− (bs+θs)
2
2(A−B) (a + Γc)
Table 2: Comparison of results from three scenarios
Proof: See Appendix A.
When bs = θs = 0, the results given in Table 3.1 reduce to the results given by Choi
(1991) in which competition in service is not taken into account. The results in Table 3.1
show that the equilibrium wholesale and retail price, service level, and demand quantity
are a linear function of both market base and production cost. By comparing the results
from each scenario, we have the following proposition.
COROLLARY 3.1. When the two manufacturers are identical (same market base, pro-
duction cost and service cost coefficient) and ηbp > bs(bs + θs) and a > bpc, s
MS < sRS <
sV N .
Proof: See Appendix A.
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This proposition states that when the manufacturers possess the most bargaining power,
consumers receive the least benefit from service. The proposition shows that the consumers
are better off when there is no dominant power between the retailer and manufacturers.
This is reflected in higher service levels and greater demand quantity in the VN scenario
as compared to those in MS and RS.
We next compares other quantities among the three scenarios. We find that the results
of comparison depend on the value of bs and θs. When bs and θs are greater than zero, the
results from Manufacturer Stackelberg can vary, depending on the values of the parameters.
Thus, they can not be compared to the results from the other two cases. However, when
bs = θs = 0, the results from all three games in Table 3.1 can be simplified and compared.
The following corollary states these findings.
COROLLARY 3.2. When the two manufacturers are identical (same market base, pro-
duction cost and service cost coefficient) and ηbp > bs(bs + θs) and a > bpc, we have the
following results
(a) If bs and θs > 0 (b) If bs and θs = 0
1 N/A pMS < pV N < pRS
2 QRS < QV N QMS, QRS < QV N
3 wV N > wRS wMS > wV N > wRS


















Proof: See Appendix A.
Part (b) of Corollary 3.2 is similar to the results given by Choi (1991) and Lee and
Staelin (1997) [50]. Their models do not include the service component (i.e., bs = θs = 0 in
50
their models). Thus, Proposition 3.2 provides more general results than those in existing
literature.
Note that when bs and θs > 0, it is not possible to compare the results from the
Manufacturer Stackelberg case with the other two cases. This is because the values of
bs and θs can influence the nature of competition. When bs and θs are significant larger
than bp and θp, the two manufacturers will focus on service competition. On the other
hand, if bp and θp are significant larger than bs and θs, manufacturers will concentrate on
price competition. Thus, the relative amount of price and service level in the Manufacturer
Stackelberg case as compared to the other two cases can vary.
Note also that we can not compare the retail price among the three cases. This is also
due to the nature of competition in the industry. When bp and θp are significant larger
than bs and θs, the result will be close to that given in part (b) (i.e., p
MS < pV N < pRS).
However, if bs and θs are significant larger than bp and θp, the manufacturers will focus
on service competition. In this case, no definite statement can be concluded from the
comparison of the retail price between the three cases.
3.4 Numerical Studies
In this section, we use numerical approach to studies the behavior of firms when facing
changing environment. We follow existing literature (e.g., Tsay and Agrawal (2000) [90]
and Vilcassin et al. (1999) [91]) in defining the range of some parameters2. We explore how
retail prices, wholesale prices, service levels, and profits are affected by changes in industry
conditions, i.e., ai, ci, ηi, bp, θp, bs and θs. Changes in ai, ci, and ηi reflect changes from
2The range of parameters we use in this section can be found in Appendix A.
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individual company. On the other hand, variations in bp, θp, bs and θs reflect the dynamic
environment of the whole industry. This is because the degree to which prices or services
affect brand loyalty can change over time due to continuing competition. Thus, the results
in this section can help us understand the sensitivity of our results to either firm-specific
or industry-wide changes.
3.4.1 Individual Manufacturer Change
From the results in the last section, we found that, regardless of power structure, as market
base of manufacturer i increases, the firm can sell its product at a higher price and with
larger quantity. This brings in more revenue and makes it affordable for the manufacturer to
provide more services. This in turn creates even more demand for the product and increases
profit. We also found out that as the market base of product i increases, manufacturer j’s
profit also increases. This might be counterintuitive but can be explained as follows: the
increase in competitor’s profit is due to the factor θp in demand function which reflects the
fact that some fixed proportion of customers will switch from product i to product j due
to competition. However, the increase in price, service level and profit of product j will be
smaller than those of product i. This result is summarized in the next proposition.
OBSERVATION 3.1. Regardless of power structure, an increase in market base in one




























f) 0 < ∂ΠR
∂ai
Similar phenomenon also occurs when ci increases, except that now the increase has
adverse effect on demand quantity, service level and profit of product i. The result shows
that firm i will sell its product at a higher price and provide less service. This brings
the firm less profit. We found out that as ci increases, pj also increases. However, this
increase in pj is at a smaller magnitude than the increase in pi. As si decreases due to
a higher ci, sj increases. Thus, demand and profit for product j increase while those for
product i decrease. Note that the retailer is also hurt if the production cost of one of the
manufacturers increases; this is because of the decrease in total demand due to a higher
price. The next proposition states this result.
OBSERVATION 3.2. Regardless of power structure, an increase in production cost in


























f) 0 > ∂ΠR
∂ci
We also found that when manufacturer i has an advantage on service cost coefficient
(i.e., ηi < ηj), it will provide more service, and sell the product at lower wholesale price.
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However, its product will have a higher retail price. This leads us to the following result.
OBSERVATION 3.3. When ηi < ηj, the retailer will act as a market segmenter and sell
the product with high service at high (retail) price and sell the product with low service at
low (retail) price. Namely, si > sj and pi > pj even though wi < wj.
When manufacturer i has an advantage on service cost coefficient (i.e., ηi < ηj), he can
sell at a lower price since his service cost is less than that of his competitor. However, the
retailer will sell product i at a higher retail price. The retailer makes up for the smaller
profit from the low service product by a bigger profit from the higher service product. This
result emphasizes the role of the retailer as an intermediary. The consumers can not enjoy
better service and lower price offered by manufacturer i due to the existence of the retailer.
In order to receive high service offered by manufacturer i, they must pay a higher price.
3.4.2 Industry Change
To study the influence of bp, θp, bs and θs, we assume that the two manufacturers are
identical with the same market base (ai), production cost (ci), and service cost coefficient
(ηi). Tables 3.2 to 3.4 show the results from changes in both the individual and industry
parameters. The effect can be either monotonic increasing (as indicated by a + sign) or
decreasing (− sign), or neither (+/− sign). It can be linear (as indicated by subscript l),
nonlinear with a convex (cx), or a concave (cc) characteristic, or neither (nl). The results
from this analysis give the next observation.
OBSERVATION 3.4. The characteristic of changes in prices, service levels and profits
from variations in bp, and θp does not depend on the power structure assumption. On
the other hand, the characteristic of changes due to service-related parameters (bs and θs)
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depends on the power structure assumption and on the values of other parameters.
We next examine in details the results from Table 3.2 to 3.4 on the sensitivity of prices,
service levels, and profits to changes of each parameter.
Manufacturer Stackelberg
ai ci ηi bp θp bs θs
Wholesale Price +l +l +cc −cx −cx −cc −nl
Service Level +l −l −cx −cx −cx +cc −cx
Profit +cx −cx +/− −cx −cx +/− −cc
Retail Price +l +l +cc −cx −cx +/− −cx
Profit +cx −cx −cx −cx +cc +nl +/−
Demand +l −l −cx −cx +cc +nl +/−
Table 3: Sensitivity Analysis with Increases in Specific Parameters for Manufacturer
Stackelberg
Retailer Stackelberg
ai ci ηi bp θp bs θs
Wholesale Price +l +l +cc −cx −cx +cx +/−
Service Level +l −l +/− −cx −cx +cx +/−
Profit +cx −cx −cx −cx −cx +nl +/−
Retail Price +l +l +cx −cx −cx +nl +/−
Profit +cx −cx −cx −cx +cc +nl +/−
Demand +l −l −cx −cx +cc +/− +/−
Table 4: Sensitivity Analysis with Increases in Specific Parameters for Retailer Stackelberg
Case
Vertical Nash
ai ci ηi bp θp bs θs
Wholesale Price +l +l +cc −cx −cx +cx +cx
Service Level +l −l −cx −cx −cx +cx +cx
Profit +cx −cx +cc −cx −cx +/− −cc
Retail Price +l +l −cx −cx −cx +cx +cx
Profit +cx −cx −cx −cx +cc +cx +cx
Demand +l −l +cc −cx +cc +cx +cx
Table 5: Sensitivity Analysis with Increases in Specific Parameters for Vertical Nash Case
3.4.2.1 Market Sensitivity to Own Price (bp)
Recall that bp is the number of new customers the product attracts as its price is decreased
by 1 unit. This is different from the number of a competitor’s customers who switch
products due to a price difference, θp. As can be seen in Tables 3.2 to 3.4, as price sensitivity
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increases, the manufacturers tend to concentrate on lowering price and provide less service.
However, it turns out that demand decreases due to less service. Therefore, the profits for
the retailer and manufacturers decrease.
3.4.2.2 Market Sensitivity to Price Difference (θp)
We can see that as θp increases, the two manufacturers tend to concentrate on competing
to lower the price. This allows them to decrease the service level since it is not the key
competing factor. As the two manufacturers compete in price, they also induce a gain
in demand quantity. The retailer’s profit improves as it enjoys more sales. However, the
manufacturers’ profit decreases due to the competition to cut price.
3.4.2.3 Market Sensitivity to Own Service (bs)
When the value of bs is less than the value of bp, the two manufacturers will concentrate
on lowering retail price. This is because consumer demand is more sensitive to price than
service. This leads to a decreasing retail price and a smaller service level. When bs is
higher than bp, the two manufacturers will begin to compete to provide a higher service
level. This allows the retailer to charge a higher retail price as demand is more sensitive to
service changes than to price changes. However, since the cost of providing the next unit of
service increases by a power of 2, it is not economical to keep increasing the service level.
Therefore, when the service reaches a certain level the two competitors must again switch
to competing to offer the lower price. This leads to a decreasing retail price again when
bs is large. Demand quantities for both products and the retailer’s profit increase when
this phenomenon occurs. The manufacturers’ profit first increases due to higher revenue.
However, it later decreases when the cost of providing services gets too high, as they can
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not make up for the investment in service from sales to the retailer.
3.4.2.4 Market Sensitivity to Service Difference (θs)
We next examine the effects of varying the value of θs, the market sensitivity to difference
in service, on the optimal solution, given that the two manufacturers are symmetrical. It
turns out that as θs increases, the level of service decreases. This phenomenon may be
explained as follows: since the cost of providing service increases by a power of 2, it is not
economical to invest in service when the market is so sensitive to the competitor’s service.
Therefore, the service level lowers when θs increases. The two manufacturers switch to
competing to lower the price. This is reflected in the low price for both products when θs is
high. The demand for both products first increases because of price competition. However,
it then decreases once the level of service decreases beyond a certain level. The profits of
the retailer and manufacturers express the same property. Namely, they decrease as the
market sensitivity to competitor’s service increases.
3.5 Conclusions
Our primary objective is to highlight the importance of service from manufacturers in the
interactions between two competing manufacturers and their common retailer, facing end
consumers who are sensitive to both retail price and manufacturer service. We also explore
the role of the retailer and its bargaining power by examining the supply chain over three
different scenarios. Using the game-theoretic approach, our analysis found a number of
insights into the economic behavior of firms, which could serve as the basis for empirical
study in the future.
In this chapter, we derive expressions for equilibrium retail and wholesale prices, service
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levels, profits, and demand quantity for each product. We then analyze the results and give
some insights on the influence of each parameter. Our results show that it is more beneficial
to consumers when there is no dominant player(s) in vertical strategic interaction. In such
case, the consumers receive more manufacturer service and can buy the product at a lower
price. A counterintuitive result shows that as market base of one product increases, the
competitor also benefits but at a smaller magnitude. Furthermore, when one manufacturer
has an economic advantage in providing service, the retailer will act to separate market
segment by selling products with low service at a low price and selling products with high
service at a high price.
Our results, however, are based upon simplistic assumptions about the demand function.
Thus, there are possible extensions to improve our model. First, different or more general
forms of the demand function can be used to analyze the problem. Another possibility
is to consider the problem with demand uncertainty. In that case, the problem faced by
the retailer will be a two-product newsvendor problem with price-dependent demand (we
consider this stochastic demand assumption in Chapter 5).
Our model assumes a decreasing return in providing service to the consumers. An alter-
native assumption is to assume economies-of-scale in providing service. Similar alternatives
can also be applied to the production cost function. Our model assumes linear production
cost (fixed per-unit production cost). A more general production function can be used to
reflect scale economies.
We can extend the model over multiple periods to specifically study temporal dynamics
in the supply chain. The learning effect can be then examined. The new model can
analyze how firms and consumers can make use of their experiences and learn over repeated
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transactions. We explore this multiple period model in Chapter 4.
Furthermore, the retailer in our model enjoys regional monopolistic advantage. An
alternative is to build a model with two or more competing retailers. Other possibilities may
include the situation where one manufacturer owns and controls a retailer as a “company
store” and competes with regular channel. A more general model can also be built to
have the service components both from the manufacturers and from the retailer. Another
possible extension is to examine various mechanisms to coordinate the supply chain, such
as vertical integration or two-part tariffs.
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CHAPTER IV
LEARNING IN SUPPLY CHAIN WITH
REPEATED TRANSACTIONS AND SERVICE
CONTRIBUTIONS
4.1 Introduction
Chapter 3 studies the situation where two manufacturers compete through one common
retailer. We examine the problem with a single period model. However, in reality, the
interactions between the manufacturers, retailer, and consumers can occur repeatedly over
multiple periods or product generations. For example, in the PC industry, consumers
upgrade their PCs every 3-5 years (see [2]). The industry has also seen its product life
cycle decrease in recent years ([4], [52]). Thus, customers gain more experience on price and
service every time they upgrade products. The price they paid and the service they received
during their last experience will influence their next upgrading decisions. In addition,
with the advent of the Internet, information on prices and service reputation of many
manufacturers has been made available to consumers on many websites.
In this chapter, we study the inter-temporal behavior of the manufacturers and retailer
in the supply chain introduced in Chapter 3. Each period can be thought of as one selling
season or a span over one product generation. Thus each period in our model can span over
one quarter, 6 months, or 2 years, depending on the nature of the product being considered.
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We are interested in studying the behavior of each firm (one retailer and two competing
manufacturers) over time when faced with “learning” demand. Namely, we assume that
demand for each product in any given period is affected by two types of components: (1)
the difference in prices and services between the two products in the previous period, and
(2) the amount of investment by each manufacturer between each period to expand the
market base of its product (or brand). This assumption on the behavior of consumers
demand reflects the fact that consumers have learned from the experience they had with
the service provided by each manufacturer and the price they paid for the product. They
also are influenced by the investment by each manufacturer to expand its product’s market
base (i.e., promotions, advertising campaigns, etc.).
Thus, within each period, a manufacturer has to make decisions on wholesale price,
service level and amount of investment to expand its market base for that period. The
decision on the amount of investment is taken at the very beginning of each period. The
decisions on the wholesale price and service level are taken by each manufacturer after the
market has been influenced by the investment. Finally, the retailer makes its decision on
the retail price of both products at the end of each period. The decision cycle is repeated
over time in this order. Note that we concentrate on the Manufacturer Stackelberg model
in this chapter1.
In the past, some studies in literature have addressed the pricing in a multi-period
setting. From economic literature, there is stream of research that addresses the issue
of competing firms over multiple periods (see [87] and [76]). However, most studies in
existing literature model problems as a simple repeated game over multiple periods, with
1The study on the Retailer Stackelberg and Vertical Nash is possible in the future and is discussed in
Chapter 6.
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no demand learning. To our knowledge, no one has considered the situation with both
learning consumer demand and competing products sold through one common retailer.
There are also some studies in operations literature that study decision-making over
multiple periods. However, the majority of them only consider a single manufacturer. Issues
related to competition and gaming in pricing decisions among different firms have only been
addressed recently. For example, Cohen and Whang (1997) [17] study a set of strategic
choices facing manufacturers as they design the joint product/service bundle for a product
which may require after-sales service. The price and service quality/price are characterized
by an equilibrium to a sequential game. Vilcassim et al. (1999) [91] formulate a game-
theoretic model of firm interaction to analyze the dynamic price and advertising competition
among firms in a given product market. However, their model does not include a retailer.
Their study uses an econometric model to estimate demand and competitive interaction
parameters and derive some managerial implications for competitive interactions.
In this chapter, we approach the problem by introducing a new methodology for game-
based decision making in multiple (transactions) periods using dynamic systems and control
theory. By applying this new methodology, we answer the following questions:
i. How do the manufacturers make their pricing decisions over time?
ii. How are the prices and service levels in the second period influenced by those in the
first period?
iii. How does the whole supply chain behave over time? What indication(s) is there for
us to learn about the firms’ inter-temporal behavior?
In Section 4.2, the notations are defined and the model is described. The analysis of the
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model using game theory and dynamic systems and control theory is presented in Section
4.3 and 4.4, respectively. Numerical examples are given in the Section 4.5 to represent
possible real world cases. The comparison of results from our model and a myopic model
is presented in Section 4.6. Finally, in Section 4.7 we give final remarks for this chapter.
4.2 Model
4.2.1 Notations
In multiple period model, each decision variable has a subscript t to indicate period being
considered. This is in addition to subscript i which indicates the manufacturer (or product)
associated with the variable.
Let i = 1, 2 be the index for manufacturer/product.
t = 1, 2, ..., N is the index for transaction (or period or cycle or season).
ΠR,t = Retailer’s total profit in the t
th transaction.
ΠMi,t = Manufacturer i’s total profit in the t
th transaction.
pi,t = Retail price of product i in the t
th transaction.
si,t = The amount of service provided by supplier i to the consumer in the t
th transaction.
wi,t = Wholesale price of product i to the retailer in the t
th transaction.
Qi,t = Demand for product i in the t
th transaction.
ai,t = Market base for product i in the t
th transaction.
Ii,t = Investment from manufacturer i to expand its market base at the beginning of
the tth transaction.
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4.2.2 Supply Chain Descriptions
We study the same supply chain structure introduced in the previous chapter. In addition
we extend the problem over multiple periods, i.e. there are two suppliers (manufacturers).
Each supplier manufactures one product. The two products are sold competitively to end
consumers through one common retailer. Just as in Chapter 3, the demand for each product
in each period depends on two factors: (1) the difference in retail prices between the two
competing products, and (2) the difference in level of service provided by the product’s
manufacturer and its competitor.
Thus, within each period, the demand for each product can be expressed as:
Qi,t = ai,t − (bp + θp)pi,t + θppj,t + (bs + θs)si,t − θssj,t (32)
where the definition and range of bp, θp, bs, and θs are the same as is defined in Chapter 3.
Notice that now the variables have two subscripts: one to indicate the manufacturer and
the other to indicate time.
In this chapter, we concentrate on the Manufacturer Stackelberg model. We assume
that the suppliers in oligopolistic markets are able to establish a supplier-driven channel
2. In each transaction the manufacturer decides the level of service. In this model, we use
the same definition of service as defined in Chapter 1. We assume that both manufacturers
are Stackelberg leaders of the supply chain. They simultaneously announce the value of
their decision variables before any transaction occurs. In our model, each manufacturer
announces (simultaneously) the wholesale price and the service level. After that the retailer
2The studies on the other two models introduced in Chapter 3 (Retailer Stackelberg and Vertical Nash)
are possible in the future.
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reacts to the announcement by deciding what the retail price of each product should be.
However, the multi-period model studied in this chapter also takes into account the
inter-temporal influence of retail prices and services on consumer demand in the next
period. This is a result of the “learning” behavior of consumers. This “learning” behavior
is reflected in the increase or decrease in the size of each product’s market base over time
(indicated by ai,t in the Equation 32 above. Particularly, each product’s market base is
affected by two inter-temporal factors: (1) the difference in retail price from the previous
period, and (2) the difference in level of service provided by the manufacturers in the
previous period.
In addition to these two inter-temporal factors, the manufacturers can influence the
size of their product’s market base by making some investment to expand its market base
(i.e., through advertising campaigns, improved business infrastructure, alliance formation,
promotions, etc.) at the beginning of each period. This action taken by the manufacturers
also affects the size of ai,t.
Figure 7 shows the timeline of events within each period. Within each period, the
overall pricing and ordering decisions in the channel follow the following sequence:
Step 1. Manufacturers simultaneously choose the level of investment to influence their market
base for this period.
Step 2. The market base (ai,t) for each product is updated according to the influence from
the following factors: (1) the difference in retail price from the previous period, (2)
the difference in level of service provided by the manufacturers in the previous period,
and (3) the amount of investment each manufacturer make at the beginning of the
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Retailer gives orders





Timeline of events within each period (selling season):
2 3 4
Consumers learning is 
accounted for in the 
market base. 
Each manufacturer 
invests to expand 
its market base.
1




Figure 7: Timeline of events within each transaction.
period to influence the size of its product’s market base. The information about the
market base is revealed before the next step.
Step 3. Manufacturers simultaneously choose their wholesale price to be offered to the retailer
and the service levels to be offered to end consumers. Each manufacturer makes their
decisions so as to maximize its own profit.
Step 4. In response to manufacturers’ actions, the retailer decides the retail price of both
products so as to maximize his expected profit.
Step 5. The consumer demand for each product is realized. The profit for every firm in the
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supply chain is realized.
We assume that each manufacturer has complete information about its competitor and
the retailer’s cost parameters and also the consumer’s demand responsiveness to the retail
price. Therefore, considering the problem from Step 3 to Step 5, for given wholesale prices
chosen in Step 3, the manufacturer knows the retailer’s response in Step 4 and, hence, their
own profit in Step 5. Each manufacturer will take this into account so as to choose the
wholesale price and service level to maximize his own profit. Similar reasoning also applies
when we consider the problem faced by the manufacturers in Step 1. The manufacturers
can anticipate the market reaction (through the size of market base) in Step 2 when making
their decisions on the amount of investment in Step 1. Furthermore, the manufacturers in
Step 1 can also take into account their own best anticipated courses of action in Step 3 and
the retailer reactions in Step 4 to maximize their individual profit to be realized in Step 5.
Figure 8 give a schematic representation of the supply chain being studied in this chapter.
4.2.3 Learning Demand Function
As mentioned briefly in the description of the events that occur within each period, the
market base (ai,t) for each product in any period is influenced by the following factors: (1)
the difference in retail price from the previous period, (2) the difference in level of service
provided by the manufacturers in the previous period, and (3) the amount of investment
each manufacturer make at the beginning of the period to influence the size of his prod-
uct’s market base. We also make the following assumptions about the consumer behavior
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Figure 8: Supply Chain System.
ASSUMPTION 1. Consumers have the memory of past transactions only for the last
period.
This assumption simply states that consumer’s memory on history of past transactions
can go back to only one period. This assumption simplifies our model on the learning part
of consumers.
ASSUMPTION 2. In learning process, consumers memorize and value the differences
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in retail prices and service levels from the last period.
We make this assumption to emphasize the net effect of the differences in retail prices
and services on demand. In other words, consumers only care about the relative differences
in the retail prices and service levels between the two products. Information on past prices
and service reputation has been made available recently to consumers on many websites
on the Internet.
ASSUMPTION 3. The investment by one manufacturer (Ii,t) does not directly affect
the market base of the other product within the same period (aj,t).
This assumption separates the direct effect of investment by one manufacturer from
the action by another manufacturer. However, through strategic movement by the two
manufacturers, it is possible that an indirect effect exists. Namely, an increase in investment
by manufacturer i can induce more investment by manufacturer j. Our analysis of the
model considers this indirect influence through game-theoretic framework.
ASSUMPTION 4. The investment in market base by a manufacturer has a decreasing
return-to-scale.
This assumption is used to capture the fact that the manufacturers can not keep in-
vesting their money to expand their market base. The assumption is characterized by the
square root of Ii,t in Equation (34).
With the assumption above, the exact market base equation is given below:






























Equations (33) and (34) reflect the “learning” by consumers about the experience they
had gained before making their buying decisions within this period (before Step 3-5 begins).
4.2.4 Manufacturers’ and Retailer’s Profit Functions
As in Chapter 3, Manufacturer i’s profit within each period is the revenue minus cost.
However, in this chapter we introduce Ii,t as part of the cost to influence the market base
in period t. Therefore, the manufacturer’s profit is slightly modified in this chapter.






where i = 1, 2 and ηi is the service cost coefficient of manufacturer i. The retailer’s profit




(pi,t − wi,t)Qi,t (36)
where Qi,t is as specified in Equation (32).
However, in this chapter we make the following assumption about the objective of each
firm in the supply chain when making its decisions within each period t.
ASSUMPTION 5. In any period t, both the manufacturers and the retailer are maxi-
mizing their own “moving” two-period profit when making their decision on either prices
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or service levels.
This assumption states that both manufacturers and the retailer have a “one-period
look-ahead” behavior. This means that in any period t, each firm will try to maximize the
sum of profits in period t and t+1. Vilcassim et al. (1999) [91] also assume this framework
in their analysis on firms competing on both price and advertisement3. This two-period
optimization assumption is in contrast to the alternative “myopic” assumption in which
firms only care for current period profit when making their decisions. It is also in contrast
to another alternative model in which firms try to maximize their profits over all N periods
(i.e., until the end of a finite time horizon). The difficulty in that framework is tractability
of the closed-form solution.
The firms in our model try to maximize two-period profits. The question in our frame-
work is whether the moving two-period solution provides a reasonable approximation to
the behavior of firms in the real world. To address this question, we refer to results from an
empirical study by Vilcassim et al. (1999) [91]. They found that the relative effect of cur-
rent period actions on demand two periods in the future “ranged from around 18% to 9%,
while the effect three periods into the future was at most around 8%.” Hence, the moving
two-period model can be treated as a reasonable approximation to real profit maximizing
behavior of firms.
Thus, in any period, the manufacturers must ask how the decision they makes on
investment (Ii,t), will affect the market base in the same period t. They must also ask how
the decision on wholesale price and service level in period t would induce the reaction by
3Their study uses econometric model to estimate the demand and competitive interaction parameters.
Some parameters in our study rely on their study to get an estimation on the range of value.
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the retailer within period t, and also the market base in period t + 1. The market base
(ai,t) would in turn influence the decisions by every firm in period t+ 1. The retailer must
also ask a similar question. Specifically, the retailer must think ahead how his reaction to
wholesale prices and service levels in period t would affect both products’ market bases
(and his own profit) in period t+ 1.
The game-theoretic approach to analyze the problem must then take this fact into
account. Note that the analysis on this situation requires more than just a simple repeated
game framework, but a combination of game theory and dynamic systems control. The
game concepts are employed to analyze strategic interactions among firms in the supply
chain. Equilibrium can then be derived. Dynamic systems and control theory concepts are
employed to analyze the evolving equilibrium of the supply chain over time.
4.3 Analysis of the Model Part I: Equilibrium
The equilibrium concept used in our analysis is the subgame-perfect equilibrium. Using a
game-theoretic framework, the problem is solved backwards. Note that the problem must
be analyzed with a two-period framework, according to the way firms set their objectives
as described earlier. However, even though firms maximize their profits over two periods
(t and t+ 1), the decision process is carried out every period by each firm until the end of
time horizon.
Thus, to make a decision for period t, we begin by considering the t+1st period problem.
Once the reaction functions in the t+1st period are derived, the decision problems by each
firm in the tth period are then derived and analyzed. The methodology in calculating
(re)action functions in both periods is similar. First, the reaction function (on retail price)
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by the retailer must be derived. Then the equilibrium wholesale price and service level
given by each manufacturer are derived. Finally, the amount of investment (to induce
market base) made by each manufacturer must be calculated. The only difference between
the calculations in both periods is that when performing the calculations in the t + 1st
period, we assume that firms already have information on the value of prices and service
levels in the tth period and they are trying to maximize only the profit in the t+1st period.
The calculations for values in the tth period are carried out with the assumption that firms
know the reaction functions in the t + 1st and they all try to maximize their individual
profits over two periods.
4.3.1 Second (Next) Period Analysis
We solve the problem by first separating the problem into two phrases. The first one can be
called an inter−temporal subproblem. This is the subproblem where the decision variables
involve some variables from the previous period. This subproblem covers the Step 1 and
Step 2 defined in Figure 7. The other subproblem is an intra− temporal subproblem. This
is the subproblem in which all the parameters and variables are the results of decisions
made within the period. This subproblem covers the Step 3 to Step 5 in Figure 7. We
solve the problem by working backwards. Thus, we solve the intra-temporal subproblem
first. Then we can consider solving the inter-temporal part of the problem.
4.3.1.1 Intra-Temporal Subproblem
The intra − temporal subproblem in period t + 1 is the same as the problem we already
studied in Chapter 3. This is because by the time the retailer made decision on retail prices
in Step 5 and the manufacturers make their decisions on wholesale prices and service levels
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in Step 3, the market base parameters (ai,t+1 for i = 1, 2) have already taken into account
the investment made by the manufacturers in Step 1 of period t+1 and any inter-temporal
effects from the previous period. Thus, the objective function of each manufacturer right
before the start of Step 3 does not include the investment (Ii,t+1). Therefore, the results
of studies on the Manufacturer Stackelberg model in Chapter 3 can be applied to the
intra − temporal subproblem here. The manufacturer’s equilibrium wholesale price and






























where i, j ∈ {1, 2}, j 6= i and
Ai = 4ηi(bp + θp) + (bs + θs)
















n11 = E1 + F1D2 n12 = F2 + E2D2
n21 = F1 + E1D1 n22 = E2 + F2D1
ϕi =
2ηiAj
A1A2−B1B2 li = ϕi
(bs+θs)
2ηi
m11 = l1(E1 + F1D2 − 1ϕ1 ) m12 = l1(F2 + E2D2)
m21 = l2(F1 + E1D1) m22 = l2(E2 + F2D1 − 1ϕ2 ).
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With the results shown above we can calculate for the expression of the retail price (pi,t






























where the definition of tij, yij, gij, and hij for i, j ∈ {1, 2} are given in Appendix B.
Note that the market bases (ai,t+1 for i = 1, 2) in Equation (37) to (39) are the market
bases after the “learning” effect by the consumer (shown in Equation (34)) has taken
place earlier in the period. In the next section, the amount of investment (Ii,t+1) each
manufacturer should invest to influence the market base will be derived.
4.3.1.2 Inter-Temporal Decisions
We next consider the decisions by the two manufacturers on the investment (Ii,t+1). The
objective function of the manufacturers at this stage is as shown in Equation (35). The
manufacturer i must choose the investment I∗i,t+1 to maximize its equilibrium profit. Let
pt = [p1,t, p2,t], wt = [w1,t, w2,t], st = [s1,t, s2,t], It = [I1,t, I2,t]. The investment I
∗
i,t+1 at





j,t+1|pt,wt, st, It) (40)
where ΠMi,t+1(Ii,t+1, I
∗
j,t+1|pt,wt, st, It) denotes the profit to manufacturer i at this stage,
given earlier decisions on retail price pt, wholesale price wt, service levels st, and Investment
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It. Using Equation 34, the first order conditions can be shown as
0 =
{
2ηiQi,t+1Kj + (wi,t+1 − ci)
[1
2















where i, j ∈ {1, 2} and j 6= i.
Given the first order condition in Equation 41 and the results from Equation 37, 37,
and 39, one can derive the following linear relationship between the square root of the
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where the definition of δij, and ∆i for i, j ∈ {1, 2} are given in Appendix B.
Finally, the market base in period t+1 (ai,t+1), which is the market base after influence
from the investment I1,t+1 and I2,t+1 has been taken into account, can be derived by substi-
tuting Equation (42) into Equation (33). As a result, the market base in period t+ 1 can
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4.3.2 First (Current) Period Analysis
After knowing how each firm will behave in period t+ 1 given the information on decision
in period t, we next consider the decisions faced by each firm in period t.
4.3.2.1 Intra-Temporal Subproblem
Retailer Reaction Function
The retailer’s decision on the retail prices of both products in period t can now be
examined. Note that the objective of the retailer is now to maximize the profit over two
periods. Specifically, its objective function is





(pi,τ − wi,τ )Qi,τ (44)
where ΠR,t(pt|wt, st, It) is the sum of retailer’s profit in period t and t+ 1 when the retail










j,t|wt, st, It) (45)
where ΠR,t(pi,t, pj,t|wt, st, It) is the retailer profit when the retail price is pi,t and pj,t, given
earlier decisions on wholesale prices wt, service levels st, and investment It. The first order
condition for Equation (44) is used to find p∗i,t (i ∈ {1, 2}).
∂ΠR,t
∂pi,t
= Qi,t + (pi,t − wi,t)
∂Qi,t
∂pi,t



















Qj,t+1 + (pj,t+1 − wj,t+1)
∂Qj,t+1
∂pi,t
Using the first order condition above, the retailer’s reaction function to wholesale prices


















where the expressions for ψij, ζij, and Υi for i, j ∈ {1, 2} and j 6= i are given in Appendix
B.
Manufacturers Decision Process
The retailer’s reaction function in Equation (46) gives the manufacturers information
on how their decisions will affect the retail prices and their profits. The manufacturers then
use this information to set wholesale prices and service levels to maximize their individual














for i, j ∈ {1, 2} and j 6= i. Note that in Equation (47), Ii,t is a constant. This is because
when the manufacturers make their decisions on the wholesale prices and service levels,
the decisions on I1,t and I2,t have already been made. Each manufacturer must choose the





















where ΠMi,t(wt, st|It) is the profit of manufacturer i at this stage when manufacturers set
wholesale prices at wt and service levels at st, given earlier decisions on investment It.





































Solving the first order conditions above, the expression for wi,t and si,t can be derived as






























The expressions for ϑij, ςij, κij, and νij for i ∈ {1, 2} and j = 3− i are given in Appendix
B.
4.3.2.2 Inter-Temporal Subproblem
Continuing working backwards, the next step is for the manufacturers to analyze their
















where i ∈ {1, 2} and δ is discount factor. For simplicity, we assume that δ is 1 from now on.
Here Ii,t (i ∈ {1, 2}) are decision variables. Each manufacturer must choose the investment






where ΠMi,t(I1,t, I2,t) is manufacturer i’s profit over two periods when manufacturer 1 and 2
invest I1,t and I2,t, respectively. The first order condition from Equation (52) with respect
to the investment Ii,t is then stated as follows







































where the expressions for $ij, and εij for i, j ∈ {1, 2} and j 6= i are given in Appendix B.
Using the fact that the market base in the tth period is



















where the expressions for χij, and ωij for i, j ∈ {1, 2} and j 6= i are given in Appendix B.
The result in Equation (57) is based on the assumption that ai,0 = ai where ai is the
initial market base for product i, and pi,0 = si,0 = 0 for i ∈ {1, 2}.
4.4 Analysis of The Model Part II: Dynamic Sys-
tems
Equation (57) governs the dynamics of market bases and production cost over time. Alter-
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Φ(t) = MΦ(t− 1) (59)
Equation (58) and (59) both represent a homogeneous dynamic system. Note that the
production cost c1,t and c2,t does not change over time. From the system equation above,
a “system equilibrium” point can be defined in the following definition.
DEFINITION 4.1. A vector Φ is an equilibrium point of a dynamic system if it has the
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property that once the system state vector is equal to Φ it remains equal to Φ for all future
time.
Thus, with the assumption that Φ(0) 6= 0, a system equilibrium point must satisfy the
condition
Φ = MΦ (60)
Equation (60) is useful to find the system equilibrium when one exists. From dynamic
system theory, the existence of system equilibrium depends on the value of the dominant
eigenvalue of M . Specifically, the following lemma is derived from dynamic system theory.
LEMMA 4.1. (Luenberger [1979])Long term behavior of the market base sizes is deter-
mined by the dominant eigenvalue of M. Subdominant eigenvalues of M determine how
quickly the market bases converge or diverge.
Lemma 4.1 follows directly from dynamic system theory (see Luenberger (1979) [56]
for details) and the structure of homogeneous dynamic system of market bases stated in
Equation (58) and (59). The dominant eigenvalue of M is the eigenvalue with the largest
absolute value. Subdominant eigenvalues of M refer to all other eigenvalues of M. From
Lemma 4.1, we can analyze the dynamic behavior of the whole supply chain (i.e., retail
prices, wholesale prices and service levels) through the dynamic behavior of market bases
governed by Equation (58) and (59). This is because from Section 4.3 we can express any
such variables in any period as a function of market bases and production costs in that
period. From the special structure of M, one can find the dominant eigenvalue directly
from the component of M.
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THEOREM 4.1. Let λD be the dominant eigenvalue of M, then λD equals
(a) 1, if 1 > |χ11|,|χ22|
(b) χ11, if |χ11| > 1,|χ22|
(c) χ22, if |χ22| > 1,|χ11|
where χ11, χ22 are as defined in Equation (58).
Proof:
Eigenvalues of M are scalars λ such that M − λI is singular. This implies one must
solve for λ that satisfies det(M− λI) = 0. However, from the definition of M in Equation
(58), eigenvalues of M are 1, χ11, and χ22 (with 1 having algebraic multiplicity of 2 in this
case). Thus, the dominant eigenvalue must be the biggest of these three numbers. 
The following theorem states the condition that governs the convergent or divergent
behavior of the system.
THEOREM 4.2. If the dominant eigenvalue of M equals to 1, the market bases of both
products converge to a constant over time. Otherwise, the market bases diverge. If the
dominant eigenvalue equals to 1, the system can converge or diverge.
Proof: See Appendix B.
Theorem 4.2 states the dynamic behavior of the market bases of both products over
time. Although the theorem states only the behavior of market bases, other quantities
such as wholesale prices, retail prices, service levels, and demand quantity also follow the
behavior of market bases. If the market bases converge, these variables will converge as
well. Likewise, if the market bases diverge, they will also diverge.
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Even when we know exactly whether the market bases will converge or diverge from the
eigenvalue of M, the dynamic period-by-period behavior of the market bases (and prices
and service levels) can vary. For example, there can be some oscillation in the market bases’
sizes before each of them converge to a value. Alternatively, the market base can smoothly
increase or decrease to a value over time. In the first case, the leader-follower roles can be
alternating between the two products. Namely, the two products can switch the market
leader-follower role4 during the oscillation and before they reach the final convergent value.
The following theorem states the conditions that govern the period-by-period behavior of
the market bases.
THEOREM 4.3. The dynamic behavior of market bases can be predicted by the value of
its dominant eigenvalue as follows:
(i) If every eigenvalue of M is positive, the dynamic pattern of market bases is a geo-
metric sequence of the form rk, which (increasingly) diverge if r > 1 and converge if
r ≤ 1. No oscillation occurs in this case.
(ii) If there is at least one eigenvalue that is negative, the response is an alternating
geometric sequence of the form (−1)k|r|k. If |r| < 1, market base sizes will converge
with decreasing oscillations. If |r| > 1, market base sizes diverge with increasing
oscillations.
Proof: See Appendix B.
Theorem 4.3 characterizes the period-by-period behavior of the system variables. When
4A firm holds market leadership if it has bigger market base than its competition. On the other hand,
the firm will be called the market follower if it has a smaller market base.
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the dominant eigenvalue is negative, the market leader-follower roles between the two man-
ufacturers can be alternating every period due to the oscillation in the system variables (i.e.,
market bases, prices, service levels). When the dominant eigenvalue is real and positive, it
is still possible that the two manufacturers switch their market leadership. However, this
switching can only occur once since there will be no oscillation in the system variables.
Figure 9 shows the situation when all eigenvalues are positive. The dominant eigenvalue
of M is 1.000, while the subdominant eigenvalue equals 0.0588. The system smoothly con-
verges to the system equilibrium predicted by Equation (60). Figure 10 presents a situation
























































Figure 9: The evolution of equilibrium market bases when β = 0.0, γ = 2.8, σ = 2.8,
bp = bs = 2, θp = θs = 1.1, a1,0 = 100, a2,0 = 160, c1 = 5, c2 = 15, η1 = η2 = 5 (Manufacturer
1: Red, Manufacturer 2: Blue, Retailer: *).
when the dominant eigenvalue is greater than one (1.0046 in this case). The subdominant
eigenvalue is 0.0595. In this case, the system does not converge to a system equilibrium.
However, it has a smooth behavior with no oscillation over time.
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Figure 10: The evolution of equilibrium market bases when β = 0.3, γ = 2.8, σ = 2.8,
bp = bs = 2, θp = θs = 1.1, a1,0 = 100, a2,0 = 160, c1 = 5, c2 = 15, η1 = η2 = 5 (Manufacturer
1: Red, Manufacturer 2: Blue, Retailer: *).
Figure 11 presents an example of a situation when the dominant eigenvalue is positive
and equal to 1 but the subdominant eigenvalue is negative and greater than −1. In this
example, the dominant eigenvalue of M is 1, while the subdominant eigenvalue equals -
0.5634. Figure 11 shows that after some oscillation, the system settles down to the system
equilibrium (which follows Equation (60)).
Figure 12 shows the situation when the dominant eigenvalue is positive and greater
than 1 but the subdominant eigenvalue is negative and greater than −1. In this example,
the dominant eigenvalue of M is 1.0046, while the subdominant eigenvalue equals −0.5671.
As can be seen from the figure, the system oscillates during the first few periods before
it settles on a smoother increasing behavior. Note that Manufacturer 1 starts off being a
market leader but ends up by being a market follower. Detailed discussions on this behavior
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Figure 11: The evolution of equilibrium market bases when β = 0.0, γ = 3.8, σ = 2.8,
bp = bs = 2, θp = θs = 1.1, a1,0 = 100, a2,0 = 160, c1 = 5, c2 = 15, η1 = η2 = 5 (Manufacturer
1: Red, Manufacturer 2: Blue, Retailer: *).
of the two manufacturers will be presented in Section 4.5. In the next section, numerical
examples from several scenarios are presented. Some observations and managerial insights
are then provided.
4.5 Numerical Studies on Special Cases
In this section, we show numerical examples of possible real cases. We follow existing
literature (e.g., Tsay and Agrawal (2000) [90] and Vilcassin et al. (1999) [91]) in defining
the range of some parameters. The range of parameters we use in this section can be found
in Appendix B.
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Figure 12: The evolution of equilibrium market bases when β = 0.3, γ = 3.8, σ = 2.8,
bp = bs = 2, θp = θs = 1.1, a1,0 = 100, a2,0 = 160, c1 = 5, c2 = 15, η1 = η2 = 5 (Manufacturer
1: Red, Manufacturer 2: Blue, Retailer: *).
4.5.1 No Oscillation
From Equation (58) and (59) and Theorem 4.3, the occurrence of oscillation behavior of
market depends on the parameter values. With numerical studies, we observe a range of
parameters such that the system smoothly moves to the system equilibrium as defined in
Equation (60). The following observation gives the market conditions such that oscillation
in market behavior would not occur.
OBSERVATION 4.1. The oscillation behavior of the supply chain system will not occur
if all the following conditions hold:
(a) γ ≤ max (bp, θp)
(b) σ ≤ max (bs, θs)
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(c) 0.5σ ≤ γ ≤ 1.5σ.
This observation states that if values of both γ and σ are not very different from each
other and not far different from bp, θp, bs, and θs, market base evolution over time will be
smooth (no oscillations). Part (a) and (b) is reasonable and valid in most situations since
demand should be more sensitive to current price (service) than last period price (service).
To understand part (c), we should examine the case when this condition is not satisfied.
If demand is a lot more sensitive to last period price than last period service (γ >> σ), a
two-period profit-maximizing manufacturer may sell product at a low price in period t and
plan to overprice in period t+ 1. However, when period t+ 1 is reached, the manufacturer
will find that it has a smaller market base in period t + 1 due to overpricing. It then
would have to underprice again in period t + 2 in order to regain the market base loss
due to overpricing in period t + 1. This phenomenon would repeat itself overtime and
cause oscillation in market bases, prices, and service levels. A similar situation can occur
when demand is more sensitive to last period service than the last period price. Thus, in a
situation where demand sensitivities to prices and service levels are not far different from
each other, there will be no oscillation in the system.
Now, consider the situations given in Figure 11 to 12. The only difference in parameter
values between these situations is the β value. When β = 0, the investment Ii,t will not
affect the market base for product i in period t for i = 1, 2. Namely,
ai,t = ai,t−1 − γ(pi,t−1 − pj,t−1) + σ(si,t−1 − sj,t−1) (61)
for i, j ∈ {1, 2} and j 6= i. This is the case when consumers are not sensitive to the
investment made by the manufacturers in current period. Thus, it is not beneficial to the
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manufacturers to invest in any market expansion activities (Ii,t = 0 for i ∈ 1, 2). On the
other hand, if β > 0, the consumers are sensitive to the market investment made by the
manufacturers. Thus, it is always beneficial for the manufacturers to invest some money for
market expansion activities in this case. The following observation captures both scenarios.
OBSERVATION 4.2. The value of consumer sensitivity to market expansion investment
(β) determines whether the system is convergent or divergent:
(i) When β = 0 there will be no investment to expand market bases in any period and
the system will converge.
(ii) When β > 0 the manufacturers will keep investing in expanding the market bases and
the system will diverge.
Figure 9 and 11 shows the situation when β = 0. They show that the system finally
becomes stable. When β > 0, both manufacturers will keep investing to expand their
market bases. In that case, the market base will keep growing as shown in Figure 10 and
12.
From now on, we assume that β > 0 so that the investment to expand market base
by manufacturers will not be zero (Ii,t > 0 for i = 1, 2). We also assume the validity of
conditions given in Observation 4.1 on the range of γ and σ. This is to prevent oscillations
in market bases over time.
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Figure 13: The evolution of equilibrium market bases when β = 0.0, γ = 0.6, σ = 1.8,
bp = bs = 2, θp = θs = 1.1, a1 = 100, a2 = 100, c1 = 5, c2 = 5, η1 = 7, η2 = 5 (Manufacturer
1: Red, Manufacturer 2: Blue).
4.5.2 Service-Emphasized Market
Figure 13 shows a typical case where demand is more sensitive to last period service than
last period price in the learning process5. In this case, we find that the firm with service
cost advantage will be the winner over time. This result assures the importance of service
component in competitions over repeated transactions.
5It is unrealistic to consider market with service only sensitivity and ignore the price component all
together (i.e., β = γ = 0). At least that is not the product type we are concentrating on with our model.
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Figure 14: The evolution of equilibrium market bases when β = 0.0, γ = 1.8, σ = 0.0,
bp = bs = 2, θp = θs = 1.1, a1 = 100, a2 = 100, c1 = 5, c2 = 15, η1 = 5, η2 = 5 (Manufacturer
1: Red, Manufacturer 2: Blue).
4.5.3 Price Sensitive Market
In this example, we investigate the result of a special case where consumers only care about
prices from previous period in their learning process. Namely, β = σ = 0 while γ > 0.
Since β = 0, the system will finally converge to a system equilibrium. In this case, the
final retail price of both products will be the same. However, the company with the cost
advantage (either production cost or service cost advantage) can afford to sell its product
cheaper while providing more service to consumers. This leads to an equilibrium in which
the company with the cost advantage gets more demand for its product and earns greater
profit. The retailer will sell both products at the same price. The following observation
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states this result.
OBSERVATION 4.3. Given that demand is only sensitive to price in its learning process
(i.e., β = σ > 0 and γ > 0), the company with any type of cost advantage will gain more
profit and capture a larger market base than its competitor. The retailer will sell both
products at the same retail price but the firm with cost advantage will be able to support
more service to its customers.
This situation emphasizes the role of the retailer as a middle man who can control the
consumer demand through retail price setting. Since demand is not sensitive to service
from the last period, the role of the middle man is highlighted in this case. Figure 14 shows
the system dynamics in a typical price-sensitive market.
4.5.4 Identical Manufacturers
In this example, we consider the situation when the two manufacturers are identical in
product and service cost. Namely, c1 = c2 = c and η1 = η2 = η. We observe that no matter
how different the initial value the manufacturers have for market bases, both products will
be sold at the same price with the same level of service provided to the consumers. An
example of this scenario is shown in Figure 15.
OBSERVATION 4.4. If all the costs are the same, the two manufacturers will converge
to the same market size and sell their products at the same price, while providing equal
level of service to consumers. This happens even though the two products may start with
different market bases initially.
This observation emphasizes the importance of production and service cost components
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Figure 15: The evolution of equilibrium market bases when β = 0.3, γ = 2, σ = 2,
bp = bs = 2, θp = θs = 1.1, a1 = 120, a2 = 80, c1 = c2 = 15, η1 = η2 = 5 (Manufacturer 1:
Red, Manufacturer 2: Blue, Retailer: *).
in competition between the two manufacturers over repeated transactions. If the two man-
ufacturers possess similar underlying production and service capability, initial advantage
by either company on the market base vanishes over time.
4.5.5 Production Cost Leader vs. Service Cost Leader
In this example, we study competition between two manufacturers that possess different
advantages. One manufacturer, company 1, possesses superior production technology and
thus has a lower production cost. The other, company 2, is more efficient in providing
service and thus has a smaller service cost coefficient. Thus, c1 < c2 and η1 > η2. We
are interested in investigating the extent to which each advantage can help a company to
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compete with the other.
The following observation states that the company with service cost advantage will
always win in the long-run over the company with production cost advantage, no matter
how big the production cost advantage or how small the service cost advantage.
OBSERVATION 4.5. Given that demand is equally sensitive to both price and service
level (i.e., bp = bs, θp = θs, γ = σ > 0) and β > 0, the company with service cost advantage
may earn less profit and capture smaller market base in the beginning. However, it will
finally gain more profit and capture larger market base than its smaller-production cost
competitor. This happens no matter how big the production cost advantage company 1 has
over company 2, or how small the service cost advantage company 2 has over company 1.
This observation emphasizes the importance of service component in competition over
the long-run. Figure 16 shows a typical situation in the competition between a production
cost leader and a service cost leader. Notice that at the beginning, the service cost leader
may have a smaller demand and earn less profit. However, as it keeps increasing service
levels to consumers, it can finally win more customers and earn bigger profit than its
production cost leader competitor. Note also that the production cost leader company has
a bigger initial market base but that still does not change the end result.
4.6 Comparisons with Myopic Model
In this section we compare our results with myopic models. In the model, the two man-
ufacturers and the retailer just try to optimize their single-period profits. We study and
compare the results from this myopic model to those from our model. We perform this
comparison under two different assumptions on demand. In the first case, demand is
95




















































































Figure 16: The evolution of equilibrium market bases when β = 0.9, γ = 1.8, σ = 1.8,
bp = bs = 2, θp = θs = 1.1, a1 = 100, a2 = 500, c1 = 3, c2 = 25, η1 = 9, η2 = 5 (Manufacturer
1: Red, Manufacturer 2: Blue).
memoryless. Consumers in this case do not learn from past experience and only concern
about prices and services in current period. For our model, this is a special case when
β = γ = σ = 0. In the second case, consumers learn from past experience. Thus, demand
for product i will depend on prices and service in both the previous and the current periods.
To begin our comparison, we first state the equilibrium decisions made by myopic firms.
4.6.1 Myopic Decision Model
Myopic firms optimize profit in the current period only. In comparison to our model, it
is as if firms are in the second stage of the two-period profit-optimizing model studied in
Section 4.3.1. Therefore, the results from Section 4.3.1 can be applied here. Thus, for any
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Also, from Section 4.3.1 the wholesale prices, retail prices, service levels, and demand




























































All the parameters are as defined previously in Section 4.3.1. We now compare the numer-
ical results from our model and the myopic model.
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4.6.2 Myopic Firms with Memoryless Demand
Figure 17 compares the results from our model and those from a model with myopic firms.
The market bases are the same for both models and do not change over time since there is
no learning demand. The manufacturers do not have to invest since demand is not affected
by their investments (β = 0). It can be seen that the manufacturers’ profits are higher in
our model. Service levels and prices are also higher in our model, even though demand is
smaller. Thus, the manufacturers in our model concentrate on the higher end of the market
(high service, high price), where as the manufacturers in myopic model focus on the lower
end (low service, low price). This is an important insight for firms in a market where the
learning effect from consumers is small. High-end consumers are willing to pay more for
higher service level and firms can earn more profits focusing on this group of consumers.
4.6.3 Myopic Firms with Learning Demand
Figure 18 shows the comparison when consumers learn from the past period. This figure
shows the major difference between the results from our model and those from a myopic
model. In a myopic model, the firms only care about their profits in the current period and
ignore any future effects their behavior might cause over time. Thus, they are not capable
to cope with the learning consumers. Their markets shrink and they earn less profit over
time. On the other hand, our model, with think-ahead firms, can prevent this phenomenon
from happening. They plan their actions to take advantage of the learning behavior of
demand. The service levels and prices are chosen such that the firms are rewarded by the
consumers. Thus, markets keep growing for both products while firms can keep earning
more profits.
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Figure 17: Comparison between Myopic and Two-period profit optimizing model. β =
0, γ = 0, σ = 0, bp = bs = 2, θp = θs = 1.1, a1 = 120, a2 = 80, c1 = 5, c2 = 5, η1 = 6, η2 = 5
(Myopic: xxx, Two-Period: –, Manufacturer 1: Red, Manufacturer 2: Blue).
4.7 Final Remarks
To develop our multi-period model, we apply both game theory and dynamic systems
and control theory to characterize our model. We assume that firms use a moving two-
period profit-maximizing strategy. Demand is assumed to have a “learning” capability.
Information on the previous period prices and services, as well as manufacturers’ investment
to expand market bases, can influence market base of each product in current period. Using
concepts from dynamic systems and control with numerical studies on some special cases,
some managerial insights are obtained.
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Figure 18: Comparison between Myopic and Two-period profit optimizing model. β =
0.5, γ = 0.4, σ = 0.3, bp = bs = 2, θp = θs = 1.1, a1 = 120, a2 = 80, c1 = 5, c2 = 5, η1 =
6, η2 = 5 (Myopic: xxx, Two-Period: –, Manufacturer 1: Red, Manufacturer 2: Blue).
We find that if demand is only sensitive to price in the learning process, the manufac-
turer with any type of cost advantage will gain more profit and capture a larger market
base than its competitor. The retailer will sell both products at the same retail price but
the firm with cost advantage will be able to support more service to its customers. Also,
if all the costs are the same between two identical manufacturers, they will possess equal
market size and sell their products to the same group of customers even though they may
initially start with different market bases.
Our main finding is that if demand is equally sensitive to both price and service level,
the manufacturer with service cost advantage may earn less profit and capture a smaller
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market base in the beginning. However, it will finally gain more profit and capture a larger
market base than its smaller-production cost competitor. This happens no matter how big
the production cost advantage its competitor has, or how small the service cost advantage
the manufacturer has over its competitor.
We realize that our assumption on constant unit production cost over time may not
be realistic. Other alternatives such as economy-of-scale production cost or decreasing
return-to-scale production cost can be explored in the future. These assumptions will
affect the pricing behavior of both products over time. In our case, since unit production
cost is constant, a firm can increase service levels and keep charging a higher price without
worrying much about production cost. Thus, retail price can keep increasing as long as
service can make up for the price increase. Other assumptions on production cost are likely
to yield different results.
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CHAPTER V
COMPETITION IN SUPPLY CHAIN WITH
UNCERTAIN DEMAND
5.1 Introduction
In Chapter 3 we studied the supply chain with two manufacturers producing different but
substitutable products. These manufacturers sell their products to a common retailer, who
in turn, sell the products to the end consumer. We assumed in Chapter 3 that consumer
demand for each product is deterministic and is sensitive to two factors: (1) retail price,
(2) service provided by the manufacturer. In this chapter, the single-period problem is
extended to the case where demand is stochastic. Figure 19 shows the supply chain that
will be studied in this chapter.
Only the manufacturers Stackelberg case is considered here. The manufacturers try
to maximize their own profits and simultaneously announce wholesale prices and service
levels at the beginning of the period. The retailer must decide how much to order from each
manufacturer and what the retail price of each product should be. The order quantities
from the retailer become demands for the manufacturers to fill. We assume that the
manufacturers’ production process and the retailer’s procurement process have zero lead-
time. At the retailer level, products are put into inventory. Demand for each product is














production cost (c1) production cost (c2)
At period t
µi = ai - bppi + θp(pj - pi) + bssi – θs(sj - si)
Di = µi + ε
Figure 19: Stochastic Model.
obtain a salvage value for any leftover inventory, or be charged a shortage cost for each
unit of unfulfilled demand (i.e., there is no backlogging).
In summary, for each transaction, the overall pricing and ordering decisions in the
channel follow the following sequence:
Step 1. Manufacturers simultaneously announce wholesale prices to be offered to the retailer
and service levels to be offered to consumers.
Step 2. In response to the manufacturers’ announcements, the retailer decides the retail price
and ordering quantity of each product that would maximize his expected profit. Re-
tailer’s ordering quantities become incoming demands for each manufacturer.
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Step 3. Consumer demand for each product is realized.
Step 4. Shortage cost or disposal cost for each product is charged to the retailer, depending
on the demand and the stocking level. The manufacturers realize their profit in this
transaction.
Figure 20 shows the timeline of events in this model.
Retailer gives orders





Demand for the 
season is realized
Retailer gets profits











Figure 20: Timeline of events within each transaction.
We assume that each manufacturer has complete information about its competitor
and the retailer’s cost parameters and also the consumer’s demand responsiveness to the
retail price. Therefore, for given wholesale prices chosen in Step 1, each manufacturer can
anticipate the retailer’s response in Step 2. Each manufacturer will take this into account
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so as to choose the wholesale price and service level in Step 1 to maximize its own profit
in Step 4.
We also assume that the retailer, though not knowing the exact demand for each product
for a given retail price, knows its distribution. Since demand for each product is stochastic
and is price- and service-sensitive, the retailer is facing a two-product newsvendor problem
with a joint price-ordering decision in each period. This means the retailer has to take into
account the demand sensitivity to the retail price when he determines the retail price and
the order quantity for each product1.
In our model, the consumer demand is sensitive to prices and to service provided by
the manufacturers. However, from the retailer’s point-of-view, demand is only sensitive to
retail price. This is because we are assuming that manufacturers posses more bargaining
power and announce their wholesale price and service level before the retailer makes its
decision about the retail price and order quantity. The retailer can only react by choosing
the retail price and ordering quantity for each product. It is as if he is facing a newsvendor-
type problem. In order to study the model, it is important to first study how the retailer
would solve his problem.
The two-product newsvendor problem with price-dependent demand distribution will
be examined first because it is the problem faced by the retailer in our model. The notations
to be used in this chapter will be given. In Section 5.2, the decision faced by every firm in
the supply chain (two manufacturers and one retailer) will be analyzed. Specifically, their
profit functions will be defined. The demand function will also be specified.
1Note that as opposed to the traditional newsvendor model where the retail price is fixed, the retail
price of each product is a decision variable of the retailer. This problem was first addressed by Lau and
Lau (1988) [45] for a single product newsvendor.
105
In Section 5.3, the standard newsvendor model and its key results will be presented.
Some key literature on the newsvendor problem with price-dependent demand distribution
will also be briefly reviewed. A new newsvendor model will be introduced and studied.
Conditions that would guarantee the existence of a unique optimal solution is presented.
These conditions can be viewed as generalizations of the results in existing literature.
Finally, numerical examples is provided in Section 5.5.
5.2 Supply Chain Model
The supply chain in this case is similar to the one defined in Chapter 3. However, with
stochastic demand, the amount of the order the retailer places to each manufacturer is not
necessarily the same as the actual demand size. There are some costs associated with the
uncertainty in demand. Thus, the retailer’s profit is defined slightly differently from the
one given in the deterministic case. It is important to define some new variables as well as
redefine some of the old variables.
5.2.1 Notations
Let i = 1, 2 be the index for the manufacturer/product.
TRR = Retailer’s total revenue.
TRMi = Manufacturer i’s total revenue.
TCR = Retailer’s total cost.
TCMi = Manufacturer i’s total cost.
ΠR = Retailer’s profit.
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ΠMi = Manufacturer i’s profit.
pi = Retailer’s selling price of product i.
wi = Manufacturer i’s selling price to the retailer.
Qi = Amount bought from manufacturer i by the retailer.
Di = Total demand of product i by end consumers.
si = Service level for product i provided by manufacturer i.
ci = Per unit production cost of product i as faced by manufacturer i.
gi = Retailer’s unit salvage value of product i’s leftover at the end of the season. Note
that if this quantity is negative, it can be regarded as the holding cost or the disposal cost.
bi = Retailer’s oppportunity cost of product i. This cost is charged when there is not
enough inventory to satisfy the demand.
5.2.2 Retailer’s Profit Function
The retailer has two types of revenue for each product. The first type is the revenue received
from the sale of each product within the normal transaction (at price pi). The amount sold
is the minimum of Qi and Di. The other income is the salvage value of each product, gi,
obtained at the very end of the sale season if there are leftovers, i.e., if Qi > Di. Note that
if gi is negative, then it stands for the cost of getting rid of the product (disposal cost).









There are also two types of cost faced by the retailer. The first one is the cost of acquiring
each unit of the product, wi. This is the same as the wholesale price charged by each
manufacturer. The second type of cost is the underage cost, bi. This cost is charged when
there is not enough inventory to meet the realized demand. The retailer’s total cost can





wiQi + bi(Di −Qi)+
}
. (63)





pimin(Qi, Di) + gi(Qi −Di)+ − [wiQi + bi(Di −Qi)+]
}
. (64)
5.2.3 Manufacturer’s Profit Function
We assume that each manufacturer uses a per-unit charge (wiQi) for the product sold to
the retailer. Therefore, TRMi = wiQi. The types of cost faced by each manufacturer are
the cost of producing each unit of product and the costs of providing the service. As done
in previous chapters, we make the assumption that the cost of providing service has a





This cost function reflects the assumption that it is getting more expensive to provide the
next unit of service. Therefore, each manufacturer’s profit function can be expressed as






The expected demand can be expressed by
µi(pi, pj, si, sj) = ai − bppi + θp(pj − pi) + bssi − θs(sj − si) (66)
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where ai, bp > 0 and bs, bu, θp, θs, θu ≥ 0, and are defined as in Chapter 3. We can rewrite






 −(bp + θp) θp






 (bs + θs) −θs






µ(p, s) = A + Bpp + Bss. (69)
We define εi as a random variable for product i where i ∈ 1, 2. It is defined on the range
[Ai, Bi] and has zero expectation. We further assume that εi is the same for every period.
Let Fi(.) represent the cumulative distribution function of εi, and fi(.) be the probability
density function. Therefore, εi ∼ Fi(0, σ2i ). With this definition of εi, we can express the
demand function as
D(p, s, ε) = µ(p, s) + ε
= A + Bpp + Bss + ε, (70)
where ε = [ε1 ε2]
T .
Note that in the case of a single period problem with deterministic demand and no
learning, Equation (69) reduces to
D(p, s) = A + Bpp + Bss. (71)
This describes the case studied previously in Chapter 3.
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5.3 Two-Product Newsvendor Problem
In our model, the retailer must calculate four decision variables: the order quantities and
the retail prices for both products. The retailer is facing the two-product newsvendor
problem with a price-dependent demand distribution. This model requires more special
treatment than the classical newsvendor model where the demand is independent of the










Mean Demand (µi) = ai - (bp +θp)pi + pj
Figure 21: Two-Product Newsvendor Problem .
Although many studies have been developed on the newsvendor problem over the past
decade, none have addressed the problem faced by the retailer in our model. The price
sensitive version of the newsvendor problem was first formulated by Whitin (1955)[95]. In
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his model, selling price and stocking quantity are decided simultaneously. Whitin used
the newsvendor model where the probability distribution of demand depends on the unit
selling price, and where price is a decision variable rather than an external parameter. Mills
(1959)[61] refined the formulation by explicitly specifying mean demand as a function of
selling price.
The problem of the newsvendor with price-dependent demand was later studied by Lau
and Lau (1988)[45] and Petruzzi and Dada (1999). Lau and Lau (1988) considered the
problem where the demand distribution is normal with expected demand linearly related
to price, and has a constant standard deviation. Petruzzi and Dada (1999) investigated
an extension to the problem. Particularly, they studied the problem with both the linear
demand function (additive form) and the constant elasticity demand function (multiplica-
tive form). They also gave conditions such that a unique optimal solution exists. However,
both Lau and Lau (1988) and Petruzzi and Dada (1999) only considered the case of a single
product newsvendor.
5.3.1 Classical (Standard) Newsvendor Model
First, we review the classical newsvendor model where the retail price is given. Let cu
denote the underage cost associated with each demand that cannot be met, and co denote
the overage cost associated with each newspaper that is not sold. The retailer (newsvendor),
facing the uncertain demand D, has to decide the order quantity Q that minimizes his cost.
That is, the retailer seeks to minimize expected cost
Min C(Q) = cuE(D−Q)+ + coE(Q−D)+
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where X+ denotes the function max(0, X). It is well known that the optimal order quantity







It can be shown that this optimal solution can also be obtained if one tries to maximize
the profit instead of trying to minimize the cost. Let p be the per-unit selling price, w be
the per-unit cost of acquiring inventory, g be the per-unit salvage value, b be the per-unit
shortage cost, and demand be distributed over the range [A,B] with cumulative distribution
function F (·). As a result, we can write the expected profit as
E[Π] = pEmin[D,Q]− wQ+ gE(Q−D)+ − bE(D −Q)+. (73)








xdF (x)−Q(1− F (Q))
]
= w + b[−Qf(Q)− (1− F (Q)) +Qf(Q)]
= w − b(1− F (Q)).
The (expected) marginal revenue is given by
d
dQ















= p[Qf(Q) + (1− F (Q))−Qf(Q)]
+g[F (Q) +Qf(Q)−Qf(Q)]
= p(1− F (Q)) + gF (Q)
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Now, if we let p+ b−w = cu and w− g = co, the optimal solution given above will be the
same as the one shown in Equation 72.
In the next section, basic theory for the two-product newsvendor problem with a price-
dependent demand distribution will be developed.
5.3.2 Model Development
Let the demand of product i be distributed with mean µi(p1, p2) and a constant standard
deviation σi, where µi(p1, p2) can be expressed as
µi(p1, p2) = ai − bppi + θp(pj − pi). (75)
Here, the definitions of ai, bp, and θp are as defined in previous chapters. Namely, ai can
be thought of as a “market base” [90] of product i. As defined in Chapter 3, bp can be
thought of as the measure of the responsiveness of each manufacturer’s market demand to
his own price, and θp is the measure of the sensitivity of the market to the price difference
between the two products (loyalty).
Let εi be a random variable defined on the range [Ai, Bi]. We also assume that εi is
the same for every period and has zero expectation. Let Fi(.) represent the cumulative
distribution function of εi, and fi(.) be its probability density function. Therefore, εi ∼
Fi(0, σ
2
i ). With the definition of µi(p1, p2) and εi given, we can express the demand for
product i as
Di(p1, p2) = µi(p1, p2) + εi. (76)
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Figure 22: Quantity and Demand.
(1) If D1 ≤ Q1 and D2 ≤ Q2:
Π(Q1, Q2, p1, p2) = p1D1(p1, p2, ε1)− w1Q1 + g1[Q1 −D1(p1, p2, ε1)]
+ p2D2(p1, p2, ε2)− w2Q2 + g2[Q2 −D2(p1, p2, ε2)] (77)
(2) If D1 > Q1 and D2 ≤ Q2:
Π(Q1, Q2, p1, p2) = p1Q1 − w1Q1 − b1[D1(p1, p2, ε1)−Q1]
+ p2D2(p1, p2, ε2)− w2Q2 + g2[Q2 −D2(p1, p2, ε2)] (78)
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(3) If D1 ≤ Q1 and D2 > Q2:
Π(Q1, Q2, p1, p2) = p1D1(p1, p2, ε1)− w1Q1 + g1[Q1 −D1(p1, p2, ε1)]
+ p2Q2 − w2Q2 − b2[D2(p1, p2, ε2)−Q2] (79)
(4) If D1 > Q1 and D2 > Q2:
Π(Q1, Q2, p1, p2) = p1Q1 − w1Q1 − b1[D1(p1, p2, ε1)−Q1]
+ p2Q2 − w2Q2 − b2[D2(p1, p2, ε2)−Q2] (80)
Now, consistent with the approach by Thowsen (1975)[86] and Petruzzi and Dada
(1999)[68], we define a new decision variable:
zi = Qi − µi(p1, p2) (81)
where µi(p1, p2) is the expected demand for product i. This transformation of decision
variables provides an alternative interpretation of the order quantity (Petruzzi and Dada
(1999)): If zi is larger than the realized value of εi, then there are leftovers. If zi is smaller
than the realized value of εi, then the shortage cost is applied. Therefore, we can say that
the retailer will not select a value of zi lower than Ai or greater than Bi because he is sure
to lose money. Thus,
Ai ≤ zi ≤ Bi. (82)
One can think of zi as the Risky Order Quantity (ROQ) since it is the amount ordered
above the expected demand2. Using (81), we can rewrite the conditions in (77) - (80) as:
2It can also be interpreted as a surrogate for safety stock [68], since safety stock is defined as the


















Figure 23: z and e.
(1) If ε1 ≤ z1 and ε2 ≤ z2:
Π(z1, z2, p1, p2) = p1[µ1(p1, p2) + ε1]− w1[µ1(p1, p2) + z1] + g1[z1 − ε1]
+ p2[µ2(p1, p2) + ε2]− w2[µ2(p1, p2) + z2] + g2[z2 − ε2] (83)
(2) If ε1 > z1 and ε2 ≤ z2:
Π(z1, z2, p1, p2) = p1[µ1(p1, p2) + z1]− w1[µ1(p1, p2) + z1]− b1[z1 − ε1]
+ p2[µ2(p1, p2) + ε2]− w2[µ2(p1, p2) + z2] + g2[z2 − ε2] (84)
(3) If ε1 ≤ z1 and ε2 > z2:
Π(z1, z2, p1, p2) = p1[µ1(p1, p2) + ε1]− w1[µ1(p1, p2) + z1] + g1[z1 − ε1]
+ p2[µ2(p1, p2) + z2]− w2[µ2(p1, p2) + z2]− b2[z2 − ε2] (85)
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(4) If ε1 > z1 and ε2 > z2:
Π(z1, z2, p1, p2) = p1[µ1(p1, p2) + z1]− w1[µ1(p1, p2) + z1]− b1[z1 − ε1]
+ p2[µ2(p1, p2) + z2]− w2[µ2(p1, p2) + z2]− b2[z2 − ε2] (86)
Using (81) and (83) - (86), we can write the retailer’s expected profit as:





{pi[µi(p1, p2) + xi] + gi[zi − xi]} fi(xi)dxi




{pi[µi(p1, p2) + zi]− bi[xi − zi]} fi(xi)dxi
}
(87)
We can rearrange the expression (87) into a combination of the riskless profit and the









(xi − zi)fi(xi)dxi = Expected shortage of zi.
For each i in (87), by adding and subtracting
∫ Bi
zi
pixifi(xi)dxi and using the fact that
the mean of the distribution F(.) is zero, we obtain the following lemma.
LEMMA 5.1. The expected profit that the retailer receives for each product i is
E[Πi(z1, z2, p1, p2)] = (pi − wi)µi(p1, p2)− (wi − gi)Θi(zi)− (pi + bi − wi)Θi(zi)
. (88)
Proof: See Appendix C.
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The right side of Equation 88 can be separated into two parts. The first term, (pi −
wi)µi(p1, p2) represents the riskless profit function, the profit for a given price when there
is no uncertainty in the demand of product i. The last two terms together represent the
loss function which takes into account the loss due to overage or underage cost of product
i created by the uncertainty in demand (Mills (1959)[61], Silver and Peterson (1985)[77],
and Petruzzi and Dada (2001)[69]). From (88), we can rewrite (87) as




(pi − wi)µi(p1, p2)− (wi − gi)Θi(zi)− (pi + bi − wi)Θi(zi)
}
. (89)
Now, in order to maximize the retailer’s expected profit, we calculate the first and
second partial derivatives of E[Π(z1, z2, p1, p2)] with respect to z1, z2 and p1, p2. Note that
∂Θi(zi)/∂zi = Fi(zi) and ∂Θi(zi)/∂zi = −(1− Fi(zi)). The first order derivatives are
∂E[Π(z1, z2, p1, p2)]
∂z1
= −(w1 − g1) + (p1 + b1 − g1)(1− F1(z1)) (90)
∂E[Π(z1, z2, p1, p2)]
∂z2
= −(w2 − g2) + (p2 + b2 − g2)(1− F2(z2)) (91)
∂E[Π(z1, z2, p1, p2)]
∂p1
= a1 − 2(bp + θp)p1 + 2θpp2 + (bp + θp)w1 − θpw2 −Θ1(z1)
(92)
∂E[Π(z1, z2, p1, p2)]
∂p2
= a2 − 2(bp + θp)p2 + 2θpp1 + (bp + θp)w2 − θpw1 −Θ2(z2)
(93)
The second order derivatives are
∂2E[Π(z1, z2, p1, p2)]
(∂z1)2
= −(p1 + b1 − g1)f1(z1), (94)
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∂2E[Π(z1, z2, p1, p2)]
(∂z2)2
= −(p2 + b2 − g2)f2(z2), and (95)
∂2E[Π(z1, z2, p1, p2)]
(∂p1)2
= −2(bp + θp) =
∂2E[Π(z1, z2, p1, p2)]
(∂p2)2
. (96)
Notice from (96) that, for any given z1 and z2, E[Π(z1, z2, p1, p2)] is concave in both p1
and p2. Therefore, we can first solve for p1 and p2 as functions of z1 and z2 using (92) and
(93). Then, we can substitute these functions into E[Π(z1, z2, p1, p2)] and optimize with
respect to z1 and z2. Similarly, since (94) and (95) imply that for any given p1 and p2,
E[Π(z1, z2, p1, p2)] is concave in both z1 and z2, so we can optimize z1 and z2 for the given
p1 and p2 using (90) and (91), and then search for the values of p1 and p2 that maximize
E[Π(z1, z2, p1, p2)]. Both procedures yield the same answer (see [69]), but only the first
method will be used here. The following proposition gives the expressions for optimal
retail price as a function of z1 and z2.
PROPOSITION 5.1. Given z1 and z2, the optimal pi can be calculated by:
pi
∗ = pi(z1, z2) = p
0
i − αΘi(zi)− βΘj(zj) (97)
where α = bp+θp
2bp(bp+2θp)





and ξi = ai + (bp + θp)wi − θpwj.
Proof: See Appendix C.
The optimal prices shown in proposition 5.1 can be separated into two parts. The first
part, p0i , is the riskless price. It is the price that maximizes the riskless part of the Equation
(88). The optimal prices, p1
∗ and p2
∗, are less than the optimal riskless price due to the
risk created by the demand uncertainty for each product. Both Mills (1959) and Petruzzi
and Dada (1999) give similar observations for the single product case.
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We can now use (97) by substituting them into the profit function to optimize E[Π(z1, z2)].
Attention needs to be paid to the shape of E[Π(z1, z2)] since the function might have mul-
tiple optimal points, or the point that satisfy the first order condition might not be the
global optimal, or no optimal point might exist. These scenarios might occur depending on
the parameters of the problem. For example, suppose the manufacturers are symmetrical
and demand is uniformly distributed. Let bp =0.8, θp =0.2, w1 = w2 = 5, g1 = g2 = 3,
b1 = b2 = 4, a1 = a2 = 2, B1 = B2 = 8. In such a case, Figure 24 shows that no unique
maximum point exists. On the other hand, with the same demand distribution, suppose
we let bp =0.4, θp =0.6, w1 = w2 = 5, g1 = g2 = 3, b1 = b2 = 4, a1 = a2 = 20, B1 = B2 = 2.
Then, we can see from Figure 25 that there exists a unique solution.
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Figure 24: Surface plot shows that no unique maximum exists.
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Figure 25: Surface plot shows that a unique maximum point exists.
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Therefore, we have to analyze the shape of the function and find the sufficient condition
for the existence of a unique solution. The following proposition gives such a condition.
PROPOSITION 5.2. For p1
∗ and p2
∗ given in Proposition 5.1, the newsvendor’s optimal




∗, where each of z1
∗ and
z2
∗ can be determined according to the following:
(i) For any arbitrary distribution function Fi(·), zi∗ can be found by an exhaustive search
over the region [Ai, Bi].






for zi ∈ [Ai, Bi], then the largest zi ∈ [Ai, Bi] that satisfies the first order optimality
condition is zi
∗.
(iii) If condition (ii) is met and
2bp(bp + 2θp)(bi − wi) + (bp + θp)(ξi + Ai) + θp(ξj −Θj(zj)) > 0
for each i = 1, 2 and j = 3 − i, then (z1∗, z2∗) is the unique point in the space
[A1, B1]× [A2, B2] that satisfies the first-order optimality condition.
(iv) The optimal zi
∗ must satisfy the following equations:
(w1 − g1) =
{
(bp + θp)(ξ1 −Θ1(z1)) + θp(ξ2 −Θ2(z2))
2[(bp + θp)2 − θ2p]




(w2 − g2) =
{
θp(ξ1 −Θ1(z1)) + (bp + θp)(ξ2 −Θ2(z2))
2[(bp + θp)2 − θ2p]




where ξi = ai + (bp + θp)wi − θpwj.
Proof: See Appendix C.
The above results are generalizations of the results by Petruzzi and Dada (2001)[68].
The differences arise from: (a) the fact that the retailer is carrying two competitive products
while Petruzzi and Dada (2001) studied the case with only a single product, and (b) the way
we define our demand function (when θp = 0, our results reduce to their results). Condition
(iii) guarantees that E[Π(z,p(z))] is unimodal, provided that 2φ(zi)
2 + dφ(zi)/dzi > 0.
It turns out that all Increasing Failure Rate (IFR) distributions (see Shaked and Shan-
thikumar (1994)[75]) such as the normal or uniform distribution would satisfy condition
(ii). Note that condition (ii), 2φ(zi)
2 + dφ(zi)/dzi > 0, is a necessary condition but not a
sufficient condition. Therefore, having a demand with a IFR distribution is not sufficient
for a unique solution to exist. Only when condition (iii) is also satisfied would there exist
a unique solution.
However, for a general IFR distribution, it is difficult to obtain the closed form solution
for condition (iv) in Proposition 5.2. Therefore, in the next section, we will focus on
uniformly distributed demand.
5.3.2.1 EXAMPLE: Uniformly Distributed Demand
Since the uniform distribution has the IFR property, we can use it in our initial investi-
gation. For i ∈ 1, 2, εi is distributed over the range [−Bi, Bi] because it is now uniformly



















The expected shortage at zi, Θi(zi), and the expected leftover at zi, Θi(zi), can be calculated










We know that −Bi ≤ zi ≤ Bi from (82); (100) shows that the expected shortage of zi
is monotonically decreasing in the range [−Bi, Bi], which is consistent with our intuition.
Figure 26 shows such a property for the case where Bi = 2.
Using condition (iv) in proposition 5.2, we find that the optimal solution (z1
∗, z2
∗) must
satisfy the following condition when both products have uniformly distributed demand.
LEMMA 5.2. Assuming that both products have uniformly distributed demand, the fol-
lowing condition must be satisfied for each i ∈ {1, 2} and j = 3− i at the optimal solution:
2bp(bp + 2θp)(wi − gi) =
[(bp + θp)ξi + θpξj + 2bp(bp + 2θp)(bi − gi)]
2Bi
(Bi − zi)
− (bp + θp)(Bi − zi)
3
8B2i




Proof: See Appendix C.
In the special case where both products have the same parameters, i.e., g1 = g2 =
g, b1 = b2 = b, B1 = B2 = B, ξ1 = ξ2 = ξ, and w1 = w2 = w, we can further simplify
the above lemma. One can think of this as having identical manufacturers, i.e. the two
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Figure 26: Expected shortage is monotonically decreasing within the defined range.
manufacturers possess the same production technology and produce similar products. In
this case, the newsvendor would choose the same decision variable for both products, i.e.,
z1 = z2 = z. Therefore, the conditions in Lemma 5.2 can be reduced to:
2bp(w − g) = [ξ + 2bp(b− g)]
B − z
2B





Now, to analyze the whole supply chain, we work backwards to find the equilibrium solution.
First, we find the retailer’s reaction function, given the information about the suppliers’
action and the demand from the last period. Namely, we express demands Q1, Q2 and retail
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prices p1, p2 as a function of wholesale prices w1, w2, and service levels s1, s2. We calculate
the retailer’s reaction function using the results from Section 5.3, where we studied the
two-product newsvendor problem with a price-dependent demand distribution. We then
find the suppliers’ optimal action given that they know how the retailer is going to react
to their moves.
5.4.1 Retailer’s Reaction Function
In Section 5.3 we provide conditions that guarantee the existence of a unique optimal
solution. The results can now be applied to find the retailer’s reaction function. Since the
existence of a unique optimal solution for the retailer is important in gaming if we are to
use the concept of pure strategy, we assume that condition (iii) in proposition 5.2 is valid
from now on.
Note that in this chapter we write µi for i ∈ {1, 2} as a function of p1, p2, s1, s2, as
opposed to the expression in Equation (75). This is because, from the point of view of the
newsvendor (retailer), s1 and s2 are already known by the time of his decision; he only
needs to take into account his action (p1, p2) on the mean of demand distribution. Thus,
the market base defined in Equation (75) equals to ai + bssi− θs(sj − si) where i, j ∈ {1, 2}
and j 6= i. To find the retailer’s reaction function, we must express z1 and z2 in terms
of w1, w2, s1 and s2 using condition (iv) given in Proposition 5.2. Namely, we have to
simultaneously solve
(w1 − g1) =
{
(bp + θp)(ξ1 −Θ1(z1)) + θp(ξ2 −Θ2(z2))
2[(bp + θp)2 − θ2p]





(w2 − g2) =
{
θp(ξ1 −Θ1(z1)) + (bp + θp)(ξ2 −Θ2(z2))
2[(bp + θp)2 − θ2p]
+ b2 − g2
}
(1− F2(z2))
where ξi = ai + (bp + θp)wi − θpwj. It turns out that such closed forms of z1∗ and z2∗ can
not be easily obtained. However, we can get the values of z1
∗ and z2
∗ for any given w1, w2,
s1 and s2 by using numerical analysis. This is done by plotting the “reaction surface” of
z1
∗ and z2
∗ as a function of w1, w2, s1 and s2.
In general, given such “reaction surfaces” z1
∗ and z2
∗ from the retailer, we can find the
corresponding optimal p1
∗ and p2
∗ by using the result from Proposition 5.1. The optimal
order quantity for each product can then be obtained using Proposition 5.1 and 5.2. The
retailer’s optimal ordering quantity for each product i can then be calculated to be
Qi
∗(w, s) = µi(p1
∗, p2
∗) + zi
∗(w1, w2, s1, s2) (104)
5.4.2 Manufacturers’ Problem
Each manufacturer i faces the demand distribution given in (104) and (??). His profit
function can then be expressed as





We assume that both manufacturers have complete access to the information of their com-
petitor and make their moves simultaneously. The Nash Equilibrium will be chosen by each
manufacturer, after taking into account the other’s decision when choosing wholesale price




∗) is a Nash equilibrium
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Normally, if the first-order condition approach is valid, the optimal wholesale price and
service level for each product can be obtained by solving the two sets of first-order optimality
conditions simultaneously. Namely, we have for each product i,
∂ΠMi
∂wi
= 0 = Qi(w1, w2, s1, s2) + (wi − ci)





= 0 = −ηisi + (wi − ci)
∂Qi(w1, w2, s1, s2)
∂si
(109)





∗ that satisfies the first order condition specified above.
5.4.3 Equilibrium Search Algorithm
We can see from the previous section that the retailer’s reaction function can not be easily
obtained as a closed form function of wi and si for i = 1, 2. Therefore, we propose the
following simple algorithm for the manufacturers to calculate their optimal wholesale price
and service level.
ALGORITHM 5.1. For a single period problem and a given IFR demand distribution,
(Step 0) Set WLi and S
L












(Step 1) For each i, discretize values of wi and si for W
L









(Step 2) Calculates the value of z1 and z2 that satisfy the following equations for each combi-
nation of w1, w2, s1, s2.
(i) 2bp(bp + 2θp)(bi − wi) + (bp + θp)(ξi + Ai) + θp(ξj −Θj(zj)) > 0




+ bi − gi
}
(1− Fi(zi))
(iii) Ai ≤ zi ≤ Bi.
(Step 3) From the surface of z1
∗ and z2
∗ obtained in Step 1, use the results from Proposition





(Step 4) Using Q1
∗ and Q2
∗ obtained in the previous step, each manufacturer can calculate his
profit(ΠMi) by using Equation (105).
(Step 5) From the profit surface (ΠMi) obtained in the last step, find the optimal wi
∗ and si
∗















(Step 6) If for each ΠMi,
∂ΠMi
∂wi
∣∣∣wi∗, ∂ΠMi∂wj ∣∣∣wj∗, ∂ΠMi∂si ∣∣∣si∗, and ∂ΠMi∂sj ∣∣∣sj∗ are all less than δ, Stop.






















and go to Step (1).
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In this algorithm, we start from a wide range of wholesale prices and service levels and
narrow down to find the optimal solution. We stop when the slope of the profit surface is
less than δ, where δ can be chosen to be a very small number (ideally, we want to stop at
the point where the slope is zero).
5.5 Identical Duopolists with Uniformly Distributed
Demand
In this section, we give a numerical example and study the effects of each parameter on the
optimal solution. We focus on the case where demand is uniformly distributed. We also
assume that the two manufacturers are identical. This means that they both possess the
same technology and skills and have the same market base (a1 = a2). In Section 5.3 we
developed some calculations for the uniformly distributed demand. In this section, we will
use the calculations in examples involving identical manufacturers. We know from Lemma
5.2 that, for identical duopolists, the following equation must be satisfied
2bp(w − g) = [ξ + 2bp(b− g)]
B − z
2B




However, we know from Proposition 5.1 and equation (??) that, for identical duopolists, ξt
in the above equation can be written as
ξ = a+ bpw + bss.
Therefore, we can rewrite equation (110) as
2bp(w − g) = [a+ bpw + bss+ 2bp(b− g)]
B − z
2B




where we define u0 = 0.
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Let bp = 0.7, θp = 0.2, bs = 0.8, θs = 0.2, a1 = a2 = 40, b1 = b2 = 2, g1 = g2 = 4, c1 =
c2 = 5, η1 = η2 = 2, and B1 = B2 = 15. From section 5.3, we know that deriving a closed
form solution for z1
∗ and z2
∗ for a general demand distribution is very difficult. In Lemma
5.2, the necessary condition for the optimal solution to uniformly distributed demand is
given. In such a case, solving for the closed form solution of zi is still not a simple task.
Even in the special case where the two manufacturers are identical, we have the following
two conditions that must be satisfied simultaneously
1) 2bp(w − g) = [a+ bp(w + 2b− 2g) + bss]
B − z
2B




2) −B ≤ z ≤ B (113)
where the first condition follows from Lemma 5.2 and the second condition follows from
the definition of z. Note that since the two manufacturers are symmetrical, their wholesale
price and service level will be equal. Therefore, w1 = w2 = w and s1 = s2 = s. Also,
z1 = z2 = z, which can be derived using Equations 112 and 113. This scenario gives an
example of the “reaction surface” for the case of identical manufacturers with uniformly
distributed demand.
Figure 27 gives the surface of the optimal z∗ for each value of w and s obtained by using
Equation (103). The surfaces for p∗ and Q∗ are derived from the optimal z∗ and are given
in Figures 28 and 29, respectively.
Figure 28 shows that at any wholesale price, the higher the level of service the man-
ufacturers provide, the higher the price the retailer can charge. This shows that services
add value to the customers who are more willing to pay a higher price for the product with
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a higher level of service. Figure 28 also shows that, at any level of service, the higher the
wholesale price, the higher the retail price. This is due to double marginalization. There-
fore, the retail price is highest when the manufacturers set a high wholesale price and also
provide a high level of service. The opposite is true when the retail price is lowest.
Figure 29 shows that the ordering quantity is inversely related to the wholesale price
and is directly related to the level of service. We see that the ordering quantity is lowest
when the wholesale price is at its highest and the level of service is at its lowest. The
opposite happens when the price is low and the level of service is high. This behavior is
consistent with our intuition.
From the figures, we can compare and see the common relationship between z∗, p∗, and
Q∗. When the price p∗ is high (in other words, when w and s are high), z∗ and Q∗ are low.
Using Algorithm 5.1 defined previously, we can obtain the manufacturers’ profit. Figure
30 shows the surface of the the manufacturers profit. The values of w∗ and s∗ turn out
to be 26.9744 and 12.5256, respectively. The corresponding optimal manufacturer profit
is 295.9627. Using Equation (103), we calculate z to be −0.5444. Using Propositions 5.1
and 5.2, we calculate the optimal retail price, p∗, and optimal ordering quantity, Q∗, to be
40.3396 and 17.0384 respectively. The corresponding expected retailer’s profit is 358.55093.
The following table compares these results with those obtained from the deterministic
demand model (with the same parameters) in Chapter 3.
As can be seen from the table, to cope with uncertainty, the retailer must order a
larger quantity to avoid shortage cost. At the same time, the retail and the wholesale
prices are chosen to be higher to extract more revenue from each unit sold. However, the
3From an experiment with 50 runs
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Parameter Deterministic Stochastic
Wholesale Price (w1 = w2) 23.2439 26.9744
Service Level (s1 = s2) 2.7366 12.5256
Manufacturer Profit (ΠM1 = ΠM2 ) 266.1563 295.9627
Retail Price (p1 = p2) 41.7571 40.3396
Ordering Quantity (Q1 = Q2) 14.9993 17.0384
Retailer Profit (ΠR) 479.8361 358.5509 (expected)
Table 6: Comparing results from the deterministic demand case and stochastic demand
case when both manufacturers are symmetrical.
manufacturers have to provide more services to attract more potential customers. The
manufacturers earn higher profit in the stochastic case while the retailer earns less. This is
because the retailer has to order more to avoid a shortage penalty, while being exposed to
the possibility of being able to sell less than the expected value. The fact that manufacturers
have more power (first mover advantage) also gives them the advantage over the retailer
when there is uncertainty in demand. Moreover, manufacturers have control over service
levels, which can influence consumer demand as well.
5.6 Final Remarks
In this chapter, we first study the two-product newsvendor problem with price-dependent
demand. We find that there can exist many optimal solutions within the defined range.
Therefore, the first and second optimality condition would not give the unique solution.
We provide the conditions such that a unique optimal solution exists, and give some sample
calculations for the uniformly distributed demand case.
We then consider the whole supply chain by including the two manufacturers into the
model. We focused on the Manufacturer Stackelberg case. With the model in place, we
used the results from Section 5.3 to find the retailer’s reaction function. We then proposed
an algorithm for the manufacturers to find the equilibrium wholesale price and service level,
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given that they can anticipate the retailer’s reaction function. Finally, a numerical example
is provided for the case where the two manufacturers are symmetrical and the demand is
uniformly distributed.
In our model, we assume that there is no delivery time lag, that the leftover from one
period cannot be carried over to the next period, and that the excess demand is lost. The
extension to relax these assumptions is possible in the future.
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Figure 27: Optimal z as a function of w and s in the first period for the case of identical
duopolists and uniformly distributed demand.
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Figure 28: Optimal p as a function of w and s in the first period for the case of identical
duopolists and uniformly distributed demand.
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Figure 29: Optimal Q as a function of w and s in the first period for the case of identical
duopolists and uniformly distributed demand.
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Figure 30: Optimal manufacturer profit as a function of w and s in the first period for
the case of identical duopolists and uniformly distributed demand.
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CHAPTER VI
SUMMARY AND FUTURE RESEARCH
6.1 Summary
This thesis aims at developing and analyzing models using techniques from various fields to
gain some insights in the area of supply chain management. More specifically, we focus on
a two-stage supply chain with two manufacturers and one common retailer. Following an
introduction in Chapter 1 and a literature review in Chapter 2, we presented an analysis
of the deterministic demand case in Chapter 3.
In Chapter 3, we extended the model from existing literature by including service from
the manufacturers to consumers. We studied how different assumptions on bargaining
power between retailer and manufacturers influence their strategic interactions at equilib-
rium. We also investigate how parameters associate with the supply chain (such as market
base, market sensitivities, and production cost) can affect the equilibrium solution. We
analyze the effects through parameters such as the retail price, wholesale prices, service
levels, retailer’s ordering quantities, and profits. We found that it is more beneficial to
consumers when there is no dominant player(s) in vertical strategic interaction. In such
case, the consumers receive more manufacturer service and can buy product at a lower
price. A counterintuitive result shows that as the market base of one product increases, the
competitor also benefits but at a lesser extent. Furthermore, when one manufacturer has
economic advantage in providing service, the retailer will act to separate market segment
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by selling the product with low service at a low price and selling the product with high
service at a high price.
Chapter 4 studies the model over multiple periods with demand learning. The learning
process assumed in demand function is to capture how experience from past interactions
influences customer demand in the future. Information on the previous period prices and
services, as well as manufacturers’ investment, can influence the market size of each product
in the current period. We apply both game theory and dynamic systems and control theory
to characterize our model. We assume that firms use a moving two-period profit-maximizing
strategy. Using concepts from dynamic systems and control theory with numerical studies
on some special cases, managerial insights are obtained.
We find that if all the costs are the same between two identical manufacturers, they will
eventually possess equal market size and sell their products to the same group of customers
even though they may start with different market bases initially. Our main finding is
if demand is equally sensitive to both price and service level, the company with service
cost advantage may earn less profit and capture a smaller market base in the beginning.
However, it will finally gain more profit and capture a larger market base than its smaller-
production cost competitor. This happens no matter how big the production cost advantage
its competitor has, or how small the service cost advantage the company has over its
competitor.
In Chapter 5, we first study the two-product newsvendor problem with price-dependent
demand. We find that there can exist many optimal solutions within the defined range.
Therefore, the first and second optimality condition would not give the unique solution.
We provide the conditions such that a unique optimal solution exists, and give some sample
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calculations for the uniformly distributed demand case.
We then consider the whole supply chain by including the two manufacturers into the
model. We focused on the Manufacturer Stackelberg case. With the model in place, we
used the results from Section 5.3 to find the retailer’s reaction function. We then proposed
an algorithm for the manufacturers to find the equilibrium wholesale price and service level,
given that they can anticipate the retailer’s reaction function. Finally, a numerical example
is provided for the case where the two manufacturers are symmetrical and the demand is
uniformly distributed.
6.2 Future Research Plan
One possible extension is to compare our model to the supply chain with a centralized
planner - a single firm with the capability to produce both products to meet the uncer-
tain consumer demand. Explorations on different payment schemes to induce the system-
optimal solutions (e.g., two-part tariff, or other type of payment contract) can be carried
out. Expected contribution here will be an important inclusion to the existing literature
on channel coordination (see Cachon (2001) [10] for reviews).
Another interesting extension would be to study the n-product newsvendor model with
price-dependent demand. This would generalize the results from Chapter 5. This extension
would contribute to the literature on the newsvendor model.
It is also possible to investigate and compare our results to those from models with
other forms of demand function. In our model, we used linear additive demand function.
Some of the possible alternatives are to use exponential demand functions. One particular




APPENDIX A: APPENDIX FOR
CHAPTER 3
A.1 Proof to Proposition 3.1 (Supplier Stack-
elberg)
I first study the equilibrium in this game. In this Supplier Stackelberg game, each supplier
first simultaneously announces his price and service level. The retailer observe the prices
and service levels and then decides the prices he is going to charge for each product.
Consumer demand for product i, qi, is
Qi(pi, pj, si, sj) = ai − bppi + θp(pj − pi) + bssi − θs(sj − si)
Here, bs and bp measure the responsiveness of each manufacturer’s market demand to
its own price and service, respectively. On the other hand, θs and θp measure the loyalty of
the market. Namely, when the price of product i is decreased by one unit, it will gain bp+θp
more customers. Among these customers, θp of them are switching from its competitor’s
product while bp of them are the direct result of bigger market demand due to smaller price.
Supplier i’s profit function is





for i ∈ {1, 2}. Note that the quadratic function is used here to reflect the diminishing
return on investment in providing services.
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Retailer’s profit is
ΠR = (p1 − w1)Q1 + (p2 − w2)Q2
To solve this problem, we work backwards in time (a standard approach in solving
Stackelberg game). We first look at the retailer’s reaction function after he has the infor-
mation about prices and service levels announced by the suppliers. The retailer’s profit
function can be expressed as:
ΠR = (p1 − w1)[a1 − bpp1 + θp(p2 − p1) + bss1 − θs(s2 − s1)]
+(p2 − w2)[a2 − bpp2 + θp(p1 − p2) + bss2 − θs(s1 − s2)].
Retailer’s Problem




= ai − 2bppi + θp(pj − 2pi) + bssi − θs(sj − si) + wibp + wiθp
+pjθp − wjθp
2bppi + 2θppi = ai + θppj + bssi − θs(sj − si) + wi(bp + θp) + θp(pj − wj)
pi =
ai + bssi − θs(sj − si) + wi(bp + θp) + θp(2pj − wj)
2(bp + θp)
.
To check the optimality, we check the Hessian matrix:
∂Π2R
∂p2i









= −2bp − 2θp.
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Assuming that bp ≥ 0 and θp ≥ 0, we have a negative definite Hessian. Therefore, the p1
and p2 calculated above are the optimal reaction functions for the retailer. Solving for p
∗
i





(bp + θp)ai + θpaj
2bp(bp + 2θp)
− θs(sj − si)
2(bp + 2θp)
+
(bp + θp)bssi + θpbssj
2bp(bp + 2θp)
. (114)
This is the reaction function of the retailer given that he has observe w1, w2, s1 and s2.
Suppliers’ Problem
The suppliers in this game move simultaneously. They simultaneously announce wi and
si, their prices and level of services they are going to invest, respectively. Knowing the
reaction function from the retailer, they calculate the optimal wi and si.
Supplier i faces the following demand function:
Qi = ai − bppi + θp(pj − pi) + bssi − θs(sj − si). (115)
From the retailer’s reaction function, we know that:







(2θs + bs)(si − sj)
2(bp + 2θp)
. (116)
Substituting (116) and (114) into (115), we have




(bp + θp)ai + θpaj
2bp(bp + 2θp)
− θs(sj − si)
2(bp + 2θp)
+










(2θs + bs)(sj − si)
2(bp + 2θp)
]
+ bssi + θs(sj − si)






(bp + θp)ai + θpaj
2bp(bp + 2θp)
− θs(sj − si)
2(bp + 2θp)
+










(2θs + bs)(sj − si)
2(bp + 2θp)
]












= ai − bp
[
wi +
(bp + θp)ai + θpaj
2bp(bp + 2θp)
− θs(sj − si)
2(bp + 2θp)
+











(2θs + bs)(sj − si)
2(bp + 2θp)
]




























− bp(bp + θp)bs
2bp(bp + 2θp)
− θp(bs + 2θs)
2(bp + 2θp)
+ bs + θs
]
− ηisi
From this first order condition, we have
s∗i =
(wi − ci)(bs + θs)
2ηi
(118)
Substitute (118) into (117), we have
w∗i =
2ηi
4ηi(bp + θp) + (bs + θs)2
{
ai +



















Ai = 4ηi(bp + θp) + (bs + θs)
2
Bi = 2ηiθp − θs(bs + θs)
(














− θpbs(bs + θs)
2ηi(bp + 2θp)















(ai +Djaj) + (Ei + FiDj)ci + (Fj + EjDj)cj
]
Substitute (120) into (118), we have














These w∗i , and s
∗
i constitute the Nash equilibrium and take into account to retailer’s reaction
function.
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A.2 Proof to Proposition 3.2 and 3.3 (Retailer
Stackelberg)
In this situation, we assume that the retailer has more power in the relationship with the its
suppliers. This higher power is reflected in its earlier move than the suppliers. Particularly,
the retailer first announce the margin (and retail price) it desires. The suppliers then take
this information and decide their optimal wholesale price and service level.
Let mi be the margin of product i enjoyed by the retailer. Namely,
pi = wi +mi.
Suppliers’ Problem
Since the retailer moves first in this game, we need to calculate for the suppliers’reaction
function. Note that the suppliers move simultaneously. Therefore, we need to calculate the
Nash equilibrium between them. The profit function for supplier i can be expressed as:






Qi = a− bppi + θp(pj − pi) + bssi − θs(sj − si)



















0 = ai − (bp + θp)pi + θppj + (bs + θs)si − θssj − (bp + θp)(wi − ci)








0 = (wi − ci)(bs − θs)− 2ηisi
Therefore,
s∗i =
(wi − ci)(bs − θs)
2ηi
From this equation, we can derive w∗i to be
w∗i =
2ηi
2ηi(bp + θp)− (bs + θs)2
{
















G = bp + θp
Hi = 2ηi(bp + θp) + (bs + θs)
2























ai − Ljaj − (θpLj +G)pi + (GLj + θp)pj + (Mi − LjNi)ci
]
.





ai − Ljaj − (θpLj +G)pi + (GLj + θp)pj
]
Retailer’s Problem
Retailer is the Stackelberg leader in this problem. He makes decision about p1 and p2 after
observing w1, w2, s1 and s2. His profit function can be expressed as:
ΠR = (p1 − w1(p1, p2))Q1(p1, p2) + (p2 − w2(p1, p2))Q2(p1, p2)

















































(X2U1 − Y V1)a1 + (Y V2 −X2U2)a2 + (X2ρ1 − Y σ1)Wc1 + (Y ρ2 −X2σ2)Wc2
X1X2 − Y 2
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p∗2 =
(Y U1 −X1V1)a1 + (X1V2 − Y U2)a2 + (Y ρ1 −X1σ1)Wc1 + (X1ρ2 − Y σ2)Wc2
X1X2 − Y 2
.
where
W = H1H2 −K2
U1 = ξ1ρ1 + ω1γ1 + ξ2L1σ2 + ψ2φ2
U2 = ξ2σ2 + ω1φ1 + ξ1L2ρ1 + ψ2γ2
V1 = ψ1γ1 + ξ1σ1 + ω2φ2 + ξ2L1ρ2
V2 = ψ1φ1 + ξ2ρ2 + ω2γ2 + ξ1L2σ1
X1 = 2(ω1ρ1 + ψ2σ2)
X2 = 2(ω2ρ2 + ψ1σ1)
Y = ψ1ρ1 + ψ2ρ2 + ω1σ1 + ω2σ2
ξi = ηiHj
ωi = HiHj −K2 + ηiHj(G+ θpLj)
ψi = ηiHj(GLj + θp)
γi = ηiHjG
φi = ηiKG
ρi = ηiG(HjG+ θpK)
σi = ηiG(GK + θpHj)
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A.3 Proof to Proposition 3.4 (Vertical Nash)
Game-theoretic framework is employed to derive the reaction function of each firm in the
supply chain. Fortunately, the reaction functions for the retailer and the manufacturers
were already derived in the Manufacturer Stackelberg game and the Retailer Stackelberg
game respectively. From the Manufacturer Stackelberg game, the retailer’s reaction func-




















where i ∈ {1, 2} and j = 3 − i. From the Retailer Stackelberg game, the manufacturers











ai − Ljaj − (θpLj +G)pi + (GLj + θp)pj
]
for wholesale price and service level respectively. Hi, K, Li,Mi, Ni, and G for i = 1, 2 and
j = 3 − i are defined as in the Retailer Stackelberg game. Solving the above equations
simultaneously yields the Nash equilibrium solution. The final expressions for the retail
prices are
p1 =
(γ2κ1 + λ1κ2)a1 + (γ2ν1 + λ1ν2)a2 + γ2ψ1c1 + λ1ψ2c2
γ1γ2 − λ1λ2
p2 =
(γ1κ2 + λ2κ1)a1 + (γ1ν2 + λ2ν1)a2 + γ1ψ2c1 + λ2ψ1c2
γ1γ2 − λ1λ2
where
γ1 = 2bp(bp + 2θp)W + η1H2(θpL2 +G)bp(bp + 2θp) + ϑ1H2(bs + θs)(θpL2 +G)
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−ϑ2H1(GL1 + θp)
γ2 = 2bp(bp + 2θp)W + η2H1(θpL1 +G)bp(bp + 2θp) + ϑ1H1(bs + θs)(θpL1 +G)
−ϑ2H2(GL2 + θp)
κ1 = η1H2bp(bp + 2θp) + (bp + θp)W + ϑ1H2(bs + θs)− ϑ2H1L1
κ2 = −η2H1L1bp(bp + 2θp) + θpW − ϑ1H1L1(bs + θs) + ϑ2H2
ν1 = −η1H2L2bp(bp + 2θp) + θpW − ϑ1H2L2(bs + θs) + ϑ2H1
ν2 = η2H1bp(bp + 2θp) + (bp + θp)W + ϑ1H1(bs + θs)− ϑ2H2L2
ψ1 = η1bp(bp + 2θp)H2(U1 − L2V1)
ψ2 = η2bp(bp + 2θp)H1(U2 − L1V2)
λ1 = η1H2(GL1 + θp)bp(bp + 2θp) + ϑ1H2(bs + θs)(GL2 + θp)− ϑ2H1(θpL1 +G)
λ2 = η2H1(GL1 + θp)bp(bp + 2θp) + ϑ1H1(bs + θs)(GL1 + θp)− ϑ2H2(θpL2 +G)
ϑ1 = θsbp + bs(bp + θp)
ϑ2 = (θpbs − bpθs)(bs + θs)
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A.4 Proof to Theorem 3.1
When the two manufacturers are identical, the wholesale prices, retail prices, and service
levels for the two manufacturers will also be identical (i.e., they are going after the same
market).
Manufacturer Stackelberg
From Section 3.3.1, if we let a1 = a2 = a, c1 = c2 = c, η1 = η2 = η, we will have
H1 = H2 = H, L1 = L2 = L, M1 = M2 = M , and N1 = N2 = N . The consumer demand






















The decision on equilibrium wholesale price and service level by each manufacturer can















respectively. Using these expressions, the retail price and demand quantity can be calcu-











[bpη(E + F )
A−B
























In this case, pMS − wMS = QMS
bp








The manufacturer’s profit can be calculated as
ΠMSM = (w































The equilibrium retail price can be also be simplified as shown below
pRS =
H +K + 2ηbp
2bp(H +K + ηbp)
a+
H +K
2(H +K + ηbp)
c.




2(H +K + ηbp)
a+
2(H +K) + ηbp




2(H +K + ηbp)
[a− bpc].
Demand quantity can be calculated to be
QRS =
η(bp + θp)
2(H +K + ηbp)
[a− bpc].
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The manufacturer margin, wRS − c, can be derived to be η
2(H+K+ηbp)
[a − bpc]. Thus, the
manufacturer’s profit can be calculated to be
ΠRSM = (w




η(η(bp + θp) +H)
8(H +K + ηbp)2
[a− bpc]2.





2bp(H +K + ηbp)
[a− bpc]2.
Vertical Nash





















To obtain the equilibrium solution, the three equations above are solved simultaneously.
The equilibrium retail price can be calculated to be
pV N =
[ H +K + ηbp + bs(bs + θs)




2(H +K) + ηbp + bs(bs + θs)
]
c.
The equilibrium wholesale price and service level are
wV N =
[ η
2(H +K) + ηbp + bs(bs + θs)
]
a+
[ 2(H +K) + bs(bs + θs)





2(H +K) + ηbp + bs(bs + θs)
(a− bpc).
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The consumer demand can be derived to be
QV N = a− bppV N + bssV N
=
η(bs + θs)
2(H +K) + ηbp + bs(bs + θs)
(a− bpc).
The manufacturer profit margin, wV N − c is
wV N − c = η
2(H +K) + ηbp + bs(bs + θs)
(a− bpc).
Thus, the manufacturer profit can be calculated to be
ΠV NM =
η[η(bs + θs) +H]
2[2(H +K) + ηbp + bs(bs + θs)]
(a− bpc)2.
Using the above equations for equilibrium retail price, wholesale price and consumer de-







[ η(bp + θp)





A.5 Proof to Corollary 3.1







sV N > sRS.





















From the definition given in Chapter 3, we have
H −K = 2η(2bp + θp) + (bs + θs)2 +
θs(bs + θs)(bp + 2θp − bs)
(bp + 2θp)




























Therefore, sMS < sRS < sV N . 
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A.6 Proof to Corollary 3.2
The case when bs = θs = 0 is trivial and will not be given here. We are focus on the case
when bs, θs > 0. We know that if ηbp > bs(bs + θs), Φ < Ψ. Thus, from the results given in
Theorem 3.1, it follows immediately that
QV N > QRS
ΠV NM < Π
RS
M
To prove that ΠV NR < Π
RS
R , we first note that
X2 > {X − (ηbp − bs(bs + θs))}{X + (ηbp − bs(bs + θs))}
{2η(bp + θp) + ηbp − bs(bs + θs)}2 > {2η(bp + θp)}{2η(bp + θp) + 2ηbp − 2bs(bs + θs)}
{2(H +K) + ηbp + bs(bs + θs)}2 > {2η(bp + θp)}{2(H +K) + 2ηbp}
1
2(H +K) + 2ηbp
>
2η(bp + θp)





























To show that wV N > wRS, we begin with the assumption that a > bpc and ηbp >
bs(bs + θs). Therefore,
0 <
































0 < wV N − wRS
Therefore, wV N > wRS.
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A.7 Range of Parameters Used in Numerical
Studies
Parameter Range
bp {0.3, 0.5, 0.7, 0.9, 1.1, 1.3, 1.5}
θp {0.3, 0.5, 0.7, 0.9, 1.1, 1.3, 1.5}
bs {0.3, 0.5, 0.7, 0.9, 1.1, 1.3, 1.5}
θs {0.3, 0.5, 0.7, 0.9, 1.1, 1.3, 1.5}
ai {40, 60, 80, 100, 120}
ci {2, 4, 6, 8, 10}
ηi {2, 4, 6, 8, 10}
The range of these parameters are based on related literature such as Tsay and Agrawal
(2000) [90] and Vilcassin et al. (1999) [91] (see Chapter 2 for the review of these papers).
Figure 31 to 37 show how changes in each parameter affect the equilibrium solution.
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Figure 31: Analysis of the supply chain when a1 is changing.
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Figure 32: Analysis of the supply chain when c1 is changing.
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Figure 33: Analysis of the supply chain when η1 is changing.
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Figure 34: Analysis of the supply chain when bp is changing.
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Figure 35: Analysis of the supply chain when θp is changing.
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Figure 36: Analysis of the supply chain when bs is changing.
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Figure 37: Analysis of the supply chain when θs is changing.
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APPENDIX B: APPENDIX FOR
CHAPTER 4





















































l1 − θs2 l2D1,






l1D2 − θs2 l2,


















l2 − θs2 l1D2,
h11 = − bp+θp2 ϕ1(E1 + F1D2) +
θp
2
ϕ2(F1 + E1D1) +
bs+θs
2
m11 − θs2 m21
h12 = − bp+θp2 ϕ1(F2 + E2D2) +
θp
2
ϕ2(E2 + F2D1) +
bs+θs
2
m12 − θs2 m22
h21 = − bp+θp2 ϕ2(F1 + E1D1) +
θp
2
ϕ1(E1 + F1D2) +
bs+θs
2
m21 − θs2 m11
h22 = − bp+θp2 ϕ2(E2 + F2D1) +
θp
2
ϕ1(F2 + E2D2) +
bs+θs
2
m22 − θs2 m12
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B.2 Parameters Specifications for Equation (42)
αi,t = ai,t − γ(pi,t − pj,t) + σ(si,t − sj,t)



























(bs + θs)µjDj − (bp + θp)ϕiDj + θpϕj − θsµi
]
%i = − (bp+θp)ϕi2 φi +
θpϕj
2







+ τi)αi,t + υiαj,t + %i
Λi = ϕiρi + ξiϕi(αi,t +Djαj,t + φi)− ηiµ2j(αi,t +Djαj,t)− ηiµjλj − ξ1c1
ri = ϕi(0.5 + 2τi)− ηiµ2j
Ψi = ϕiυi + ϕi(0.5 + τi)Dj − ηiµ2jDj
δ11 =
β(2−β2r2)(0.5ϕ1+r1)+β3Ψ1Ψ2










(2−β2r1)(2−β2r2)−β4Ψ1Ψ2 , Ω1 = ϕ1%1 + (0.5 + τ1)ϕ1φ1 − η1µ2λ2 − (0.5 + τ1)c1
∆2 =
β3r2Ω1+β(2−β2r1)Ω2
(2−β2r1)(2−β2r2)−β4Ψ1Ψ2 , Ω2 = ϕ2%2 + (0.5 + τ2)ϕ2φ2 − η2µ1λ1 − (0.5 + τ2)c2
ν̂ = ν̂1
2 − ν̂22





B.3 Parameters Specifications for Equation (46)
ψ11 = ν̂(ν̂2ϑ̂3 − ν̂3ϑ̂2), ψ12 = ν̂(ν̂2ϑ̂4 − ν̂4ϑ̂2)
ψ21 = ν̂(ν̂1ϑ̂3 − ν̂3ϑ̂1), ψ22 = ν̂(ν̂1ϑ̂4 − ν̂4ϑ̂1)
ζ11 = −ν̂(θpν̂2 + (bp + θp)ϑ̂2), ζ12 = ν̂((bp + θp)ν̂2 + θpϑ̂2)
ζ21 = ν̂(θpν̂1 + (bp + θp)ϑ̂1), ζ22 = −ν̂((bp + θp)ν̂1 + θpϑ̂1)
Υ1 = ν̂(ν̂2ϑ̂5 + ν̂5ϑ̂2), Υ2 = ν̂(ν̂5ϑ̂1 + ν̂1ϑ̂5)
κ̂1 = t11γα̂1 + t12γα̂2, κ̂2 = ϕ1γα̂1 + ϕ1D2γα̂2
κ̂3 = g11γα̂1 + g12γα̂2, κ̂4 = t21γα̂1 + t22γα̂2
κ̂5 = ϕ2D1γα̂1 + ϕ2γα̂2, κ̂6 = g21γα̂1 + g22γα̂2
µ̂1 = −t11σα̂1 − t12σα̂2, µ̂2 = −ϕ1σα̂1 − ϕ1D2σα̂2
µ̂3 = −g11σα̂1 − g12σα̂2, µ̂4 = −t21σα̂1 − t22σα̂2
µ̂5 = −ϕ2D1σα̂1 − ϕ2σα̂2, µ̂6 = −g21σα̂1 − g22σα̂2
φ̂1 = (βδ11 + 1)a1,t−1 + βδ12a2,t−1 + β∆1, φ̂2 = (βδ22 + 1)a2,t−1 + βδ21a1,t−1 + β∆1
ψ̂1 = g11φ̂1 + g12φ̂2 + j11c1 + j12c2, ψ̂2 = g21φ̂1 + g22φ̂2 + j21c1 + j22c2
ν̂1 = −2(bp + θp) + 2κ̂3(κ̂1 − κ̂2) + 2κ̂6(κ̂4 − κ̂5), ν̂2 = 2θp − 2κ̂3(κ̂1 − κ̂2)− 2κ̂6(κ̂4 − κ̂5)
ν̂3 = (bs + θs) + 2µ̂3(κ̂1 − κ̂2) + 2µ̂6(κ̂4 − κ̂5), ν̂4 = −θs − 2µ̂3(κ̂1 − κ̂2)− 2µ̂6(κ̂4 − κ̂5)
ν̂5 = a1,t + ψ̂1(κ̂1 − κ̂2) + κ̂3τ̂1 + ψ̂2(κ̂4 − κ̂5) + κ̂6τ̂2
ϑ̂1 = 2θp − 2κ̂3(κ̂1 − κ̂2)− 2κ̂6(κ̂4 − κ̂5),
ϑ̂2 = −2(bp + θp) + 2κ̂3(κ̂1 − κ̂2) + 2κ̂6(κ̂4 − κ̂5),
ϑ̂3 = −θs − 2µ̂3(κ̂1 − κ̂2)− 2µ̂6(κ̂4 − κ̂5),
ϑ̂4 = (bs + θs) + 2µ̂3(κ̂1 − κ̂2) + 2µ̂6(κ̂4 − κ̂5),
ϑ̂5 = a2,t − ψ̂1(κ̂1 − κ̂2)− κ̂3τ̂1 − ψ̂2(κ̂4 − κ̂5)− κ̂6τ̂2
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ν̃51 = (δ̃51α̃1 − δ̃1α̃51)(β̃2α̃1 − β̃1α̃2)− (δ̃2α̃1 − δ̃1α̃2)(β̃51α̃1 − β̃1α̃51)
ν̃52 = (δ̃52α̃1 − δ̃1α̃52)(β̃2α̃1 − β̃1α̃2)− (δ̃2α̃1 − δ̃1α̃2)(β̃52α̃1 − β̃1α̃52)
ν̃53 = (δ̃53α̃1 − δ̃1α̃53)(β̃2α̃1 − β̃1α̃2)− (δ̃2α̃1 − δ̃1α̃2)(β̃53α̃1 − β̃1α̃53)
ν̃54 = (δ̃54α̃1 − δ̃1α̃54)(β̃2α̃1 − β̃1α̃2)− (δ̃2α̃1 − δ̃1α̃2)(β̃54α̃1 − β̃1α̃54)
φ̃51 = (γ̃51α̃1 − γ̃1α̃51)(β̃2α̃1 − β̃1α̃2)− (γ̃2α̃1 − γ̃1α̃2)(β̃51α̃1 − β̃1α̃51)
φ̃52 = (γ̃52α̃1 − γ̃1α̃52)(β̃2α̃1 − β̃1α̃2)− (γ̃2α̃1 − γ̃1α̃2)(β̃52α̃1 − β̃1α̃52)
φ̃53 = (γ̃53α̃1 − γ̃1α̃53)(β̃2α̃1 − β̃1α̃2)− (γ̃2α̃1 − γ̃1α̃2)(β̃53α̃1 − β̃1α̃53)
φ̃54 = (γ̃54α̃1 − γ̃1α̃54)(β̃2α̃1 − β̃1α̃2)− (γ̃2α̃1 − γ̃1α̃2)(β̃54α̃1 − β̃1α̃54)
ξ̃51 = (δ̃51α̃4 − δ̃4α̃51)(β̃2α̃4 − β̃4α̃2)− (δ̃2α̃4 − δ̃4α̃2)(β̃51α̃4 − β̃4α̃51)
ξ̃52 = (δ̃52α̃4 − δ̃4α̃52)(β̃2α̃4 − β̃4α̃2)− (δ̃2α̃4 − δ̃4α̃2)(β̃52α̃4 − β̃4α̃52)
ξ̃53 = (δ̃53α̃4 − δ̃4α̃53)(β̃2α̃4 − β̃4α̃2)− (δ̃2α̃4 − δ̃4α̃2)(β̃53α̃4 − β̃4α̃53)
ξ̃54 = (δ̃54α̃4 − δ̃4α̃54)(β̃2α̃4 − β̃4α̃2)− (δ̃2α̃4 − δ̃4α̃2)(β̃54α̃4 − β̃4α̃54)
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ϕ̃51 = (γ̃51α̃4 − γ̃4α̃51)(β̃2α̃4 − β̃4α̃2)− (γ̃2α̃4 − γ̃4α̃2)(β̃51α̃4 − β̃4α̃51)
ϕ̃52 = (γ̃52α̃4 − γ̃4α̃52)(β̃2α̃4 − β̃4α̃2)− (γ̃2α̃4 − γ̃4α̃2)(β̃52α̃4 − β̃4α̃52)
ϕ̃53 = (γ̃53α̃4 − γ̃4α̃53)(β̃2α̃4 − β̃4α̃2)− (γ̃2α̃4 − γ̃4α̃2)(β̃53α̃4 − β̃4α̃53)
ϕ̃54 = (γ̃54α̃4 − γ̃4α̃54)(β̃2α̃4 − β̃4α̃2)− (γ̃2α̃4 − γ̃4α̃2)(β̃54α̃4 − β̃4α̃54)
λ̃51 = (δ̃51α̃1 − δ̃1α̃51)(β̃4α̃1 − β̃1α̃4)− (δ̃4α̃1 − δ̃1α̃4)(β̃51α̃1 − β̃1α̃51)
λ̃52 = (δ̃52α̃1 − δ̃1α̃52)(β̃4α̃1 − β̃1α̃4)− (δ̃4α̃1 − δ̃1α̃4)(β̃52α̃1 − β̃1α̃52)
λ̃53 = (δ̃53α̃1 − δ̃1α̃53)(β̃4α̃1 − β̃1α̃4)− (δ̃4α̃1 − δ̃1α̃4)(β̃53α̃1 − β̃1α̃53)
λ̃54 = (δ̃54α̃1 − δ̃1α̃54)(β̃4α̃1 − β̃1α̃4)− (δ̃4α̃1 − δ̃1α̃4)(β̃54α̃1 − β̃1α̃54)
θ̃51 = (γ̃51α̃1 − γ̃1α̃51)(β̃4α̃1 − β̃1α̃4)− (γ̃4α̃1 − γ̃1α̃4)(β̃51α̃1 − β̃1α̃51)
θ̃52 = (γ̃52α̃1 − γ̃1α̃52)(β̃4α̃1 − β̃1α̃4)− (γ̃4α̃1 − γ̃1α̃4)(β̃52α̃1 − β̃1α̃52)
θ̃53 = (γ̃53α̃1 − γ̃1α̃53)(β̃4α̃1 − β̃1α̃4)− (γ̃4α̃1 − γ̃1α̃4)(β̃53α̃1 − β̃1α̃53)
θ̃54 = (γ̃54α̃1 − γ̃1α̃54)(β̃4α̃1 − β̃1α̃4)− (γ̃4α̃1 − γ̃1α̃4)(β̃54α̃1 − β̃1α̃54)
ρ̃1 = (δ̃4α̃1 − δ̃1α̃4)(β̃2α̃1 − β̃1α̃2)− (δ̃2α̃1 − δ̃1α̃2)(β̃4α̃1 − β̃1α̃4)
ρ̃2 = (γ̃3α̃1 − γ̃1α̃3)(β̃2α̃1 − β̃1α̃2)− (γ̃2α̃1 − γ̃1α̃2)(β̃3α̃1 − β̃1α̃3)
ρ̃3 = (δ̃3α̃1 − δ̃1α̃3)(β̃2α̃1 − β̃1α̃2)− (δ̃2α̃1 − δ̃1α̃2)(β̃3α̃1 − β̃1α̃3)
ρ̃4 = (γ̃4α̃1 − γ̃1α̃4)(β̃2α̃1 − β̃1α̃2)− (γ̃2α̃1 − γ̃1α̃2)(β̃4α̃1 − β̃1α̃4)
ρ̃5 = (δ̃3α̃1 − δ̃1α̃3)(β̃4α̃1 − β̃1α̃4)− (δ̃4α̃1 − δ̃1α̃4)(β̃3α̃1 − β̃1α̃3)
ρ̃6 = (γ̃2α̃1 − γ̃1α̃2)(β̃4α̃1 − β̃1α̃4)− (γ̃4α̃1 − γ̃1α̃4)(β̃2α̃1 − β̃1α̃2)
ρ̃7 = (δ̃2α̃1 − δ̃1α̃2)(β̃4α̃1 − β̃1α̃4)− (δ̃4α̃1 − δ̃1α̃4)(β̃2α̃1 − β̃1α̃2)
ρ̃8 = (γ̃3α̃1 − γ̃1α̃3)(β̃4α̃1 − β̃1α̃4)− (γ̃4α̃1 − γ̃1α̃4)(β̃3α̃1 − β̃1α̃3)
ρ̃9 = (δ̃3α̃4 − δ̃4α̃3)(β̃2α̃4 − β̃4α̃2)− (δ̃2α̃4 − δ̃4α̃2)(β̃3α̃4 − β̃4α̃3)
ρ̃10 = (γ̃1α̃4 − γ̃4α̃1)(β̃2α̃4 − β̃4α̃2)− (γ̃2α̃4 − γ̃4α̃2)(β̃1α̃4 − β̃4α̃1)
ρ̃11 = (δ̃1α̃4 − δ̃4α̃1)(β̃2α̃4 − β̃4α̃2)− (δ̃2α̃4 − δ̃4α̃2)(β̃1α̃4 − β̃4α̃1)
ρ̃12 = (γ̃3α̃4 − γ̃4α̃3)(β̃4α̃4 − β̃4α̃2)− (γ̃2α̃4 − γ̃4α̃2)(β̃3α̃4 − β̃4α̃3)
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α̃1 = η̃11 + κ̃11τ̃11 + ψ̃11[µ̃11 − (κ̃11/4η1)(bs + θs)2]− 2(δ12 − δ11)2(γϑ̃1 − σ)γ%̃1
α̃2 = η̃12 + κ̃11τ̃12 + ψ̃12[µ̃11 − (κ̃11/4η1)(bs + θs)2]− 2(δ12 − δ11)2(γϑ̃2 − σ)γ%̃1
α̃3 = 2π̃11 + κ̃11µ̃11 + κ̃11[µ̃11 − (κ̃11/4η1)(bs + θs)2]− 2(δ12 − δ11)2γ2%̃12
α̃4 = π̃12 + κ̃11µ̃12 + κ̃12[µ̃11 − (κ̃11/4η1)(bs + θs)2]− 2(δ12 − δ11)2γ2%̃1%̃2
α̃51 = υ̃11 + κ̃11σ̂11 + α̂11[µ̃11 − (κ̃11/4η1)(bs + θs)2]
α̃52 = υ̃12 + κ̃11σ̂12 + α̂12[µ̃11 − (κ̃11/4η1)(bs + θs)2]
α̃53 = ω̃11 − π̂11 + κ̃11θ̂11 + (ω̂11 − 1)[µ̃11 − (κ̃11/4η1)(bs + θs)2]
α̃54 = ω̃12 + κ̃11θ̂12 + ω̂12[µ̃11 − (κ̃11/4η1)(bs + θs)2]
β̃1 = −η1 + ψ̃11τ̃11 + ψ̃11[τ̃11 − (ψ̃11/4η1)(bs + θs)2]− 2(δ12 − δ11)2(γϑ̃1 − σ)2
β̃2 = ψ̃11τ̃12 + ψ̃12[τ̃11 − (ψ̃11/4η1)(bs + θs)2]− 2(δ12 − δ11)2(γϑ̃1 − σ)(γϑ̃2 − σ)
β̃3 = η̃11 + ψ̃11µ̃11 + κ̃11[τ̃11 − (ψ̃11/4η1)(bs + θs)2]− 2(δ12 − δ11)2(γϑ̃1 − σ)γ%̃1
β̃4 = ψ̃11µ̃12 + κ̃12[τ̃11 − (ψ̃11/4η1)(bs + θs)2]− 2(δ12 − δ11)2(γϑ̃1 − σ)γ%̃2
β̃51 = ψ̃11σ̂11 + α̂11[τ̃11− (ψ̃11/4η1)(bs + θs)2]
β̃52 = ψ̃11σ̂12 + α̂12[τ̃11 − (ψ̃11/4η1)(bs + θs)2]
β̃53 = −η̂11 + ψ̃11θ̂11 + (ω̂11 − 1)[τ̃11 − (ψ̃11/4η1)(bs + θs)2]
β̃54 = ψ̃11θ̂12 + ω̂12[τ̃11 − (ψ̃11/4η1)(bs + θs)2]
γ̃1 = η̃21 + κ̃22τ̃21 + ψ̃21[µ̃22 − (κ̃22/4η2)(bs + θs)2]− 2(δ22 − δ21)2(γϑ̃1 − σ)γ%̃2
γ̃2 = η̃22 + κ̃22τ̃22 + ψ̃22[µ̃22 − (κ̃22/4η2)(bs + θs)2]− 2(δ22 − δ21)2(γϑ̃2 − σ)γ%̃2
γ̃3 = π̃21 + κ̃22µ̃21 + κ̃21[µ̃22 − (κ̃22/4η2)(bs + θs)2]− 2(δ22 − δ21)2γ2%̃1%̃2
γ̃4 = 2π̃22 + κ̃22µ̃22 + κ̃22[µ̃22 − (κ̃22/4η2)(bs + θs)2]− 2(δ22 − δ21)2γ2%̃22
γ̃51 = υ̃21 + κ̃22σ̂21 + α̂21[µ̃22 − (κ̃22/4η2)(bs + θs)2]
γ̃52 = υ̃22 + κ̃22σ̂22 + α̂22[µ̃22 − (κ̃22/4η2)(bs + θs)2]
γ̃53 = ω̃21 + κ̃22θ̂21 + ω̂21[µ̃22 − (κ̃22/4η2)(bs + θs)2]
γ̃54 = ω̃22 − π̂22 + κ̃22θ̂22 + (ω̂22 − 1)[µ̃22 − (κ̃22/4η2)(bs + θs)2]
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δ̃1 = ψ̃22τ̃21 + ψ̃21[τ̃22 − (κ̃22/4η2)(bs + θs)2]− 2(δ22 − δ21)2(γϑ̃1 − σ)(γϑ̃2 − σ)
δ̃2 = −η1 + ψ̃22τ̃22 + ψ̃22[τ̃22 − (κ̃22/4η2)(bs + θs)2]− 2(δ22 − δ21)2(γϑ̃2 − σ)2
δ̃3 = ψ̃22µ̃21 + κ̃21[τ̃22 − (κ̃22/4η2)(bs + θs)2]− 2(δ22 − δ21)2(γϑ̃2 + σ)γ%̃1
δ̃4 = η̃22 + ψ̃22µ̃22 + κ̃22[τ̃22 − (κ̃22/4η2)(bs + θs)2]− 2(δ22 − δ21)2(γϑ̃2 + σ)γ%̃2
δ̃51 = ψ̃22σ̂21 + α̂21[τ̃22− (ψ̃22/4η2)(bs + θs)2]
δ̃52 = ψ̃22σ̂22 + α̂22[τ̃22 − (ψ̃22/4η2)(bs + θs)2]
δ̃53 = ψ̃22θ̂21 + ω̂21[τ̃22 − (ψ̃22/4η2)(bs + θs)2]
δ̃54 = −η̂22 + ψ̃22θ̂22 + (ω̂22 − 1)[τ̃22 − (ψ̃22/4η2)(bs + θs)2]
η̃11 = −(bp + θp)ν̂(ϑ̂3ν̂2 − ϑ̂2ν̂3)− θpν̂(ϑ̂3ν̂1 − ϑ̂1ν̂3) + (bs + θs)
η̃12 = −(bp + θp)ν̂(ϑ̂4ν̂2 − ϑ̂2ν̂4)− θpν̂(ϑ̂4ν̂1 − ϑ̂1ν̂4)− θs
η̃21 = θpν̂(ϑ̂3ν̂2 − ϑ̂2ν̂3) + (bp + θp)ν̂(ϑ̂3ν̂1 − ϑ̂1ν̂3)− θs
η̃22 = θpν̂(ϑ̂4ν̂2 − ϑ̂2ν̂4) + (bp + θp)ν̂(ϑ̂4ν̂1 − ϑ̂1ν̂4) + (bs + θs)
π̃11 = (bp + θp)ν̂(θpν̂2 + ϑ̂2(bp + θp)) + θpν̂(θpν̂1 + ϑ̂1(bp + θp))
π̃12 = −(bp + θp)ν̂((bp + θp)ν̂2 + ϑ̂2θp)− θpν̂((bp + θp)ν̂1 + ϑ̂1θp)
π̃21 = −θpν̂(θpν̂2 + ϑ̂2(bp + θp))− (bp + θp)ν̂(θpν̂1 + ϑ̂1(bp + θp))
π̃22 = θpν̂((bp + θp)ν̂2 + ϑ̂2θp) + (bp + θp)ν̂((bp + θp)ν̂1 + ϑ̂1θp)
χ̃11 = ϕ1γ(α̂1 +D2α̂2) = −χ̃12
χ̃21 = ϕ2γ(D1α̂1 + α̂2) = −χ̃22
$̃11 = ϕ1σ(α̂1 +D2α̂2) = −$̃12
$̃21 = ϕ2σ(D1α̂1 + α̂2) = −$̃22
ψ̃11 = χ̃11ν̂(ϑ̂3ν̂2 − ϑ̂2ν̂3)− χ̃12ν̂(ϑ̂3ν̂1 − ϑ̂1ν̂3) + $̃11
ψ̃12 = χ̃11ν̂(ϑ̂4ν̂2 − ϑ̂2ν̂4)− χ̃12ν̂(ϑ̂4ν̂1 − ϑ̂1ν̂4) + $̃12
ψ̃21 = χ̃21ν̂(ϑ̂3ν̂2 − ϑ̂2ν̂3)− χ̃22ν̂(ϑ̂3ν̂1 − ϑ̂1ν̂3) + $̃21
ψ̃22 = χ̃21ν̂(ϑ̂4ν̂2 − ϑ̂2ν̂4)− χ̃22ν̂(ϑ̂4ν̂1 − ϑ̂1ν̂4) + $̃22
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κ̃11 = −χ̃11ν̂(θpν̂2 + ϑ̂2(bp + θp)) + χ̃12ν̂(θpν̂1 + ϑ̂1(bp + θp))
κ̃12 = χ̃11ν̂((bp + θp)ν̂2 + ϑ̂2θp)− χ̃12ν̂((bp + θp)ν̂1 + ϑ̂1θp)
κ̃21 = −χ̃21ν̂(θpν̂2 + ϑ̂2(bp + θp))− χ̃22ν̂(θpν̂1 + ϑ̂1(bp + θp))
κ̃22 = χ̃21ν̂((bp + θp)ν̂2 + ϑ̂2θp) + χ̃22ν̂((bp + θp)ν̂1 + ϑ̂1θp)
τ̃11 = κ̂3ν̂(ϑ̂3ν̂2 − ϑ̂2ν̂3) + κ̂3ν̂(ϑ̂3ν̂1 − ϑ̂1ν̂3) + µ̂3
τ̃12 = κ̂3ν̂(ϑ̂4ν̂2 − ϑ̂2ν̂4) + κ̂3ν̂(ϑ̂4ν̂1 − ϑ̂1ν̂4)− µ̂3
τ̃21 = κ̂6ν̂(ϑ̂3ν̂2 − ϑ̂2ν̂3) + κ̂6ν̂(ϑ̂3ν̂1 − ϑ̂1ν̂3) + µ̂6
τ̃22 = κ̂6ν̂(ϑ̂4ν̂2 − ϑ̂2ν̂4) + κ̂6ν̂(ϑ̂4ν̂1 − ϑ̂1ν̂4)− µ̂6
µ̃11 = −κ̂3ν̂(θpν̂2 + ϑ̂2(bp + θp)) + κ̂3ν̂(θpν̂1 + ϑ̂1(bp + θp))
µ̃12 = κ̂3ν̂((bp + θp)ν̂2 + ϑ̂2θp)− κ̂3ν̂((bp + θp)ν̂1 + ϑ̂1θp)
µ̃21 = −κ̂6ν̂(θpν̂2 + ϑ̂2(bp + θp))− κ̂6ν̂(θpν̂1 + ϑ̂1(bp + θp))
µ̃22 = κ̂6ν̂((bp + θp)ν̂2 + ϑ̂2θp) + κ̂6ν̂((bp + θp)ν̂1 + ϑ̂1θp)
ϑ̃1 = 2bpν̂(ν̂3 − ϑ̂3), ϑ̃2 = 2bpν̂(ν̂4 − ϑ̂4)
ϑ̃3 = 2bpν̂(ν̂5 − ϑ̂5), %̃1 = −%̃2 = 2bpν̂(bp + 2θp)
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B.5 Proof to Theorem 4.2
The system given in Equation 59 is
Φ(t) = MΦ(t− 1). (121)
Let P be the modal matrix of M. That is, P is the 4x4 matrix whose 4 columns are the
eigenvectors of M. For a given Φ(t), we define a vector z(t) by
Φ(t) = Pz(t). (122)
This transformation follows from the fact that any vector Φ(t) can be written as a linear
combination of its eigenvectors. That is Φ(t) can be expressed as
Φ(t) = z1(t)e1 + z2(t)e2 + z3(t)e3 + z4(t)e4. (123)
where zi(t), i ∈ 1, 2, 3, 4 are scalars. Using the fact that Mei = λiei (where λi is an
eigenvalue of M), multiplying the equation above by matrix M yields
Φ(t + 1) = MΦ(t) (124)
= λ1z1(t)e1 + λ2z2(t)e2 + λ3z3(t)e3 + λ4z4(t)e4. (125)
In this new transformation, the original system in Equation 59 can be represented as
Pz(t + 1) = MPz(t). (126)
or, equivalently,
z(t + 1) = P−1MPz(t). (127)
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This defines a new system that is related to the original system by a change of variable.
The new system matrix P−1MP is equal to Λ, where Λ is the diagonal matrix with the








λ1 0 0 0
0 λ2 0 0
0 0 λ3 0









which explicitly displays the diagonal form obtained by the change of variable.
The state-transition matrix of a constant coefficient discrete-time system at period k is
Mk. The system matrix can be calculated by first converting M to diagonal form as
M = PΛP−1. (129)
which provides a representation of M in terms of its eigenvalues and eigenvectors. It then
follows that for any k ≥ 0
Mk = PΛkP−1. (130)
Therefore, calculation of Mk is transferred to the calculation of Λk. Since Λ is diagonal,
one finds immediately that
Λk =

λk1 0 0 0
0 λk2 0 0
0 0 λk3 0




One can see immediately that if the magnitude of dominant eigenvalue is less than 1 (i.e.,
|λi| < 1 for all i), as k increases, Λk tends toward zero. This corresponds to the system
converging over time. On the other hand, if there is at least one eigenvalue with magnitude
greater than one (|λj| > 1 for some j), the system of market bases evolution will increases
geometrically towards infinity. This corresponds to a divergent system.
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B.6 Proof to Theorem 4.3
Let λ be the dominant eigenvalue of a discrete time system. It is possible to express λ in
the form
λ = reiθ = r(cos θ + i sin θ). (132)
The characteristic response due to this eigenvalue is
λk = rkeikθ = rk(cos kθ + i sin kθ). (133)
The coefficient that multiplies the associated eigenvector varies according to this charac-
teristic pattern. From the above equation, one can see that if λ is real and positive, the
response pattern is the geometric sequence rk, which increases if r > 1 and decreases if
r < 1. No oscillation will occur with positive eigenvalue since rk remains positive for any
k. However, if λ is negative, the response will be an alternating geometric sequence since
rk switches sign for every step.
If λ is complex, it will appear with its complex conjugate. The real response due to
both eigenvalues is of the form rk(A cos kθ+ iB sin kθ). If θ 6= 0, the expression within the
parentheses will change sign a k changes. However, the exact pattern of variation will not
be perfectly regular. In our problem, we assume that λ is not complex. Therefore, this
irregular oscillation case is excluded from our analysis.
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B.7 Range of Parameters Used in Numerical
Studies
Parameter Range
bp {0.3, 0.5, 0.7, 0.9, 1.1, 1.3, 1.5}
θp {0.3, 0.5, 0.7, 0.9, 1.1, 1.3, 1.5}
bs {0.3, 0.5, 0.7, 0.9, 1.1, 1.3, 1.5}
θs {0.3, 0.5, 0.7, 0.9, 1.1, 1.3, 1.5}
ai {40, 60, 80, 100, 120}
ci {2, 4, 6, 8, 10}
ηi {2, 4, 6, 8, 10}
γ {0.5, 1.0, 1.5, 2.0, 2.5, 3.0, 3.5, 4.0}
σ {0.5, 1.0, 1.5, 2.0, 2.5, 3.0, 3.5, 4.0}
β {0.5, 1.0, 1.5, 2.0, 2.5, 3.0, 3.5, 4.0}
The range of these parameters are based on related literature such as Tsay and Agrawal
(2000) [90] and Vilcassin et al. (1999) [91] (see Chapter 2 for the review of these papers).
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APPENDIX C: APPENDIX FOR
CHAPTER 5
C.1 Proof to Lemma 5.1







pi[µi(p1, p2) + xi]fi(xi)dxi + giΘi(zi) +
∫ Bi
zi
pi[µi(p1, p2) + zi]














−giΘi(zi)− biΘi(zi)− wi[µi(p1, p2) + zi]
= piµi(p1, p2)− piΘi(zi) + giΘi(zi)− biΘi(zi)− wiµi(p1, p2)− wizi
= (pi − wi)µi(p1, p2) + giΘi(zi)− (pi + bi)Θi(zi)− wizi
Now, the last term, −wizi, can be expressed as:











= −wiΘi(zi) + wiΘi(zi)
Therefore, for each i in (87)
E[Πi(z,p)] = (pi − wi)µi(p1, p2)− (wi − gi)Θi(zi)− (pi + bi − wi)Θi(zi)

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C.2 Proof to Proposition 5.1
To solve for p1 and p2 in terms of z1 and z2, we set the first order derivatives in (92) and
(93) to zero:
0 = a1 − 2(bp + θp)p1 + 2θpp2 + (bp + θp)w1 − θpw2 −Θ1(z1)
= ξ1 − 2(bp + θp)p1 + 2θpp2 −Θ1(z1)
p1
∗(p2) =
ξ1 + 2θpp2 −Θ1(z1)
2(bp + θp)
where ξi = ai + (bp + θp)wi − θpwj. Set (93) to zero and substitute the above expression of
p1
∗ into it.
0 = a2 − 2(bp + θp)p2 + 2θpp1 + (bp + θp)w2 − θpw1 −Θ2(z2)
= ξ2 − 2(bp + θp)p2 −Θ2(z2) +
2θp
[






p2 = θp(ξ1 −Θ1(z1)) + (bp + θp)(ξ2 −Θ2(z2))
p2
∗ =
θp(ξ1 −Θ1(z1)) + (bp + θp)(ξ2 −Θ2(z2))
2[(bp + θp)2 − θ2p]
Substituting the expression of p2











With some algebra rearrangement, we finally get
p1
∗ =
(bp + θp)(ξ1 −Θ1(z1)) + θp(ξ2 −Θ2(z2))
2[(bp + θp)2 − θ2p]

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C.3 Proof to Proposition 5.2
The proof provided here is a more generalized version of the one given in Petruzzi and
Dada (1999)[68]. In their work, they assume that the newsvendor carries only one item.
Our model assume that the newsvendor carries two competitive products with a demand
function defined differently from the one assumed in their work. To prove proposition 5.2,





(bp + θp)(ξ1 −Θ1(z1)) + θp(ξ2 −Θ2(z2))
2[(bp + θp)2 − θ2p]
+ b1 − g1
}
(1− F1(z1))






θp(ξ1 −Θ1(z1)) + (bp + θp)(ξ2 −Θ2(z2))
2[(bp + θp)2 − θ2p]
+ b2 − g2
}
(1− F2(z2))
−(w2 − g2) (136)
We need to find the values of z1 and z2 such that the first order optimality conditions
above are satisfied. If we let Γi(z) =
∂E[Π(z,p(z))]
∂zi
, we then need to find the zeros of Γi(z).







From (137), you can see that dΓi(z)
dzj
is monotone and non-negative with its value equal zero
when z1 = B1 or z2 = B2. Therefore, there exists only one value of zj for each value of zi





(bp + θp)ξi + θpξj + 2(bi − gi)[(bp + θp)2 − θ2p]
2[(bp + θp)2 − θ2p]
(−fi(zi))
185
− (bp + θp)Θi(zi)
2[(bp + θp)2 − θ2p]
(−fi(zi)) +
(bp + θp)(1− Fi(zi))2
2[(bp + θp)2 − θ2p]
− θpΘj(zj)






2[(bp + θp)2 − θ2p]
{
(bp + θp)ξi + θpξj + 2(bi − gi)[(bp + θp)2 − θ2p]
−(bp + θp)Θi(zi)− θpΘj(zj)−











2[(bp + θp)2 − θ2p]
{



























= − (bp + θp)fi(zi)
2[(bp + θp)2 − θ2p](φi(zi))2
∗{




= −(bp + θp)fi(zi)(1− Fi(zi))








Therefore, if Fi(.) is a distribution satisfying the condition 2(φi(zi))
2 + dφi(zi)
dzi
> 0, it follows
that Γi(z) is either monotone or unimodal in zi. In either case, it implies that Γi(z) =
∂E[Π(z,p(z))]
∂zi
has at most two roots. Furthermore, we can see that Γ1(B1, .) = −(w1−g1) < 0
and Γ2(., B2) = −(w2 − g2) < 0. Therefore, if Γi(z) has only one root, there is a change
of sign for Γi(z) from positive to negative. This corresponds to a local maximum for
E[Π(z,p(z))]. On the other hand, if it has two roots, the larger of the two corresponds to a
local maximum and the smaller of the two corresponds to a local minimum of E[Π(z,p(z))].
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In either case, E[Π(z,p(z))] has only one local maximum, identified either as the unique
value of z1 and z2 that satisfy Γi(z) = 0 for i = 1, 2, or as the largest value of zi that
satisfies Γi(z) = 0 for i = 1, 2.
Now, since E[Π(z,p(z))] is unimodal if Γi(z) has only one root for i = 1, 2, a sufficient
condition for unimodality of E[Π(z,p(z))] is Γ1(A1, .) > 0 and Γ2(., A2) > 0 or, equiva-
lently, 2[(bp + θp)
2 − θ2p]Γ1(A1, z2) > 0 and 2[(bp + θp)2 − θ2p]Γ2(z1, A2) > 0. For example,
Γ1(A1, z2) =
{
(bp + θp)(ξ1 −Θ1(A1)) + θp(ξ2 −Θ2(z2))
2[(bp + θp)2 − θ2p]




Using the fact that F (Ai) = 0, we get the following:
2[(bp + θp)
2 − θ2p]Γ1(A1, z2) = (bp + θp)(ξ1 −Θ1(A1)) + θp(ξ2 −Θ2(z2))
+2[(bp + θp)
2 − θ2p](b1 − g1)− 2[(bp + θp)2 − θ2p](w1 − g1)
= (bp + θp)(ξ1 −Θ1(A1)) + θp(ξ2 −Θ2(z2))
+2[(bp + θp)
2 − θ2p](b1 − w1)
= (bp + θp)(ξ1 + A1) + θp(ξ2 −Θ2(z2))
+2bp(bp + 2θp)(b1 − w1)
where Θ1(A1) = µε − A1 = −A1. The same demonstration can be done to prove the
condition 2[(bp + θp)
2 − θ2p]Γ2(z1, A2) > 0.
Now, assuming that the condition (iii) in the Proposition 5.2 is satisfied, the optimal z1
and z2 can be found by substituting the value of pi
∗ given in Proposition 5.1 into (90), (91)
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(This gives the same results as re-optimizing E[Π(z,p(z))]. We then get the following:
(w1 − g1) =
{
(bp + θp)(ξ1 −Θ1(z1)) + θp(ξ2 −Θ2(z2))
2[(bp + θp)2 − θ2p]




(w2 − g2) =
{
θp(ξ1 −Θ1(z1)) + (bp + θp)(ξ2 −Θ2(z2))
2[(bp + θp)2 − θ2p]
+ b2 − g2
}
(1− F2(z2))
Since we assume that condition (iii) of Proposition 5.2 is satisfied, there is one unique
solution (z1
∗, z2
∗) in the space [A1, B1]× [A2, B2], which can be expressed as a function of
ξ1 and ξ2. It is now straightforward to find the values of z1 and z2 such that the first order
optimality conditions above are satisfied.

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C.5 Proof to Lemma (5.2)





Since demand is uniformly distributed, therefore Fi(zi) =
zi+Bi
2Bi
and 1− Fi(zi) = Bi−zi2Bi .
From condition (iv) in Proposition 5.2, we have
(wi − gi) =
{
(bp + θp)(ξi −Θi(zi)) + θp(ξj −Θj(zj))
2[(bp + θp)2 − θ2p]
+ bi − gi
}
(1− Fi(zi)).
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